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ABSTRACT
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Kattalina Berriochoa, B.A., The University of Montana
MPA, Boise State University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston
Directed by Professor Christian Weller

Rural places are changing in unique ways compared to urban and suburban areas. Rural residents disproportionately experience geographic isolation, tax base loss, decreasing populations, and economies challenged by industrial shifts and declines. This leaves rural areas with
increasing need for public investment but does not necessarily translate into increased public
demand for these investments. In this work, I analyze the following puzzle: what explains
geographical variation in individual preferences, which often appears contrary to collective interests? Specifically, I analyze variation in investment preferences for public education and
seek to build a better understanding of the underlying dynamics that explain why individuals
across geography (urban versus rural) demand more or less funding for public schools. I contend that, apart from ideological differences compared to urban and suburban residents, unique
and understudied factors are impacting collective decision-making in rural communities with a
direct impact on public provisions. I approach this question through three research projects. In
the first project, I analyze the determinants of tax preferences for public education comparing
individuals who live in urban (metro) areas with those who live in rural (non-metro) areas. I
find that there is a difference in the way that the low-income and middle-income in non-metro
areas prefer education taxes compared to their metro counterparts. I also find that the belief
iv

that local, rural schools are spending more than average reduces tax demand for education, yet
the belief that these schools are performing on average increases this tax demand while this effect is opposite in urban areas. In the second project, I analyze the local calculation that drives
individual preferences for increasing state spending on public education. I find that as county
median income and local unemployment increases, the preference to increase education funding declines, but this does not vary by place. In the third project, I analyze local bond elections
in Texas, with a focus on the urban and rural divide, finding that across all places an increase
in non-white students and county median income are related to an increased probability of
school bond passage. Overall, I find that the urban-rural divide is not a significant way to explain differences in preferences and voter behavior. The findings in this dissertation show that
preference variation is mainly related to local economic conditions, educational attainment,
investment comparisons across jurisdictions, and differences in local beneficiaries.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview
Public education was tremendously impacted by the 2008 financial recession. As a result

of the economic downturn, which increased unemployment and decreased property values, local education revenue collected through property taxes increased and, subsequently, inequality
in school funding rose (Evans et al., 2019). One response to these school funding challenges
was increased reliance on other taxes such as sales, property, and as a secondary course of
action, supplemental bonds or levies. Consider the state of Idaho where supplemental levies
became a fundamental source of financing public education. By the 2015-16 school year,
over ninety districts in the state had passed supplemental levies, totaling $186.6 million in tax
dollars (Richert, 2016). Rural districts were disproportionately affected by these changes in
school funding. The small, rural districts in Idaho, which initially began to receive less funding
around 2006, increased their reliance on supplemental levies, requiring local voter approval for
passage. Among eighteen of these districts, eleven were able to pass an additional 2015 levy,
while seven did not receive sufficient public support for passage (Richert, 2016). Underlying
this example lies the impetus for this research.
Public schools remain a fundamental resource in communities throughout the US. However, in many cases, the public does not support an additional tax for their local public schools–
particularly, in rural, small communities. This would appear counter-intuitive as improved public education is seemingly a form of mitigating economic downturns as well as a fundamental
resource for the local community. This led to the following question: why is it that some communities, in particular small, rural communities, do not pass necessary supplemental funding
1

for their local schools? Is there something unique underlying the rural electorate, compared to
the urban electorate, where supplemental bonds appear to pass more consistently? In my dissertation, I sought to analyze three main research questions. The first is the theoretical rationale
for why a rural place, compared to an urban place, might vote against additional investment in
public goods, specifically public education. The second is to empirically analyze if there is a
fundamental difference in rural and urban places in their preferences for spending and taxes on
public education. The third was to understand if the categories of rural, suburban, and urban (as
well as metro and non-metro) are capturing underlying variation in public outcomes, specifically taxes and spending. Together, I analyze whether or not there is a difference in preferences
across geography, if those differences explains preference variation, and what are the underlying determinants for those differences in preferences. To fully explore preference variation, I
begin by considering the changing state of rural areas in the United States, contrasting these
differences to urban areas

1.2

Understanding Rurality
Rural areas in the United States constitute roughly 72 percent of land, but is home to

only an estimated 17 to 20 percent of the population. ‘Rural’ can mean many things; various
industries, diverse people, and wide-ranging public needs. Yet, rural communities tend to share
experiences when compared to their urban and suburban counterparts. Rural communities are
characterized by a common set of challenges such as deep poverty, minimal job opportunities,
and, compared to urban communities, lagging health care, educational attainment, and housing
options (Browne, 2001; Brown and Swanson, 2004). Indeed, rural communities in the US have
been characterized as “in decline and stagnant” for some time (Sharp and Parisi, 2003, pg. 357).
In 2018, while the overall number of Americans living in distressed regions (a comparative
measure of community economic well-being) declined, it continued to increase in rural zip
codes (Fikri and Lettieri, 2018).
Many rural challenges have remained largely unaddressed for years, and often decades.
National policy has sought to subsidize rural programs through redistributed tax contributions.
2

The Agricultural Adjustment Act, known as the Farm Bill, has shaped policy interventions in
rural areas to approaches tied closely to factors within the agricultural economy. In contrast,
trends toward devolution have shifted responsibility from national and state to local jurisdictions. This can pose serious problems for local governments to adequately fund and administer
policies that effectively meet local needs (Sharp and Parisi, 2003). Cramer (2016) argues that
the concept of rural consciousness is highlighted by a belief the rural places are overlooked by
policy-makers and do not receive their fair share of resources. It could be that a feedback loop
between the demand and supply of resources emerges in rural places, differently than urban
and suburban areas, where inadequate resources impact public preferences and attitudes towards government provided goods. This raises the question of the relationship between public
preferences and the allocation of public resources in rural communities.
Education finance is an essential piece of any local system of public goods. Compared
to urban and suburban schools, rural schools tend to face specific challenges including inferior
achievement, inadequate facilities,a high proportion of minority and low-income students, and
a limited number of residents with advanced degrees (Beaulieu et al., 2003). The disparity
in educational outcomes could be a result of a variety of factors. However, part of the lag in
rural student achievement could be due to unequal school funding. For example, rural schools
experience more financial constraint than urban schools as school funding formulas tend to favor quantities (not rates) of low-income schools and tax bases are weakened through distance,
isolation, and population loss (Tieken, 2014). While per pupil expenditures are higher in rural
areas, there are three main mechanisms that limit rural education systems differently than urban and suburban systems (Tennessee Educational Equity Coalition, 2019). The first is lower
median household income in rural areas, which is directly linked to local property taxes and
subsequently, to a school budget. The second is enrollment-based funding which means that
provided services are limited by low-enrollment numbers or complicated through logistical
factors, such as students spread out across districts. The third is teachers salaries, which tend
to be less competitive compared to urban and suburban schools. Rural areas, where financial
constraints impact educational achievement and opportunity, may inadvertently build public

3

preferences that further constrain adequate funding for schools. Local residents do not see the
justification for increasing funding to public schools. This would appear contrary to need, as
improved education contributes to overall economic development. While these public preferences might be tied to ideological determinants, I primarily explore how these preferences are
potentially linked to local economic and social changes.
The idea that preferences for the amount and the way schools are funded is relevant
because it is directly related to the educational opportunities and outcomes for rural youth and
indirectly, to the overall health of the rural economy. This study will explore if tax preferences
differ between rural, suburban, and urban communities. If this is the case, what contextual
factors define differences based on place and how will these differences apply to current and
potential policy approaches.
This research will further our understanding of the dynamics that drive individual demand for public goods across place. Lobao (2014) argues that economic and structural forces
that impact rural communities present an opportunity for a clear study that considers the causal
links between public action and communal outcomes. The focus on ‘rural’ will build on the literature that analyzes the importance of place in politics and the sense of the rural consciousness
(Cramer, 2016). While Cramer (2016) focuses on explaining the politics of resentment, this
dissertation intends to build on the idea that place matters in how individuals interpret political
issues and how preferences translate into funding policy. Like Cramer (2016), this research
will focus on the unique role that place plays in determining levels of redistribution for public
schools. Following the rationale of Hochschild (1981), place impacts attitudes towards who
gets what– reflecting a sense of fairness. “Geographic boundaries allow us to actually draw
lines between types of people, particularly between the haves and have-nots” (Cramer, 2016,
pg. 315). Furthermore, race and class are deeply intertwined into the politics of place. Thus,
this dissertation will build on these past studies to further our understanding of the interaction
between place, preferences, and policy.

4

1.3

Significance of Study
The idea that rural Americans go against their own interest has been circulating more

frequently in popular discourse in recent years. Most rural areas are experiencing population
decline whereas urban areas are experiencing consistent gains to population (Cromartie, 2016).
Rural communities also experience higher rates of child poverty than that found in urban and
suburban areas (United States Department of Agriculture, 2017). At the same time, rural parts
of the country tend to be more conservative than their urban counterparts (Trubowitz, 2016),
often leading to a higher likelihood of rejecting government interventions to address these
issues.
Walsh (2012) argues that the notion that rural communities ‘go against their own interest’
is not fully explained by individual preferences in rural areas, rather notions for small government exist regardless of place. In the 2008 American National Election Survey (ANES), 34
percent of rural respondents agreed that the free market is better at solving problems [than government], compared to 31 percent of non-rural respondents. Furthermore, Walsh (2012) states
that once we control income, age, race, gender, and party, these differences become statistically
insignificant. This indicates that, while ideology is certainly playing a role in rural attitudes,
there are other factors that are influencing the decision-making of rural communities, where
public services tend to face different challenges than those in urban areas. While it may be
possible that some factors such as ideology so strongly determine individual preferences that
they express preferences that are objectively against their own self-interest, it is also possible
that rural voters rationally express lower preferences for public spending, possibly because
they have fewer abilities to bear the additional taxes associated with the increased spending.
It could also be that rural individuals set their preferences based on economic factors, rather
than social and cultural issues (Bartels, 2006; Ansolabehere et al., 2006). This indicates that
income effects are more influential in setting public preferences (McCarty et al., 2006). The
comparison between rural, suburban, and urban residents furthers our understanding of the role
intervening structural and individual factors play in shaping preferences for public spending.
The obvious question, as stated above, is whether preferences of rural voters are differentially
5

influenced by other factors such as demographic change and economic circumstances.

1.4

Defining ‘Rural’
The term ‘rural’ is not easily defined but rather gives name to a wide array of place

and people. Johnson (2013), for instance, argues that, “rural America is a deceptively simple
term for a remarkably diverse collection of places.” Within the social sciences, there are two
primary approaches towards arriving at a definition of rural (Brown and Schafft, 2011). The
first approach is based on geography or space, arguing that ‘rurality’ is multidimensional and
relates to social, economic, and political factors in the places where people live and work. The
second draws from the social construction tradition, emphasizing the symbols and signs that
people associate with ‘rurality.’ This study will largely draw from the first definition of ‘rural’
as a geographical locality, based on the assumption that this definition best captures the local
economic experience that underlies preference formation.
According to Kusmin (2016), counties that fall into the rural or non-metro classification
constitute roughly 72 percent of landmass with approximately 46.2 million residents. Rural areas are spread out throughout the United States and consist of unique demographic, economic,
and geographical characteristics. While these vary between rural places, the two main characteristics that define rural areas are geographical isolation and low population density. This
study will follow the general trend of social scientists to define rural as locales with populations under 50,000, a determination of metropolitan and non-metropolitan districts (Cromartie
and Bucholtz, 2008). However, the USDA provides further insight into rural areas. According to the Rural-Urban Continuum Codes, non-metropolitan counties are measured by degree
of urbanization and adjacency to a metro area. Counties are assigned to one of nine codes.
Figure1.1 displays these codes across all counties in the United States. Additionally, these
codes can be collapsed into metropolitan and non-metropolitan distinctions. The first three
codes create the metropolitan category. The remaining six codes, including urban and rural,
create the non-metropolitan category. Figure1.2 displays these collapsed codes across all counties in the United States.
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Figure 1.1: US Counties by Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC, 2013)

For this research, counties and school districts will be the main unit of analysis. Practically speaking, these boundaries are stable and historically used to measure locale-based research by the US Census, Economic Research Service of the USDA, and the US Office of
Management and Budget (Johnson, 2013). The following sections will give a brief overview
of the social, political, and economic characteristics that create links between rural locales in
the United States.1
1

All maps in this dissertation utilize the Census Bureau TIGER/Line shapefiles. These files are based on legal
boundaries and draw over some areas, like the Great Lakes, with the counties that have jurisdiction over these
areas. I am using these shapefiles because they accurately represent county coverage. However, arguably they do
not provide the most accurate visual representation of the United States.
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Figure 1.2: US Counties by Metropolitan/Non-Metropolitan Categories
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1.4.1

Population
Population is a key determinant of rural locales. In general, rural American communities

have struggled with population decline, compared to urban and suburban areas. It was only
during the 1970s that non-metropolitan regions experienced population growth exceeding that
of metropolitan areas (Johnson, 2013). It should be noted that this was a period of increasing
natural resource extraction, brought on by the energy crisis, which shifted industry spurring
rural growth (Lobao, 2014). However, general trends in population highlight a decline since
this period. Across rural areas, population loss varies widely, with the most population loss
occurring in the North- and Southeast and the most population growth in the Inland Northwest
(Kusmin, 2016). However, even rural areas that experience population growth continue to lag
behind their urban counterparts.
Population changes in rural locales are mainly characterized as out-migration, the phenomena in which more individuals leave than arrive or are born there (Johnson, 2013). On
average, rural populations tend to be older than populations in other parts of the country (Johnson, 2013). The average age in rural America is 51 years, compared to 45 in urban areas
(United State Census Bureau, 2016). Of these individuals, the percent that lives in the state
of their birth is higher in rural areas (65.4 percent) than in urban areas (48.3 percent) (United
State Census Bureau, 2016). These population trends reflect the migration patterns that are
impacting the demographic makeup of rural America, compared to a growing population in
urban areas. Apart from out-migration patterns, the birth rate is also declining in rural areas
(Cromartie, 2017). Additionally, other contributions to low population trends are mortality
rates which are increasing among working-age adults in rural areas and are intertwined with
prescription medication abuse, especially opioids, and deaths related to heroin use (Cromartie,
2017). Finally, among the older rural population, they continue to experience disadvantages
in terms of available services and experience a higher prevalence of chronic disease, higher
disability rate, and lower prevalence of healthy behaviors (Skoufalos et al., 2017).
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1.4.2

Poverty
The geography of poverty is complicated across the urban and rural divide. The Census

Bureau recommends using the American Community Survey (ACS) over the Current Population Survey (CPS) due to sample size. Using the geographical definitions of metropolitan (city
and suburbs) and non-metropolitan (small towns and rural areas) within the ACS dataset, the
overall rate of poverty is slightly higher in non-metro counties (17.2 percent) than in metro
counties (14.3 percent) (Farrigan et al., 2014). Furthermore, poverty rates vary drastically by
region. According to the ACS data, the highest rates of poverty in non-metropolitan counties
tend to be concentrated in the South. On average, the poverty rate is highest in the South (21.7
percent) and West (17.4 percent), compared to the Northeast (14 percent) and Midwest (14.9)
(Farrigan et al., 2014). In 2018, while the overall number of Americans living in distressed
regions (a composite measure of community economic well-being) declined, it continued to
increase in rural zip codes (Fikri and Lettieri, 2018). After the 2008 recession, job growth and
recovery was much slower in rural areas. Since 2005, rural wages and salaries have continued
to lag those in urban employment sectors (Cromartie, 2017). Since 2007, the median income
in rural areas has averaged 25 percent below the urban median income (Cromartie, 2017).
Two poverty rates impact school-aged children. The first is the poverty rate of children
under the age of 18 and the second is the poverty rate of children under the age of 6. The
rate of poverty under the age of 18 is higher in non-metropolitan areas than in metropolitan
areas. For children aged 6-11, the non-metro poverty rate is 27 percent compared to 22 percent
in metro areas (Farrigan et al., 2014). For children aged 12-17, the non-metro poverty rate
is 24.5 percent compared to 20.2 percent in metro areas (Farrigan et al., 2014). In addition,
children in non-metro areas are disproportionately impacted by deep poverty 2 (Farrigan et al.,
2014). Compared to urban children, deep poverty is higher in non-metropolitan areas by approximately 2 percentage points across all youth categories. The rates of rural child poverty
are consistent for children of all races and ethnic backgrounds compared to their urban coun2

The deep poverty rate is defined as “a child’s family with income less than half (under 0.50) of their poverty
income threshold)” (United States Department of Agriculture, 2017).
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terparts. Only 50 urban counties (4.3 percent of the all urban) compared to 300 rural counties
(15.2 percent of all rural) are considered persistent poor. That is to say, a county with 20 percent or more of their populations living in poverty over approximately 30 years (Cromartie,
2017).
1.4.3

Race
In rural America, most residents are white, non-Hispanic (77.8 percent). Among the non-

white, rural population, 8.2 percent are African-American, 9.3 percent are Hispanic, and 1.9
are Native American (Council, 2012). These groups tend to be highly concentrated in certain
regions and communities, such as the South and Western United States. In the rural west, 99
percent of rural counties have seen growth in minority populations (Pohl, 2017). Due to the
out-migration of young, working-age residents, population loss is common. However, among
growing western rural states, 19 percent are expanding due only to minority population growth
(Pohl, 2017). Effectively, the growth of minority populations are slowing the decline of rural
places in the West. However, the concentration of ethnic groups in rural parts of the country
tend to remain near institutions that subjugated minority groups, such as reservations, colonias, agribusiness, and states with a history of slavery and Jim Crow laws (Rural Sociological
Society, 1993). In fact, persistent-poverty counties are mainly found in the South, comprising
nearly 85 percent of all rural counties and 20 of southern rural counties (Cromartie, 2017). The
presence of rural minorities in relation to historically oppressive institutions indicates the complexity of factors that remain and continue to constrain the development and social mobility of
rural residents.
1.4.4

Education
Approximately one-third of public schools are in rural areas (Kena et al., 2016). Com-

pared to cities, suburbs, and towns, students in rural areas are primarily white (71 percent)
(Kena et al., 2016). In addition, the highest percentage of American Indian and Alaska Native students are located in rural areas and towns, compared to cities and suburbs (Kena et al.,
2016). However, all racial and ethnic minorities in rural areas continue to lag behind white
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counterparts in educational attainment. In 2015, the share of Black (24 percent), American
Indian/Alaska Native (20 percent), and Hispanic or Latino (39 percent) students with less than
a high school diploma continued to outweigh the rates of white (13 percent) students in rural
parts of the country (Marré, 2017).
The percentage of students in rural areas attending high-poverty schools (10 percent) was
lower than the national percentage (20 percent). However, more than half of all rural students
are eligible for free and reduced meal rates in sixteen states (New Mexico, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kentucky, Florida, California, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Oregon, West Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Idaho) (Johnson et al., 2014). The rural high school diploma rate is on average under 81 percent (Johnson et al., 2014). The gap
between non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas increases in terms of college completion;
the percentage of bachelor degrees in rural areas is 19.5 percent compared to urban areas with
29 percent (United State Census Bureau, 2016). Broadly speaking, as rurality increases, the
percentage of rural adults with Bachelor degrees or higher decreases (Cromartie, 2017). Finally, rural educational attainment varies across demographic groups; rural women are more
educated than rural men and rural whites are more educated than racial and ethnic minorities
(Marré, 2017). Nearly four out of five of the counties (79 percent) deemed as “low education”
by the USDA Economic Research Services are rural (Marré, 2017). Low educational attainment in rural places is closely related to higher poverty rates as well as higher unemployment
rates and lower earnings.
1.4.5

Understanding Contemporary Rurality
Each of the outlined components (population, poverty, race, and education) provide some

contextual understanding of the conditions that vary across rural communities. This is essential
for understanding the macro- and micro-level factors that influence rural preferences throughout the US. This is due to two factors that are pertinent to the study of the rural condition,
space and time. The first factor, space, underscores the relationship of rural locales to both
urbanization and globalization. While geographically isolated, rural regions are intrinsically
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connected to the industrial development in other parts of the country and the world. Economic
forces, both nationally and internationally, have restructured work opportunities and educational payouts in rural regions. The second factor– time, highlights the institutional history that
is essential in better understanding rural communities. While it may be simple to paint rural
issues with a broad brush, it is imperative to analyze interplay between individuals and their
communities to further our understanding of rural policy challenges.
The idea behind this dissertation is to understand the mechanisms that are differentially
impacting rural areas compared to suburban and urban areas. For example, population loss in
rural areas impacts the social and economic fabric of these societies. Those who leave rural
areas have as much importance as those who stay. Education poses a conundrum to rural areas;
more educated individuals tend to leave the countryside for the city. Carr and Kefalas (2009)
state that this phenomenon is a zero-sum game, benefiting destination cities and hurting the
areas where out-migration occurs. “In less than a generation, the Heartland’s most valuable
export was no longer its crops or hogs but its educated young people” Carr and Kefalas (2009).
Just as the educated leave, those who stay continue to impact the design of public provisions
in rural communities. In addition, studies have found that public education tends to suffer in
areas where individuals have lower levels of educational achievement (Beaulieu et al., 2003).
However, Mykerezi et al. (2014) found that no cognitive difference emerged between students
in urban, suburban or rural areas. Rather, institutional factors such as limited resources for
schools and migration for job availability serve as common challenges among rural communities (Gibbs, 2005; Mykerezi et al., 2014). Increased spending per student, particularly for
limited English learners and difficulty in attracting qualified teachers incur greater costs for
rural public schools (Imazeki and Reschovsky, 2003). Heavy reliance on property taxes, low
educational rates in the community, and shifting economic opportunity create barriers to ensure that rural schools are adequate and equitable (Imazeki and Reschovsky, 2003; Jordan and
Jordan, 2004). These studies beg the question of how local institutions can better serve the
rural community and reap greater benefits from education.
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1.5

Theoretical Explanations
Education is considered the machine of social mobility because of increased individual

agency, improved employment, and the overall improvement of community well-being. Education is a byproduct of politics and society, with latter effects on both institutions. When
individuals are deprived of education, their opportunity to improve their own life is diminished. Nussbaum and Sen (1993, p.31) argue that everyone has the right to build their own
capability to achieve “valuable functioning”. Education is a fundamental component of building capabilities and serves as a form of improving individual and collective well-being, agency,
and quality of life (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993). In this context, education serves as the most
valuable avenue for bringing individuals out of current conditions and building human capacity. In nearly all publications on rural places, the topic of education emerges as a central and
important response to ensure more equitable development. This is because of the argument
that education is the most effective way to ensure social mobility, economic opportunity, and
individual growth. These factors are based on an argument that, through education, individuals can pull themselves out of current conditions and construct a more productive future for
themselves. In effect, they build the social, human, and cultural capital necessary to overcome individual and structural barriers. However, rural communities continue to grapple with
educational challenges.
This study contributes to the literature by entering the debate from the direction of public
preferences and seeks to further our understanding of the interplay between individuals and
institutions when it comes to funding rural schools. Typically, we consider finance to be a
government function and overlook the role of public preferences in explaining the amount of
funding dedicated to public institutions. Furthermore, this study challenges singular explanations of ideology, irrationality, or lack of knowledge to test the models of political economy
that emphasize the interplay between individuals and institutions. Rational under-investment
theory argues that individuals may not demand increased public finance for a good when the
return on investment does not justify the cost (Rural Sociological Society, 1993). This theory
extends Human Capital Theory to account for the structure of the economy and communal ben14

efits surrounding investment in public education. According to this theory, rural residents form
opinions based on short-term and long-term factors that impact themselves and their community. An example of short-term factors includes changing tax burdens or personal experience in
education. In contrast, long-term factors might include familial ties, migration effects, and job
availability that impact preferences for spending. Three potential explanations emerge when
we consider the relationship between public preferences and provisions within the notion of
rational under-investment.
The first is that social mechanisms drive public preferences in rural places. Iterations
of these mechanisms could include identity politics or anti-elite sentiments. In this case, public preferences are formed around ideological arguments or beliefs about who benefits from
government interventions. This would reflect rural resentment towards contemporary public institutions (Cramer, 2016). Ideological arguments in rural areas- which tend to support
anti-government approaches- could be driven by racial dynamics, classism, partisanship, or
anti-elitism. The ideological preferences differentiate between those who should benefit and
those who should pay into public services. Consider race in rural places, where historical legacies of “conflict and exclusion have led to a form of de facto racial segregation, and a range
of economic and social disparities“ (Brown and Schafft, 2011). This only adds to a sense of
distributional injustice that rural areas are overlooked and where political divisions are rooted
in a sense of us versus the elites (Cramer, 2016). Identity politics brought on by race or class
distinctions could further create incentives for under-investment in public institutions.
The second potential explanation for under-investment in rural education is derived from
political mechanisms. Rural policy, which has been historically synonymous with farm policy, could be failing rural areas by not responding to needs. This could be due to the political
powers that dominate rural politics. Overlooking the industrial variation in rural places, public
policy has historically benefited agricultural industries driven by farmers-first policy (Browne,
2001). This means that lawmakers are ineffective at passing policy to meet increasing social and economic needs in rural areas, outside farming, industry, and agriculture. Primary
policy impacting rural areas is based on interest-group dynamics rather than through agents of
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change seeking to reshape existing institutions and, subsequently, mass politics (Hansen, 1991;
Browne, 2001).
The third explanation, and focus of this dissertation, is that citizens do not receive benefits from public services, such as education. In rural areas, this could be due to the notion
that education is not a necessity for livelihood. Rural industry tends to demand low-skilled
workers (Rural Sociological Society, 1993). Limited jobs mean that educated individuals will
likely leave rural areas for employment opportunities, constraining incentives for community
investment in education (Rural Sociological Society, 1993). This is an explanation based on
labor-market mechanisms. Economic limitations, geographic distance from employment, and
lack of jobs in rural areas lead to a negative return on investment in education when individuals move away for opportunities (Carr and Kefalas, 2009). Differentiation in the labor market
leads to a self-selection phenomenon where those who value education leave and those who
do not value education stay. Investment in education is hereafter constrained in rural area by
individual preferences that account for short- and long-term consequences in human capital
formation (Rural Sociological Society, 1993).

1.6

Conceptual Framework
This study analyzes the relationship between individuals and local economic institutions

and conditions. This is due to the nature of rural areas where historical and current institutions
continue to constrain or benefit the local community members. People do not make decisions
in a vacuum. The combination of two overarching frameworks will provide the main conceptual approach to this study and provide factors, constructs, and key variables. In contrast,
theory will serve as the lens for critically approaching this topic and determining the relationship between variables. Together, these frameworks will serve as a collection of the factors
most relevant to understanding the phenomena of how individuals set spending preferences for
public services.
The first conceptual framework is derived from the theory of structuration (Giddens,
1979, 1986). Structuration is the theoretical explanation of the conditions that govern the
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continuity or transformation of structures (Giddens, 1979). This approach is born of the sociological tradition and stresses the importance of resources, power, and reciprocity between
actors (social and structural). The basic notion of this theoretical approach is that institutions
influence action by individuals in the same way that individuals influence institutions. According to this framework, there is a “mutual dependence between structure and agency” (Giddens,
1986, pg. 69). In addition, we must consider decision-making by paying close attention to
space,such as geographical isolation and trends over time. An example would be an expected
outcome based on current conditions. This framework provides a point of analysis for the
reproduction of social outcomes, as well as the points in which change may occur (Giddens,
1979).
In conjunction with Giddens (1979, 1986), the framework of Ostrom (1999) known as the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework improves our understanding of the
ways in which institutions operate and change over time. The main contribution of this framework is known as co-production, or the ways in which citizens (consumers in economic terms)
participate in the production of public goods or services, such as education. Another important
contribution of this framework is the main unit of analysis in which collective decision-making
takes place, known as action arenas (Ostrom, 1999). Furthermore Ostrom (1999) outlines the
three main factors that influence the action arena; physical and material conditions, general
attributes of a community, and rules for appropriate procedure and interaction. This study will
provide a detailed analysis on these attributes and their impact on rural collective decisionmaking.
The combination of these conceptual frameworks provides a multidimensional model of
the interactions between individuals and institutions. Giddens provides the model with variables such as structure and agency whereas Ostrom provides a venue for decision-making,
the action arena– in this research, defined as place. Ostrom offers a specification of the exogenous variables (materials, attributes, and rules) that influence the outcomes of collective
decisions. Furthermore, these frameworks provide a broader understanding around the complex interactions driving local public economies. The interplay between structure and agency
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at the collective and individual level work to either reproduce or change the policy outcomes
impacting rural educational opportunities.
The conceptual framework provides us a way of thinking of the interaction of institutional and individual factors. From the institutional approach, investment in public education
is a combination of the entities that combine resources and build capacity to provide this public service, i.e., the local economic conditions. From the individual approach, investment in
public education is a combination of the individual perspective of social mobility and the relationship between the individual and their broader networks (family and community). There
is interdependence between these two forces; public education is dependent on financial and
institutional support which is a function of public support for this publicly-provided good.
Much of the rural literature continues to return to the same policy domain, public education, as a factor in understanding the historical and current state of rural places (Rural Sociological Society, 1993; Carr and Kefalas, 2009; Duncan, 2014; Cramer, 2016). Schafft and
Biddle (2014) address the role of rural education as a form of rural development. The authors
argue that the role of local social institutions, such as schools, play critical community roles
yet face challenges of decreasing capacity. “Creating, retaining, and attracting well-educated
Americans individuals. . . will be vital to the long-term social and economic health of rural
areas” (Duncan, 2014, pg. 288). However, education funding itself continues to remain complicated in rural areas. Issues of taxation and distribution reflect a sense that “decisions about
funding schools means that small communities are the victims of distributive justice” (Cramer,
2016, pg. 59). This sense of fairness may be directly linked to the distribution of power and
resources for rural public schools.

1.7

Research Summary
In this dissertation, I analyze the following puzzle: what explains geographical variation

in individual preferences, which often appear contrary to collective interests? Specifically, I
analyze variation in investment preferences for public education and seek to build a better understanding of the underlying dynamics that explain why individuals across geography (urban
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versus rural) demand more or less funding for public schools. I contend that, apart from ideological differences compared to urban and suburban residents, unique and understudied factors
are impacting the collective decision-making in rural communities with a direct impact on the
financing of public provisions. While I compare the preferences of urban, suburban, and rural
residents, this research aims to highlight the unique dynamics that may drive variation in public
goods investment across geography. I seek to highlight why a person living in a rural place may
form a unique preference compared to their urban and suburban counterparts. I approach this
question through three research projects. In the first project, I analyze the determinants of tax
preferences for public education comparing individuals who live in urban (metro) areas with
those who live in rural (non-metro) areas. In the second project, I analyze the local calculation
that drives individual preferences for increasing state spending on public education. In the third
project, I analyze local school bond elections in Texas, with a focus on the urban and rural divide. Overall, I find that the urban-rural divide is not a significant way to explain differences in
preferences and voter behavior. The findings in this dissertation show that preference variation
is mainly related to local economic conditions, educational attainment, investment comparisons across jurisdictions, and differences in local beneficiaries- factors which may transcend
the categories of urban, suburban, and rural.

19

CHAPTER 2
INCREASING TAXES FOR SCHOOLS: DOES THE URBAN-RURAL
DIVIDE EXPLAIN DIFFERENCES IN TAX PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION?
2.1

Overview
For many governments, public education is one of the most costly goods provided to cit-

izens. Among OECD countries, an average of 6.1 percent of GDP is spent on education with
the United States spending roughly 6.9 percent of its GDP on education expenditures comprising both post-secondary and elementary-secondary levels (Kena et al., 2015). Nationally,
this amounted to an estimated $1.2 trillion dollars for the 2013-2014 school year (Kena et al.,
2015). To warrant the hefty cost of this good, it is argued that education plays a fundamental
role for society and economies; serving as a justification for the treatment of education as a
publicly-provided good, rather than through private markets. In society, the function of education ensures a trained and active labor force (Becker and Murphy, 1988). It also creates avenues
for socialization in a democratic system (Woessmann, 2016; Glaeser et al., 2007). Underlying
these objectives is the policy goal of equity where, both vertically and horizontally, citizens are
provided with comparable opportunities and resources.
At the nexus of cost and objective is the debate of how to maintain the balance between
efficiency and equity in the education systems of modern welfare states. This balance is further
complicated as we move across geography where the experience of paying for and benefiting
from public goods differs greatly. One way to categorize this geographic variation is the urbanrural divide. In this paper, I analyze how preferences for spending on schools (operationalized
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as attitudes towards changing current taxation levels for public education) vary across urban
(metropolitan) and rural (non-metropolitan) places, as well as the underlying determinants for
this variation. While this study primarily analyzes education preference heterogeneity, a secondary analysis considers if a geographic divide captures this variation and how preferences
may vary across place.
The objective of this research is to analyze the determinants of tax preferences for public
education, specifically comparing individuals who live in more urban areas compared to those
who live in more rural areas. Geography is one way to understand the variation in public education across the United States. To give the reader some context, in the US, education financing
is closely related to the economic prosperity of the local community. While educational attainment varies across place, so do funding formulas for schools. For example, local property taxes,
which directly impact public school funding, can vary greatly across place. Per pupil spending
can vary between $8,000 a year to $16,000 a year between states, with further variation at the
district level (Educational Finance Branch, 2015). The funding formula for public elementarysecondary school systems in the United States relies on approximately 65% of revenue from
local sources, mainly generated through property taxes (Educational Finance Branch, 2015).
This means that depending on where an individual lives, public education may be better or
worse, in terms of funding. On average, 38.6% of all education revenue is sourced through
local taxes, including property tax (Educational Finance Branch, 2015). However, this reliance
on property taxes can vary greatly across geography, with the average in some states resulting in nearly 50% of funds generated through local taxes. Of course, property taxes impact
property owners. Arguably, middle-income and upper-income people are more likely to own
property and thus, pay the taxes.
These dynamics around education funding underscore two features that are analyzed in
this paper: preferences by different income groups and geographical variation intersecting with
these preferences. Discussions about funding for public education generally center on the legislative and governance processes. This analysis seeks to fill gaps in empirical research about
education in terms of the political economy of redistribution, in particular individual prefer-
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ences for redistributive spending on education. Public education funding is generated through
redistributive taxes, where higher-income citizens or property owners subsidize lower-income
citizens. Thus, income levels are key variables of analysis. First, I consider how falling into a
certain income group could result in different preferences through a simple supply and demand
model. In this model, I move away from national aggregation common in redistributive models
to consider place-based variation, highlighting geographical variation. Specifically, this model
explores shifting supply and demand variation across low, middle, and high-income groups in
each place (urban, suburban, and rural). This model builds on the work of Ansell (2010). Second, due to funding formulas for American public education that may incur cost for one group
while another benefits, individual attitudes towards inequality, fairness, and government are all
relevant in understanding preferences. I include a battery of measures in each empirical analysis. These measures ask about spending and outcomes in relation to other jurisdictions such as
preferences for which government level should control education and geographic inequality in
resources and funding.
This research uses survey data from 2015 and 2016, administered through the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) to analyze this variation in preferences for funding
education across the geographic urban and rural divide. Three ordinal regression models are
outlined in this paper. In the first model, the data from these surveys is pooled to analyze
change over time in preferences for education over the urban and rural geographic divide.
Two additional models separately analyze each survey wave, comparing place and tax preferences for public education. Further, to analyze the effect of redistribution and sentiments of
fairness, these models also include questions about comparisons across schools districts, just
distributions of education funds, and local governance concerns. These models represent the
individual preference set determining the direction of education provisions, through increased
or decreased taxes.
In this paper, I show that depending on where a person lives, their preference may vary
based on relative income distributions at the local level. However, I also show that while a
geographic divide is present, it also does not provide clear categories for the beliefs or pref-
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erences of individuals in regard to public school taxes. First, I find a statistically significant
difference in the way that the middle-income group in non-metro areas prefers education taxes
compared to their middle-income counterparts in metro areas. In fact, they prefer to decrease
taxes for public education. Second, beliefs matter for preferences for education taxes. The belief that local spending is more than average reduces demand for education (with the preference
to decrease taxes). In contrast, the belief that local schools are performing better than average
increases the demand for education (through increased taxes). There is no major difference
between beliefs across geography except in one case. The belief by non-metro individuals that
their schools are performing on average increases their preference for more education taxes,
relative to their metro counterparts who prefer to decrease taxes based on this belief. In effect,
the term average may have two different meanings with two different outcomes. Third, I find
individuals across the United States prefer to increase taxes for local public education when
they believe that unequal resources and not enough funding are problematic. On the contrary,
the belief that the Federal government is a problem in public education is associated with a
preference to decrease taxes. However, there is no statistical difference in these beliefs across
the place-based categories. These findings, contrary to the model extension, find that beliefs
(often associated with ideological leanings, but not necessarily) are not shaped by place in
different ways. In this regard, individuals, regardless of place, are more alike than different.
Finally, I find that living in a rural area over time boosts individual preferences to increase taxes for public education more than living in an urban area. These findings indicate
that national political preferences may differ from local preferences regarding public goods.
In fact, local preferences for public goods differ between metro and non-metro areas based on
school performance (being an average school). While this study is useful for considering heterogeneous preferences around public schooling in the United States, my findings suggest that
place matters to a degree, but beliefs about problems, perceptions of performance, and interjurisdictional comparisons may better define the differences among individual calculations for
setting tax preferences in relation to local public schools.
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2.2

Literature
Public education, a driver of social mobility, is a form of social welfare policy that en-

sures human capital development for a nation‘s future labor supply. According to Becker
(1964, 1994), education and training are the most important forms of human capital development. In a sense, education is a form of social insurance for a future of competitive economic
activity, sufficiently trained workforce, and individual human development. Furthermore, education is a form of income redistribution and inter-generational social mobility (Hanushek
et al., 2003; Bernasconi and Profeta, 2012). Public education is justified as a social investment
based on the rate of return back into society. Society pays upfront costs for young people to
become educated, and eventually, find gainful employment and become productive members of
society. However, this means that those who consume education are not the main financiers of
this good (De Fraja, 2004a). Rather, it is a joint venture for parents, families, and the state. The
public financing of education is an inter-generational loan intended to generate human capital
accumulation (Becker and Murphy, 1988).
According to the theory of human capital development, society chooses a level of education that maximizes the discounted value of wealth and the outcome of future earnings. At the
collective level is redistribution for education, in which policy mechanisms enable the transfer
of income from older to younger generations-— all with the underlying agreement that this
initial payout will secure a future return on investment. Should opportunities to form learning
abilities be missed by a community, this could lead to costly remediation to ensure skill formation (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003). If this is the case, it would be better for communities
to finance schools in the present rather than spend more in the future for remediation. Primary
education, financed through income redistribution, illustrates the highest private returns to the
individual (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2018).
Preferences and redistribution are often interrelated in the literature— normally within
the context of the welfare state. Naturally, understanding preferences for redistribution is imperative for understanding preferences for public spending. Following this argument, to understand how individuals prefer government spending, we must take into account how they
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think about redistribution. Studies about preferences for redistribution continue to map the
complex process of human thought. Alesina and Giuliano (2011) find that preferences are
determined by personal characteristics such as age, gender, race and socioeconomic level, in
addition to the political ideology and perception of fairness. Many studies also show that the
notions of fairness, altruism, and reciprocity motivate preferences for public policy (Fehr and
Schmidt, 2001). Lewinsohn-Zamir (1998) finds that preferences for public goods, compared
to private goods, are more altruistic than self-interested. However, this sense of otherness is
compromised by an understanding of the limits of collective action and outcomes. In this case,
program donors (taxpayers) care about who benefits. Alesina and Giuliano (2011) argue that
individual perceptions of fairness in the process of mobility impacts attitudes towards redistribution.
Immigration rates and perceptions of outcomes have also been found to influence preferences. Emmenegger and Klemmensen (2013) analyze the relationship between redistribution
and immigration, finding that individual motivation (self-interest versus humanitarianism, for
example) moderates the tension between these two concepts. However, another strand of the
literature focuses on the macro-level, institutional factors as determinants for social preferences. Jakobsen (2009) finds that trust in public institutions will hold opinions in-line with
current policies and support the values upon which state institutions are founded. Busemeyer
(2013) shows that the institutional structure of education (share public versus private) is associated with individual support for redistribution. As financing for private education increases,
support for redistribution decreases. Individual level support is a function of individual income
and of the institutional arrangement of education governance.
Fladmoe (2012) argues that social democratic policies create a feedback look into public
opinion and perceptions of the system itself. In other developed countries, education funding is
a non-controversial issue due to its management by technocrats and international recognition as
an effective system. In contrast, Reed (2001) finds that attitudes towards equality and taxation
play fundamental roles in public opinion around education in the United States. Attitudes
towards education are linked to localist sentiments, which is driven by funding inequalities due
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to variation in property tax bases. Along these same lines, Klugman et al. (2011) finds that
clear cleavages exist among support for education policies based on socio-economic factors.
Thus, education policy should also be studied outside schools through analyzing the political
and social processes that shape opportunities and subsequently, opinions by the public.
Place allows for variation among policy preferences which can be further analyzed in
terms of unique demographic, economic, social, and political factors. Authors have argued
that the urban-rural divide, also known as the urban-rural interface, provides context for an
emerging sense of place (Wulfhorst et al., 2006). In this sense, place is not only where one
resides, but also where one finds attachment and identity is formed. Masuda and Garvin (2008)
argue that the politics of place are formed through unique social and community dynamics.
Kemmis (1992) asserted that the politics of place is defined as the way in which politics is
situated in both landscape and locality. The role of group consciousness, or identification
in a social grouping, is a central notion in understanding distributive equality (Walsh, 2012;
Duncan, 2014). Group identity could manifest in a variety of ways, with one of those being
spatially defined as place. Place-based consciousness has multiple defining characteristics.
Two key characteristics, adapted from Walsh (2012) drive the motivation behind this research.
First, place-based identification directly relates to perceptions of redistributive injustice and
second, this sense of injustice is a perception of deprivation relative to other groups. Cramer
(2016) argues that rural consciousness is derived from social class, in which perceptions of
having less, drives attitudes towards public institutions such as education.
The relationship between preferences and place are illustrated when we consider the
functional mechanisms of education. The returns to individuals based on their educational
investment are crucial in understanding public provision preference levels across place. The
basic mechanism is simple: if rural people experience lower returns to education, then they will
likely demand less education funding. Clearly, the same could be true for urban and suburban
people. The next question is why would the returns to education vary across place. Card and
Krueger (1992) find that variation in the rate of return to education is substantial across states
and time, mainly as a function of differing quality to schooling across geography leading to
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differences in local education opportunities and outcomes.
Returns to education can take on a variety of forms. In the sociology and economics
literature, the value of education is captured as a factor promoting economic growth (Krueger
and Lindahl, 2001), reducing criminal behavior to ensure larger social cost-savings (Lochner
and Moretti, 2004), and increasing democratic participation (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Bobba and
Coviello, 2007). It is also argued that public education increases social welfare through improved social interactions (Lange and Topel, 2006). Generally, this rate of return is calculated
through exogenous differences in the the return of education, where the cost borne to society
results in collective net benefits. Another strand of the literature focuses on individual wages
and earnings in capturing the endogenous return on education (Card, 2012). Underlying these
functional forms of education is choice. The idea that individuals choose more or less education. In principle, it is easier to understand the intuition around this choice when considering
higher education (which has a private cost and directly relates to immediate lost earnings). In
consideration of primary and secondary education, the relationship between the factors that
capture the return to education are more confounding.
Aside from economic considerations, there are political elements that factor into individual preferences for education. While the basic argument for public education rests on social
mobility through increased productivity and higher wages, the reproduction of inequality is an
additional consideration (Brown and Saks, 1977). Bowles and Gintis (1977) analyze the social
reproduction of inequality perpetuated through education systems. The authors argue that by
means of unequal educational opportunity, economic disadvantage becomes inter-generational.
This assertion moves away from the purely functionalist approach that schooling provides skills
useful in the labor market and life, in general. Rather, schools function as a form of socialization into labor-market stratification, where students are bound for certain roles in society (Raudenbush and Eschmann, 2015). As education has moved away from differentiated tracks into
homogeneous skill-formation (seeking to remedy institutional inequality), there has been an increased tendency to hold schools accountable for producing a common skill-set based mainly
in cognitive skills (Murnane et al., 1995; Cohen and Moffitt, 2010). The aims of education have
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shifted from providing skills in accordance with an individual’s future labor prospects to training individuals from all backgrounds with skills that encompass all labor-market industries. In
effect, the idea of social inequality in education has changed from unequal opportunity to unequal outcomes. While the role of schools serves as an equalizing force, the capacity to benefit
from instruction is determined by the current skills of each pupil, a factor that varies based on
initial socioeconomic status (Raudenbush and Eschmann, 2015). As students enter educational
institutions with varying levels of home-based instruction, schools can shift to an unequal force
that benefits high socio-economic status students more than their low socio-economic counterparts. Thus, it could be that places with concentrated low- and middle-income groups (namely,
rural and urban areas) accurately understand the inherent inequality in education and are discouraged from investing more in this public institution.
Finally, it could be that individuals in certain places demand less education because there
is less opportunity. In this case, education may create a negative externality, that results in a
loss of educated individuals. The negative impact of this migration would be more salient in
rural areas, where population loss has negative economic and social impacts. Carr and Kefalas
(2009) argue that rural brain drain can be driven by lack of local opportunity, such as skilled
jobs with competitive wages. Vazzana and Rudi-Polloshka (2019) utilize survey data to analyze
factors in outward migration from rural Appalachia. The data showed that the greatest determinant was the likelihood of finding employment with a corresponding salary, opportunity for
advancement, and challenging/interesting work. Local opportunities and negative externalities,
resulting in a cost by the community, are inextricably linked in this regard.
This paper seeks to illustrate the relationship between individual and economic factors
with revealed preferences for tax rates. Two considerations should be outlined. First, primary
and secondary education in the United States is legislated. That is, families can opt out of
public education for private or parochial substitutes. Choice is relevant in this regard, but not
restrictive. Individuals may move or prefer substitutes, but still hold a preference for how
much money should be spent on public schools in their immediate area. Second, primary and
secondary education is funded through formulas, meaning that individuals cannot necessarily
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calculate the cost of education that is directly based on their tax contributions. To overcome
the causal concerns with individual knowledge of education taxes, respondents are only asked
to increase, decrease, or keep taxes the same. The wording of this question follows the rationale of Bergstrom et al. (1982). This may result in more or less individual burden, but the key
relationship is that which exists between the individual community member (living in various
places) and their preference for public school provisions. More importantly, is this calculation more closely correlated to individual benefit or collective outcomes? Finally, how does
this calculation change when we consider variation in geography described as the urban-rural
divide?

2.3

Education Supply and Demand Model
In this section, I add onto a simple model of education supply and demand. The original

model is based on the work of Ansell (2010) in modeling the expansion of education through
redistributive spending. In this model, individuals rationally decide whether they prefer more
public education, in other words, increased public spending. In the original model, demand for
education is based on grouping citizens into income groups (high, middle, and low). This is
important for understanding aggregate demand for redistributive spending. These models typically find that the supply of education is mainly subsidized by high income. For middle-income
groups, education is increasingly demanded because this group benefits from economic and labor mobility. The poor also demand education mainly for the benefit of positive externalities
generated through expanded public education. A simplified version of the model by Ansell
(2010) is included in Appendix A.
This model provides us with a starting point for considering variation in preferences for
education. Based on the findings of this model, the middle-class should be persistent champions of expanding education. Arguably, it would be irrational to have a group that benefits from
public education to voice a demand resulting in less expansion of government in the provision
of public education. The following section analyzes a few modifications to this model that
provide insights into shifting preferences for education as well as geographic variation.
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2.3.1

Modeling Place-Based Preferences for Redistribution
In the original model, it is argued that externalities remain purely positive. The impact

of the provision of education on income in period one is a function of which income group an
individual initially falls into (in period zero). Thus, the model further distinguishes between
the three main income groups (high, middle, and low). The impact of education provisions
on high-income earners is largely a net negative for this group. Expanding education for this
group results in high taxes and negative impact. This is mainly due to the decreasing premium
on skilled labor, resulting from an increasing proportion of the population that now falls into
this labor segment. In contrast, we find that middle-income families largely benefit from the
expansion of education. As this group moves from unskilled to skilled labor, we find that they
experience an increase in income. For the middle-income, the benefit from education expansion
(potentially moving this group into skilled labor) in period one is a net benefit. Finally, we find
that the low-income additionally benefit from increased spending on education, regardless of
their lack of movement out of the unskilled labor. Ansell (2010) argues that even if this group
does not receive education, they benefit from the positive externalities collectively generated
through better local schools.
Working off this original model, I outline the underlying rationale for why an individual
who benefits from government would oppose expanding this public good. I alter the model
slightly to consider decentralized finance (the US funding formula split between national, state,
and local sources) as a factor in driving preferences. As in the original model, I focus on the
role of political institutions and labor market structures on the preferences of groups to target
redistribution. Individuals choose to expand education through jurisdictional taxation rates.
To build on the idea of progressive tax policy, we must understand relative wealth rather than
absolute wealth as well as relative income distributions rather than absolute distributions.
In a decentralized system, public education is funded through a formula of local, state,
and federal taxes– with the bulk of education finance relying on local and state taxes. Thus,
I build an extension to the original model taking into account the local nature and impact of
decentralization on public preferences. The goal of this extension is to examine preference
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heterogeneity among individuals based in place. Furthermore, this extension considers the
local-level distribution of income. These considerations provide some insight into why individuals in certain places may demand (and subsequently, invest) more or less in public education,
notwithstanding the benefits of education on the local community. The extension of this model
asserts that preferences for education are endogenous, meaning that preferences are affected
by an individual’s response resulting from external factors. I argue that these factors are placebased, rooted in the location where an individual lives and works. This drives their calculation
for how much public education is valued. I extend the model to account for this variation in
terms of taxation. Variation at the local level will provide some insight into heterogeneous
preferences for education expansion and provide insight into why preferences may contradict
objective economic and social outcomes from greater investment in public education.
The total cost of education will no longer be a function of national average income, but
rather the average income of each jurisdiction. This change means that tax rates will shift across
place. Generally, average and median incomes remain lower in rural or non-metropolitan areas
compared to urban or metropolitan areas. Additionally, earnings for the same educational
attainment is lower in rural areas compared to urban areas (Marré, 2017). Variation among
places would lead to differentiation in preferences for public education provisions.
First, we need to consider the impact of wealth distribution within place. While being
low-income might be comparable to somewhere between urban and rural places, being highincome in each place is a distinct experience. The high end of the distribution in rural areas
may fall somewhere in the upper-middle distribution when compared to urban areas. This
would mean that being in the middle-income group would have a very different local standing,
depending on the place. For the middle-income group (at the aggregate level) they now experience the ceiling to income in a rural place. This would indicate that, like the high-income
group at the national level, the middle-income in rural areas are now faced with the lion’s share
of tax burden, in addition to decreased productivity due to global integration of markets and
skilled labor.
Externalities are now also generated at the local level. Should these externalities be neg-
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ative, for example due to the migration of children to more skilled labor markets, many of
the benefits in the previous model diminish. This would mean that the middle-class are now
rationally voicing less demand for expanded education; a phenomenon that could be categorized as rational under-investment. Rational under-investment theory extends Human Capital
Theory to account for the structure of the economy and communal outcomes from investing in
public goods, such as education (Rural Sociological Society, 1993). According to this theory,
individual opinions are driven by economic factors that impact themselves and their community. In the consideration of place-based variation, rational under-investment would mainly be
a middle-class, rural or non-metropolitan phenomenon.
2.3.1.1

Relative Income

Place-based variation is the key to understanding a shift in preferences moving over geography. The impact on the political demands of individuals is a condition of individual and
place-based considerations. In some places, it could be that the high-income groups have a
larger role in determining the depth and expansion of education. However, when we analyze
heterogeneity, it is necessary to understand the relative standing of individuals within the jurisdiction of taxation. Thus, the first implication of this extension is that the utility function
of an individual can shift due to relative (rather than absolute) economic standing. Figure 2.1
displays the distribution of income between metro and non-metro residents among the 2015
survey respondents. From these distributions, there is notable clustering around the middleincome in the non-metro sample compared to the metro sample. In fact, the metro sample has
a much longer distribution on family incomes that extend into the highest income. The comparison on distributions of income provides some insight into how being middle-to high-income
in a non-metro place might be a different experience in terms of social burden relative to those
in a metro place.
Place-based variation means that preferences are endogenous and driven by relative income distributions and local effects. Consider income distributions, which vary across place.
Being middle-class in one place could result in very different preferences when compared to
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being middle-class in another place. Table 2.1 outlines these shifts across place. Now, we find
that demand for education is a function of relative income depending on where one lives. This
implies that individuals with the same income, across place, would value education differently.
Preferences are directly related to local conditions, meaning that an individual could relocate
to another place and their preferences could shift. However, I argue that the main factors influencing the individual response to their external environment are mainly, the local distribution
of income, local opportunity, and existing geographical variation in education.
The first implication of this model is that demand by income groups can shift across
place. Figure 2.2 displays the distribution of income between metro and non-metro residents
among the 2016 survey respondents. We find a similar distribution to that within the 2015 survey respondents. Again, there is notable clustering around the middle-income in the non-metro
sample compared to the metro sample. The metro sample in this survey group also has a much
longer distribution on family incomes that extend into the highest income. Comparing these
frequency graphs allows us to reflect on the local-level distribution of income, which would
vary across place. While there is a notably larger portion of the population in the metro sample at the high end of the distribution to bear the burden of public education taxes,the same is
not true for the non-metro residents. In fact, the high-end of this distribution clusters around
the low- and middle-income. These distributions of income indicate that the burden of public
provisions in non-metro areas is borne by other segments of the population, primarily the local
middle-class. According to the model outlined above and contrary to aggregate models of redistribution preferences, the consideration of relative income distribution could drive down the
demand for education from those who seemingly benefit most from its expansion– primarily,
the non-metro, middle class.
2.3.1.2

Local Opportunity

In addition, the consideration of return on investment from education is now complicated
by place-based variation. The original specification of this model assumes only positive externalities. However, it is likely that negative externalities could also result from expanded educa-
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Income Metro versus Non-Metro Residents (2015 Survey)

Figure 2.2: Distribution of Income Metro versus Non-Metro Residents (2016 Survey)

34

tion, primarily in rural areas. Consider a rural or non-metropolitan place in the United States.
Unskilled labor remains the largest segment of the labor market. However, the economic outcomes from this labor segment are affected by globalization, where markets become more
international and many industries move employment to other locations due to lower production costs. In an urban or metropolitan space, globalization has not driven down the premium
on labor to the same degree as in rural or non-metropolitan areas. Thus, education expansion
in a rural or non-metropolitan areas likely leads to outward migration. This outward migration
to benefit from skilled labor markets is clearly reflecting social mobility. However, negative
externalities are experienced by those left behind (as well as those who are deciding whether
to expand education at the local level).
I claim that for the parents of educated individuals, expanding education results in a loss
of the physical presence of family. Family ties, especially in rural areas, provide important social benefits. First, rural areas tend to be mainly populated by older individuals, where elderly
care becomes more important and less common (Marré, 2017). Families, specifically children,
often provide this care. For residents without children, the return on investment from expanding education just migrated to more lucrative labor markets. Second, the outward migration
of educated individuals from rural areas creates a self-selection issue. Those left behind, employed in the unskilled labor segment characterized by stagnant wages, are not benefiting from
the expansion of education. Positive externalities are not so clear, due to the outward migration of the educated. Further, it would be rational for this group to underestimate the benefits
generated by education based on the mixed individual and collective local experience. The
second implication of this model is that demand by individuals, across place, will reflect local
opportunity and potential negative externalities.
2.3.1.3

Fairness Across Jurisdiction

Preferences are no longer based on aggregate redistribution but are now a function of local redistribution. Decentralized public provisions create a patchwork system of public goods.
An individual may set their preference level not only based on the local economic and social
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effects of education spending, but also based on cross-jurisdictional estimations. The consideration of spending across jurisdictions may provide a baseline for individuals to estimate
what they think is appropriate or sufficient spending on goods. Additionally, individuals can
compare the performance of goods across jurisdictions. This means that individuals are in a
situation where preferences are subject to local level effects and the comparative effects of
adjacent jurisdictional funding and outcomes can be observed. A taxpayer may not want to
pay more if they are are already paying more than adjacent districts or if their schools are performing worse than adjacent districts. This would result in some sense of fairness or inequality
based on comparisons across places. Fairness, a function of comparing spending and quality of
goods across districts, will influence an individual preference for spending on their local public
schools. Thus, the relative demand of education may highlight a sense of fairness as well as a
comparison across jurisdictions in regards to taxation in a decentralized system.
In this model, the observation of benefits in the adjacent jurisdiction would drive preferences in your own jurisdiction. This modification is about the efficiency of taxation compared
to other tax rates; the perception that payment and outcomes are relative to what others around
you are paying and experiencing. The relative demand of education would shift the preference
to the individual (as a taxpayer and a voter) to equalize funding or outcomes across jurisdiction. In sum, local taxation relative to adjacent jurisdictions will shift the demand for education
based on the perceptions of unequal spending. However, this could be remedied through a shift
to centralized taxation schemes– a return to the flat tax model of Ansell (2010). The third
implication of this model is that demand by individuals, across place, will reflect relative and
comparative public education spending, outcomes, and governance.
2.3.1.4

Place As a Factor

There a few key insights based on this model extension. First, place matters in determining tax preferences. Individual preferences are shaped by local-level factors. When we consider
education taxes, individuals are effectively determining if the local benefit is worth the local
cost. This would mean that individuals are driven by observations of the economic and social
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shifts around them. Individual and aggregate education rates, levels of poverty and employment, local distribution of income and migration rates into the jurisdiction would determine
a preference for taxes intended to fund public education. In addition, perceptions of fairness
in resource allocation and education outcomes relative to other districts would shift demand
for more or less education funding. Second, outcomes are not only a function of individual
experience, but draw on collective outcomes. This means that, while education is generally
positive for society, negative externalities can impact individual utility functions. A parent not
demanding more public education may be counter-intuitive, but this preference could reflect
rational under-investment in public goods that derive from local economic outcomes and social
shifts. While this phenomenon may be less likely in densely populated areas due to private
substitutes and economies of scale, individuals in less densely populated areas could express a
form of rational underinvestment that manifests itself outside of ideology. Table 2.1 outlines
how preferences may shift between place as we move across the urban-rural divide.
Table 2.1: Political Demand for Education Across Class and Place
Class

2.4

Urban (Metro)

Suburban

Rural (Non-Metro)

High

Negative

Negative

Negative

Middle

Positive

Positive

Negative

Low

Positive

Positive

Positive

Analysis
The empirical models presented in this paper are an approach to understanding hetero-

geneity in preferences across place. In this section, I run a series of ordered logit regression
models to analyze variation across place. Data for this study is from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Two waves of survey questions were administered in 2015
(sample=1000) and 2016 (sample=1500). Figure 2.3 spatially displays the location of 2015
survey respondents. Figure 2.4 spatially displays the location of 2016 survey respondents. In
the modules, survey questions focused on the attitudes towards public education, including
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funding preferences and the perceived impact of federalism on public education. Using zip
codes, respondents were then matched to county-level economic and social variables.
County-level data includes measures of poverty, population, education, and race. Poverty
estimates are model-based estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and
Poverty Estimate (SAIPE) program. Population estimates were collected from the U.S. Census
Bureau County Population Estimates. County unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program and median households are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimate (SAIPE)
program. Education data is collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and the decennial Censuses of Population as well as the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. Economic
variables are lagged for one year prior to the survey.
The notion of place can be complex. For this study, I approach the rural definition in
two ways. First, I utilize the United States Department of Agriculture Rural-Urban Continuum
Codes for 2013. This format defines non-metro and metro counties based on a few parameters,
including the main economic industry and population density. The estimated rural/non-metro
population in the United States is between 17 and 20 percent. Table 2.2 provides descriptive
statistics for each survey sample based on the Rural-Urban Continuum codes. This first definition is used in the two empirical models that analyze separate survey datasets. The second
definition of place mainly relies on population density. To construct this measure, respondents
in counties with 20,000 people or less are considered rural compared to counties with over
20,000 people being considered urban. This definition is used in the empirical model using
combined data, which is specified by pooling the data from both surveys.
For each empirical analysis, the dependent variable is a measure of tax preferences for
public education. Survey respondents are asked, “Would you vote to increase taxes for public school funding, decrease taxes for public school funding, or keep taxes for public school
funding the same?” This variable serves as a proxy for an individual’s preference of the public
provision of spending on public education. Welch (1985) argues that preferences for taxes are
a concrete expression of willingness to pay or expand services. Following this rationale, Buse-
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Overview of 2015 & 2016 CCES Survey Respondents by Place
2015 Survey
Respondents by Place

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

Metro (Urban Code 1,2,3)

829

82.9

82.9

Non-metro (Rural Code, 4,5,6,7,8,9)

171

17.1

100.00

1,000

1,000

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

1,056

86.0

86.0

172

14.0

100.00

1,228

1,228

Total

2016 Survey
Respondents by Place
Metro (Urban Code 1,2,3)
Non-metro (Rural Code, 4,5,6,7,8,9)
Total

meyer et al. (2018) asks respondents about their willingness to pay additional taxes in order to
measure their preference for financial investment in education. Due to the nature of the dependent variable (preference moving from decreasing to increasing taxes), each regression will be
an ordered logit analysis. Coefficients are ordered log-odds estimates, which can be interpreted
as a one unit increase that will result in the predicted coefficient change in the outcome variable, holding all other variables in the model constant. Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics
for the dependent variable of each survey.
2.4.1

Empirical Setup
The empirical strategy analyzes the individual and collective determinants for education

finance preferences. Each model of the individual survey data is run with place as a dummy
variable in the model (metro=0 and non-metro=1) and then runs each model with separate
metro and non-metro samples. An obvious limitation of this approach is the sample size of
the non-metropolitan respondents, roughly 17 percent of the overall samples. However, this
approach gives us a baseline understanding of variation in political determinants for the expansion of education. The final model pools the data together to allow for an analysis of variation
over time. The following regression tables display parameter estimates and measures of fit
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Figure 2.3: 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) Respondents

40

Figure 2.4: 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) Respondents
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Overview of 2015 & 2016 CCES Survey Dependent Variable
2015 Survey
Education Taxes?

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

Increase taxes for public schools

299

29.9

29.9

Decrease taxes for public schools

222

22.2

52.1

Keep taxes the same

475

47.5

99.6

4

0.04

100

1,000

-

100

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

Increase taxes for public schools

502

40.8

40.8

Decrease taxes for public schools

248

20.2

61.1

Keep taxes the same

476

38.8

99.8

2

0.16

100

1,228

-

100

Skipped
Total
2016 Survey
Education Taxes?

Skipped
Total

including statistical significance and standard errors. All results are in odd ratio forms, which
can be interpreted as coefficients greater than one are associated with higher odds of outcome
(increasing taxes) and coefficients less than one are associated with lower odds of outcome
(increasing taxes). If the coefficient equals one, this indicates that exposure does not impact
the odds. All models are weighted.
As is common in surveys, the dependent variable (increase, decrease, or keep taxes the
same) is a categorical variable. Using this dependent variable, I am able to estimate the explanatory model for the stated preferences of individuals in regards to the rate of taxes on
schools. This question is intentionally vague, gauging an individual’s perceptions of overall
tax rates that benefit schools– it requires no specific knowledge in the complexity of school
tax calculations. The main point of interest from this variable is the outcome of individual
preference based on key explanatory and control variables. There is a natural ordering to the
potential outcome, decrease to leave the same to increase, making the ordered logit model
appropriate. With the ordered logit model, I model preferences among taxation options as a
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function of social, economic, and demographic characteristics, as a linear function of values
on one or more predictors. The ordered logit model is based on the following specification.

yic = β1 (X1i ) + β2 (X2i ) + β3 (X3i ) + β4 (X4c ) + ic

(2.1)

yi = 0 if y ≤ µ0 ,
1 = µ0 < y ≤ µ1 ,
2 = µ1 < y ≤ µ2
where yi is the observed preference for individual i. The tax preference function for each individual is composed of three individual components and one county level economic component
plus the error component, i c. In the model, β1 (X1i ) is the income group of the individual,
β2 (X2i ) is the impressions of federalism and redistribution of the individual, β3 (X3i ) is the
demographic characteristics of the individual, and β4 (X4c ) is the economic characteristics of
the county in which the individual resides.
Typically, models with different levels of aggregation suffer from heteroscedasticity and
require some form of correction to separate error structures. If left without correction, estimates
can be exaggerated at the highest aggregation level (Moulton et al., 1990). Common among
the education literature is the use of hierarchical (or mixed, multi-level) models. These models
have been found to be superior in correcting group level effects (Cheah, 2009). However,
doubts around the application of this technique arise when the size of clusters are small (less
than 5-10) and higher level variables are a function of lower level variables (average income
or unemployment rate) (Schunck, 2016). These factors will cause estimated coefficients to
suffer from downward bias. In the case of this paper, the average size of each cluster is 1.8
survey respondents. In addition, the county level variables (level 2) are drawn out of county
respondents (level 1). Following this rationale, this paper relies on standard errors clustered
at the county level. Primo et al. (2007) argue that, in estimating the effects of institutions
on individuals, clustered standard errors are feasible options. Limitations clearly remain in
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the application of this technique and the causal implications of models with multiple levels
of aggregation. However, as argued by Busemeyer (2007), these models highlight insightful
connections between macro-economic variables and micro-level outcomes.
In the individual year models, key independent variables are income groups (low, middle,
and high). I am specifically interested in how the middle class behaves across place. The
reference bracket for income variables is high-income, comparing the low- and middle- income
to the high-income in each place. These variables are included to test the model hypothesis
that income effects have varying geographical effects. This would mean that middle-class
preferences are expected to diverge when comparing place. However, I am also interested in
how elements of federalism and redistribution drives preferences. Respondents are also asked
about their impressions of relative spending to other districts and comparative performance
between districts. These variables further analyze the local effects of public goods outcomes
relative to others (surrounding jurisdictions) as factors in setting a tax preference. Alternative
independent variables are at the county-level, testing at a broader level the notion of rational
under-investment, or the idea that education could generate negative externalities which drive
down the demand for education. This latter, and secondary consideration, is operationalized
through domestic migration rates (predicting individuals moving into a district from within
the US) and international migration rates (predicting individuals moving into a district from
outside the US). Migration into a region would capture local positive externalities primarily
through local economic gain.
Control variables include education, ideological scale (moving from liberal to conservative), home-ownership status, being a parent, age, party affiliation, work status, and race
variables. County-level variables (unemployment rate, local educational attainment, poverty
rates, and immigration rates) are lagged in both models. In the third model, data is pooled
to begin to analyze the urban-rural divide over time. To consider another form of place, the
pooled model relies on population estimates. A county with less than 20,000 people is considered rural and a county with more than 20,000 people is considered urban. In reality, this
is a conservative estimate that includes large towns in the urban group. However, it provides
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another illustration of rurality in terms of population and how these place-based considerations
shape public preferences for goods.
2.4.2

Model of Pooled Data (2015 and 2016)
In the first specification of the model, the data from the 2015 and 2016 data is pooled.

The idea behind pooling this data is to attempt an estimation of the so-called urban-rural divide
over time as a factor in education tax preferences. In this model, place is defined by population
density. Rural counties are those with less than 20,000 people. This differs from the other
models that define place-based categories on the USDA rural-urban continuum codes.
Compared to more densely populated counties (urban), being in a rural county reduces
the preference for increasing taxes on public education. This variable is statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. The ordered log-odds estimate on the interaction term is also positive
and statistically significant, telling us that being in a less densely populated place compared to a
more densely populated place increases the likelihood of preferences for increasing education
taxes. Odds ratios can be interpreted as percent likelihood. In the case of the place-based
dummy variable, for the rural county group the outcome of preferring an increase in taxes is
approximately 55% less likely, compared to the urban county group and holding all variables
constant. There is reason to believe that rural counties, based on population density in this
model, increases preferences in a different way than those in urban, more-densely populated
counties. The year variable measures preference change over time. This variable shows a
positive effect on the likelihood for a preference of increasing taxes for education. This finding
shows a substantial increase in the 2016 respondents preferring to increase education taxes
compared to the 2015 data. In 2016, compared to 2015, there is a 44 percent likelihood of
preferring to increases taxes for education. However, this increase is not driven by the urban
sample but rather, the rural sample.
The interaction variable between year and place is an approximate estimate of this diverging preferences across this geographical divide. We can think of this variable as a measure
of the urban-rural divide as a factor on tax preferences. In contrast to the place-based categor-
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ical variable, the results of this interaction term differ. When interacted with time, there is a
substantial swing in the preferences of the rural sample, compared to the urban sample. Over
the two samples and compared to the urban county group, those in the rural county group are
3.23 times more likely to prefer to increase taxes for education. Contrary to the argument that
ideology underlies a lack of government investment, rural residents in the surveys are more
likely to prefer increasing taxes over time, compared to those in the urban sample. Figure 2.5
illustrates the predictive probabilities for the outcomes of the dependent variable (decrease,
keep same, or increase taxes for public education) by place over time. Clearly, the change for
increasing taxes for public education is greatest among the rural sample. Further, this finding
provides some support that place-based preferences are shifting unique to the place. If preferences were based on one sample only, the rural respondents would appear to be more likely
to oppose increasing taxes for education. However, when the samples are pooled, we find a
more complex picture of preference formation. Indeed, place-based preferences are shifting in
different ways. However, the ways in which preferences shift indicate that rural respondents,
more so than urban respondents, are actually more likely prefer increasing taxes for public
education.
In this model, I also control for local level economic variables. A key explanatory variable is the economic typology, or dominant economic industry, of each county. The baseline
variable is a non-specialized economic sector, indicating that all other economic types are compared against a non-specialized economy. The non-specialized counties are those that do not
meet the dependence criteria for any other economic type. Due to sample size limitations, I
combine farming, mining, and manufacturing counties into one variable. These findings are
not statistically significant. I also interact these variables with place (rural), resulting in no
findings. However, in this pooled model, I find that as the rate of individuals in a county with
(only) a high school degree increases, the outcome of preferring an increase in taxes is approximately 3% less likely, holding all variables constant. This finding indicates that the local
educational attainment of each county is an indicator of preferences for education taxes. As
the proportion of individuals with a limited education (high school) increases within a county,
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the effect is to decrease the likelihood of increasing taxes that benefit public schools.
2.4.2.1

Ordered Logit Model of Pooled Survey Data
Prefer to Increase Taxes

coef.

s.e.

Rural

0.45+

(0.20)

Year=2016

1.44∗∗∗

(0.15)

Year=2016 × Rural

∗

3.23

(1.91)

Economy: Farming, Mining, Manufacturing

1.08

(0.17)

Economy: Government

0.92

(0.18)

Economy: Recreation

0.77

(0.15)

Economy: Farming, Mining, Manufacturing × Rural

0.90

(0.48)

Economy: Government × Rural

2.37

(2.66)

Economy: Recreation × Rural

1.24

(1.03)

Median Income 2015

1.00

(0.00)

Percent in Poverty 2015

1.03

(0.02)

Unemployment Rate 2015

0.98

(0.05)

∗∗

Percent with High School Degree

0.97

(0.01)

Percent with College Degree

1.00

(0.01)

Rate of Domestic Migration 2015

1.01

(0.01)

Rate of International Migration 2015

0.99

(0.03)

N

2222

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

2.4.3

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Model of 2015 Survey Data
In this second specification of the model, I am mainly interested in the effect of income

across geography and the affect of fairness on education tax preferences. The first specification of the model includes all respondents across geography, including a dummy variable for
non-metro based on the USDA rural-urban continuum codes. In addition, this variable is interacted with income to consider the relationship between income and geography. In the second
specification of the model, only metro respondents are included. In the third specification, only
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Figure 2.5: Predictive Margins of Year by Place (2015 & 2016 Surveys)
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non-metro respondents are included. Following the pattern of demographic change across the
United States, the total sample for non-metro respondents is smallest.
In the 2015 survey data, place, as a category to capture economic and social experience,
is not statistically significant. This means that there is not real difference between non-metro
and metro places in changing the likelihood of preferring to increase taxes for public education.
Among the income variables (with the base category is high-income), there is no significant
difference between income levels. The low- and middle-income groups are not significantly
different than the high-income group.
However, when the income group is interacted with the non-metro variable, there is a
significant difference among the middle-class. There are two ways to interpret this interaction effect. Being middle-class in a non-metro county, compared to being middle-class in a
metro county, reduces the likelihood by approximately 80% of preferring to increase taxes for
education. Alternatively, this findings also stands when we compare the middle-class to the
high-income group in non-metro areas. This finding suggests that across metro and non-metro
counties, the likelihood of preferring to increase taxes for education held by the middle-class
changes. Furthermore, being middle-class in non-metro areas, compared to high-income, results in less demand for education. This group of individuals, the middle-income group, exhibit
a decreased demand for education across place, even with controlling for education, ideology,
parenthood, race, and party affiliation. This finding lends some support to the idea that individuals, regardless of local objective need, may exhibit contrary preferences. More importantly,
preferences based on income levels vary across place.
The other key variables of interest are those that measure attitudes about fairness and
comparisons across district. The intuition behind these measures is that local preferences are
complicated through decentralization, where individuals compare public good spending and
quality as a form of re-setting their own preference. The baseline for this category is spending
less than average. The variable, spending average, is not statistically significant. However,
spending more than average is significant and negative. Holding all variables constant, the
view that your local school is spending above average, compared to below average, reduces the
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likelihood by approximately 68% of preferring to increase taxes for education. Individual who
believes that their local spending on public education is more than average prefers to reduce
taxes on public education, relative to an individual who believes that spending is less than
average. When interacted with place, these variables are not statistically significant, indicating
no significant difference in this notions of fairness across place.
The next iteration of the fairness variables compares quality and performance of schools
across jurisdictions. The baseline for this category is performing worse than average. As in
the spending variable, the perception that schools are performing on average is not statistically
significant. However, the notion that schools are performing better than average is significant.
Holding all variables constant, the view that your local school is performing above average,
compared to below average, increases the likelihood by approximately 95% of preferring to
increase taxes for education. When interacted with the non-metro dummy variable, we find
some variation across these belief categories.
Non-metro individuals who believe that schools are performing on average prefer to
increase taxes for public, relative to metro individual. Holding all variables constant, the view
that your non-metro, local school is performing on average, compared to metro, performing
on average increases the likelihood by approximately 3.41 times of preferring to increase taxes
for education. Average appears to mean two things based on where you live. The spatial
relationship reflected in this variable is interesting because it indicates that while average school
performance might drive down the preference to increase taxes in a metro place, it has the
opposite effect in a non-metro place. It could be that average means two different things based
on the local experience of an individual. This finding provides some support for the idea that
individual preferences and demand are driven mainly through local experience and vary across
place.
Finally, to further consider the notion that individuals in rural areas might be concerned
with negative externalities, such as outward migration, the model is also estimated including
population loss as a dummy variable. This is an imperfect measure as it is the county measure
of population loss but is intended to test for spurious correlation. When this measure is inter-
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acted with the non-metro dummy variable, the preference for education taxes is inverse. It is
not a measure that is statistically significant but this indicates an inverse relationship between
preferences for education taxes and the relationship between being in a non-metropolitan place
with population loss versus being in a metropolitan place with population loss.
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2.4.3.1

Ordered Logit Model of 2015 Survey Data
Dependent Variable:
Increase Taxes for Education
Metro/Non-metro
coef.

s.e.

Non-metro

1.14

(1.02)

Low-Income

1.04

(0.22)

Middle-Income

1.12

(0.24)

Non-metro × Low-Income

0.41

(0.38)

Non-metro × Middle-Income

0.20

∗

(0.16)

Spend Average

0.78

(0.19)

Spend Above Average

∗∗∗

0.32

(0.09)

Non-metro × Spend Average

0.46

(0.35)

Non-metro × Spend Above Average

1.31

(1.17)

Perform Average

0.85

Metro

Non-metro

coef.

s.e.

coef.

s.e.

1.07

(0.23)

0.52

(0.45)

1.15

(0.25)

0.12

∗

(0.11)

0.78

(0.19)

0.37

(0.26)

(0.10)

0.58

(0.48)

∗∗∗

0.33

(0.23)

0.83

(0.22)

2.41

(1.69)

Perform Above Average

1.95

∗

(0.51)

∗

(0.51)

2.70

(2.29)

Non-metro × Perform Average

3.41+

(2.49)

Non-metro × Perform Above Average

2.22

(1.68)

1.24∗∗

(0.08)

1.29∗∗∗

(0.09)

0.90

(0.21)

(0.06)

∗∗∗

(0.06)

1.19

(0.28)

Education
Ideology Scale

∗∗

0.79

1.92

0.76

Home Owner

1.01

(0.15)

1.02

(0.15)

0.79

(0.33)

Age (10 years)

0.96

(0.06)

0.99

(0.07)

0.79

(0.12)

Being a Parent

1.11

(0.23)

1.14

(0.25)

0.75

(0.44)

+

+

Not Working

0.71

(0.13)

0.74

(0.13)

1.22

(0.86)

Black

0.90

(0.43)

1.02

(0.51)

0.11

(0.24)

White

0.87

(0.24)

0.91

(0.27)

0.32

(0.32)

Hispanic

1.02

(0.41)

1.09

(0.46)

0.15

(0.19)

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Median Income 2014

∗∗

1.00

(0.00)

∗∗

1.00

Percent in Poverty 2014

1.08

(0.10)

1.11

(0.11)

1.08

(0.26)

Percent in Poverty with Kids 2014

0.93

(0.06)

0.92

(0.06)

0.99

(0.16)

Unemployment Rate 2014

1.00

(0.08)

0.96

(0.09)

1.31

(0.31)

Percent with High School Degree 2014

0.95

(0.03)

0.94+

(0.03)

0.96

(0.10)

Percent with College Degree 2014

1.04∗

(0.02)

1.04∗

(0.02)

1.16∗

(0.08)

Domestic Migration 2014

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

International Migration 2014

1.00+

(0.00)

1.00∗

(0.00)

1.01∗∗

(0.00)

Adj R2

0.07

0.05

0.32

N

985

882

103

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.4.3.2

Ordered Logit Model of 2015 Survey Data including Population Loss
Dependent Variable:
Increase Taxes for Education
Non-metro

1.17

(0.98)

Low-Income

1.04

(0.22)

Middle-Income

1.12

(0.24)

Non-metro × Low-Income

0.41

(0.38)

Non-metro × Middle-Income

0.20

∗

(0.16)

Spend Average

0.77

(0.19)

∗∗∗

Spend Above Average

0.32

(0.09)

Non-metro × Spend Average

0.46

(0.35)

Non-metro × Spend Above Average

1.30

(1.18)

Perform Below Average

1.00

(.)

Perform Average

0.85

(0.22)

∗

(0.51)

+

Perform Above Average

1.95

Non-metro × Perform Average

3.41

(2.48)

Non-metro × Perform Above Average

2.23

(1.76)

Education

1.24∗∗

(0.08)

Ideology Scale

0.79∗∗

(0.06)

Home Owner

1.01

(0.15)

Age (10 years)

0.96

(0.06)

Being a Parent

1.11

(0.23)

+

Not Working

0.71

Black

0.90

(0.43)

White

0.86

(0.24)

Hispanic

1.02

(0.41)

Median Income 2014

∗

1.00

(0.00)

Percent in Poverty 2014

1.08

(0.10)

Percent in Poverty with Kids 2014

0.93

(0.06)

Unemployment Rate 2014

1.00

(0.08)

Percent with High School Degree 2014

0.95

(0.03)

Percent with College Degree 2014

1.04∗

(0.02)

Domestic Migration 2014

1.00

(0.00)

International Migration 2014

1.00+

(0.00)

Population Loss Dummy 2014

1.04

(0.30)

Non-metro × Population Loss Dummy 2014

0.93

(0.57)

Adj R2

0.07

N

985

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(0.12)

2.4.4

Model of 2016 Survey Data
In this sample of the 2016 survey data, three ordered regressions are again outlined. As in

the 2015 survey data models, the first specification combines the metro and non-metro samples
and then compares the metro and non-metro samples only. As in the first specification of this
model, key variables of interest are income effects across geography and attitudes towards fairness and inter-jurisdictional fairness. These models use survey questions that ask respondents
about their impressions of various education-related topics as either a problem or not. Respondents are asked whether they think local control, unequal resources, not enough funding, and
the federal government are the main issues that challenge public education. These topics relate
to components of decentralization and public provisions, each of which may drive the perception of respondents that the system is unfairly distributed. Each response can be interpreted as
an individual who believes the variable is affirmatively a problem in public education. These
variables are then interacted with the non-metro variable to consider how this perception drives
the preference for education taxes.
Unlike the 2015 survey, none of the income variables are statistically significant in the
2016 survey regressions. However, when the samples are separated by place, we find that the
low-income variable is significant and negative. This means that among the low-income in
non-metro areas, relative to the high-income, there is an increased likelihood of preferring to
decrease taxes for education. Holding all variables constant, being low-income in a non-metro
place compared to high-income, reduces the likelihood by approximately 73% of preferring to
increase taxes for education.
While it is insignificant, the middle-income group is also inverse in the non-metro sample. The lack of significance among the full samples could be due to sampling limitations,
where only 172 individuals in the survey were living in non-metro areas, compared to 1054 in
metro areas. This sampling technique could be limiting the geographical differences among
respondents, which becomes more clear as we separate the samples into metro and non-metro
groupings. Like the income variables, the place variable is not significant in this model when
interacted with income. While these variables are not statistically significant, it is interesting
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to note that when each sample is isolated into the metro and non-metro groupings, we do find
that the directions of middle-income preferences vary.
Respondents are then asked about a variety of topics which they may or may not think
are problematic for public education and local schools. Lack of local control, as a problem, is
not statistically significant in the full model, nor is its interaction with place. In other words,
the perception that lack of local control is a problem for public education is not significantly
correlated with increasing the likelihood of preferring to increase or decrease taxes for schools.
Among the non-metro samples, individuals in non-metro places who believe this is problematic are 57% less likely to increase taxes, relative to those who do not think that a lack of
local control is a problem. On the contrary, the belief that unequal resources among schools
is a problem increases the demand for education through increased tax preferences. Individuals who perceive unequal resources among schools as a problem prefer to increase taxes for
education. Holding all variables constant, the view that unequal resources is problematic for
public education, compared to those who do not think this is a problem, increases the likelihood by approximately 2.31 times of preferring to increase taxes for education. However, this
relationship is not statistically significant when comparing metro to non-metro places. Among
the metro sample, this finding is most pronounced. In the metro sample, the belief that unequal
resources is problematic, compared to those who do not belief this, increases the likelihood of
preferring to increase taxes for public education by 2.19 times.
Next, we turn to the belief that there is not enough funding as a problem for public
schools. This variable is significant and positive, indicating that this belief results in individual
preferences to increase taxes for education. Holding all variables constant, the view that not
enough funding is problematic for public education, compared to those who do not think this is
a problem, increases the likelihood by approximately 4.45 times of preferring to increase taxes
for education. This does not vary across place, until we separate the samples and can see that
this is mainly dominated by the strong effect among those living in non-metropolitan places.
Among the non-metro sample, the view that not enough funding is problematic for public
education, compared to those who do not think this is a problem, increases the likelihood by
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approximately 5.05 times of preferring to increase taxes for education.
In contrast, the notion that the federal government is a problem drives down the preference for increasing taxes. Holding all variables constant, the view that the federal government
is problematic for public education, compared to those who do not think this is a problem, decreases the likelihood by approximately 56% of preferring to increase taxes for education. We
see this across all the geographic mini-samples, but it is most pronounced in the metropolitan
sample. Among the metro sample, the view that the federal government is problematic for public education, compared to those who do not think this is a problem, decreases the likelihood
by approximately 55% of preferring to increase taxes for education.
Among each of the belief variables, there is no significant interaction between problem
perception and place in the full model. Being in a non-metro place and holding these perceptions of issues that plague the education system does not statistically differ from being in a
metro place. Again, this could be due to the fact that this survey sample is heavily skewed
towards the metropolitan respondents.
To check for spurious correlation, I also include a model that calculates population loss.
As in the 2015 models, this is an imperfect measure that calculates a related externality to
education. When population loss is included, we find that preference for education taxes is
inverse. As a county experiences population loss, this reduces the likelihood by approximately
32% of preferring to increase taxes for education. While this is not statistically significant
in the interaction term, the sign is inverse. This indicates there is a difference in individual
preferences between geography when the local surrounding communities experience population loss. Interestingly, including this variable also shifted the results of the belief variables.
When controlling for population loss, the belief that lack of local control is problematic drives
down the demand for education taxes more for non-metro individuals than for metro individuals. Holding all variables constant, the view that lack of local control is problematic for public
education in non-metro places, compared to those with the same belief in metro places, reduces
the likelihood by approximately 57% of preferring to increase taxes for education.
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2.4.4.1

Ordered Logit Model of 2016 Survey Data
Dependent Variable:
Increase Taxes for Education
Metro/Non-metro
coef.

s.e.

Non-metro

1.77

(0.94)

Low-Income

0.92

Middle-Income

Metro

Non-metro

coef.

s.e.

coef.

s.e.

(0.20)

0.94

(0.21)

0.27∗

(0.14)

1.15

(0.22)

1.20

(0.23)

0.67

(0.29)

Low-Income × Non-metro

0.46

(0.26)

Middle-Income × Non-metro

0.55

(0.27)

Lack of Local Control

0.85

(0.15)

0.85

(0.15)

0.43∗

(0.17)

Lack of Local Control × Non-metro

0.46

(0.22)

Unequal resources among schools=2

2.13∗∗∗

(0.40)

2.19∗∗∗

(0.42)

1.63

(0.71)

1.06

(0.59)
4.79∗∗∗

(0.79)

5.05∗∗∗

(1.93)

0.45∗∗∗

(0.08)

0.61

(0.27)

1.00

(.)

Unequal resources among schools × Non-metro
Not Enough Funding
Not Enough Funding × Non-metro
Federal Government
Federal Government × Non-metro
Education
Ideology Scale
Not Home Owner

∗∗∗

4.45

1.15
∗∗∗

0.44

2.25
∗

1.15

∗∗∗

0.79

∗∗∗

1.63

(0.71)
(0.55)
(0.08)
(1.13)
(0.07)
(0.05)
(0.23)

∗

(0.07)

1.24

(0.21)

∗∗∗

(0.05)

0.93

(0.13)

∗∗

(0.25)

1.62

(0.48)

1.16
0.76

1.55

Age (10 years)

1.09

(0.06)

1.08

(0.07)

1.10

(0.14)

Being a Parent

0.99

(0.15)

1.08

(0.17)

0.51

(0.21)

White

1.29

(0.33)

1.47

(0.36)

0.36

(0.32)

Black

1.13

(0.49)

1.06

(0.45)

1.78

(2.86)

Hispanic

1.10

(0.39)

1.12

(0.40)

0.77

(1.07)

Not Working

1.15

(0.17)

1.20

(0.19)

0.89

(0.33)

Median Income 2015

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Percent in Poverty 2015

1.03

(0.08)

0.95

(0.09)

1.05

(0.13)

Percent in Poverty with Kids 2015

0.99

(0.05)

1.00

(0.05)

1.01

(0.09)

Unemployment Rate 2015

0.93

(0.07)

0.90

(0.07)

1.07

(0.13)

Percent with High School Degree 2015

0.99

(0.03)

0.96

(0.03)

1.02

(0.06)

Percent with College Degree 2015

1.00

(0.02)

1.01

(0.02)

0.98

(0.04)

Rate Domestic Migration 2015

∗

1.02

(0.01)

1.01

(0.01)

1.05

(0.03)

Rate International Migration 2015

1.00

(0.04)

1.01

(0.04)

1.13

(0.16)

Adj R2

0.14

0.14

0.26

N

1226

1054

172

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.4.4.2

Ordered Logit Model of 2016 Survey Data with Population Loss
Dependent Variable:
Increase Taxes for Education
Non-metro

2.32

(1.42)

Low-Income

0.95

(0.21)

Middle-Income

1.18

(0.23)

Low-Income × Non-metro

0.41

(0.24)

Middle-Income × Non-metro

0.51

(0.25)

Lack of Local Control

0.85

(0.15)

Lack of Local Control× Non-metro

+

(0.21)

∗∗∗

(0.40)

0.43

Unequal resources among schools

2.15

Unequal resources among schools× Non-metro

1.05
∗∗∗

Not Enough Funding

4.43

Not Enough Funding × Non-metro

(0.59)
(0.71)

1.16

(0.56)

0.44∗∗∗

(0.08)

Federal Government × Non-metro

2.01

(1.01)

Education

1.15∗

(0.07)

Federal Government

Ideology Scale

∗∗∗

(0.05)

∗∗

(0.24)

0.79

Not Home Owner

1.61

Age (10 years)

1.09

(0.06)

Being a Parent

0.98

(0.15)

White

1.35

(0.34)

Black

1.15

(0.49)

Hispanic

1.22

(0.45)

Not Working

1.15

(0.17)

Median Income 2015

1.00

(0.00)

Percent in Poverty 2015

1.02

(0.08)

Percent in Poverty with Kids 2015

1.01

(0.05)

Unemployment Rate 2015

0.94

(0.07)

Percent with High School Degree 2015

1.00

(0.03)

Percent with College Degree 2015

1.00

(0.02)

Rate Domestic Migration 2015

1.01

(0.01)

Rate International Migration 2015

0.99

(0.04)

+

Population Loss Dummy 2015

0.65

Population Loss Dummy 2015=1 × Non-metro

0.90

Adj R2

0.15

N

1226

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(0.16)
(0.44)

2.5

Discussion of Variables
Among the control variables in the 2015 models, there are significant effects for indi-

vidual education, ideology, party affiliation, and the unemployment rate. Being more educated
increases the demand for education, in particular, among the metro sample. Ideology has the
opposite effect. Increasing the conservative orientation of individuals reduces their preference
for increasing taxes across all specifications of the model. It is also interesting to consider
what is not statistically significant in these models. Being a parent, for example, is not significant. However, considering the direction of coefficients, there is movement across geography.
While being a parent in a metro place increases demand for education (preference for increasing taxes), the opposite effect is found in the non-metro sample. In this specification, being
a parent in a non-metro place reduces the likelihood of preferring to increase taxes for public
education. We may assume that parents are nearly direct beneficiaries of public education, and
these results could indicate that while being a parent of a child benefiting from education in
a metro place results in positive externalities, it is the parents in the non-metro sample that
experience negative externalities associated with better education, namely migration for work
opportunities. Furthermore, while the percent of high school degree holders in a county increases, we find an inverse relationship to education. This means that individuals with only a
high school degree in a place result in the preference to decrease taxes for education. In contrast, increasing the percent of college degree holders is positively associated with increases
taxes for public education. Additionally, we find some variation in preferences based on international migration rates as we move over the geographical categories. Namely, international
migration to a county has a significant effect on preferences for increasing taxes, but in this
sample, the result is very minimal.
Among the control variables in the 2016 models, education is significant and increases
the likelihood of preferring to raise taxes. Ideology is significant in all models except the
non-metro sample, resulting in decreased taxation preferences as conservative ideological disposition grows. As in the first specification of the survey model, control variables such as age,
being a parent, race, percent in poverty, and migration rates do not provide consistent results
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across each sample specification. The key take-away from this model is that perceptions of
problems appear to drive preferences for tax changes for public education. When we consider
how these relationships compare across place, there is no significant difference. The type of
places where respondents live (metro versus non-metro) does not capture different preferences.
Rather, this is captured by beliefs about the main problems in public education.
There are clear limitations to this study. First, the data is cross-sectional. This provides
only a snapshot of preferences and does not fully reveal causal mechanisms. From these results, we can infer association between variables and outcomes. Second, the samples for the
non-metro or rural groups are not large. Again, this limits the statistical power of these results.
Thus, all findings should be interpreted with caution. However, each model specification provides some insight into the place-based variation that might explain differences between those
who live in metropolitan areas compared to those who live in non-metropolitan areas. Nonmetropolitan residents compared to metropolitan residents seemingly set a different baseline
for quality. Future research should consider the impact of comparing quality across goods and
how those comparisons may have different starting points depending on place. In accordance,
beliefs about systematic problems do not vary across place. This could be due to the way in
which place is defined, which USDA rural-urban codes are not capturing. Thus, future analysis
of the shared and divergent experiences across place could provide further insight into underlying mechanisms. Additional studies should focus on baseline variation in public goods and
the underlying experiences that link or separate places, could offer better understanding into
the rationality that drives preferences and ultimately, outcomes in public education and other
public provisions.

2.6

Conclusion
Public education is complex and presents an individual with many functional forms that

carry with them costs and benefits. When we ask a survey respondent to consider ”taxes for
education,” there is an underlying calculation taking place. A person may be thinking of their
own experience, the benefits experienced by their children, family, or friends, or the ways
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in which better schools improve the level of local livelihood. They may be considering one
or all of these outcomes from education. It is undoubtedly a complicated mental process.
In fact, from the outside, these individual preferences may not seem so straight-forward. In
particular, an incomplete picture of these preferences could continue to lend itself to the idea
that individuals go against their own interest and ultimately, make contradictory decisions about
public issues. This paper provides insight into one aspect of this process. In this paper, I
show that while a geographic divide is present, it does not also provide clear categories for the
beliefs or preferences of individuals. Simply put, place matters to a degree, but beliefs about
problems, perceptions of performance, and inter-jurisdictional comparisons may better define
the differences among individual calculations for setting tax preferences in relation to local
public schools.
In the combined specification of the model, I pool the 2015 and 2016 survey data. This
approach aims to analyze the urban and rural divide, over time. In this model, rural is defined
as any county with less than 20,000 residents. In this analysis, being in a rural area, relative
to an urban area- in this case densely populated- is associated with a preference to decrease
taxes for education. However, this finding is not so straight-forward. Over the two samples and
compared to the urban county group, those in the rural county group are 3.23 times more likely
to prefer to increase taxes for education. Within these two samples, living in a rural area over
the years of 2015 to 2016 increases the likelihood of an individual preference to increase taxes
for public education, more so than indiviuals living in an urban area. So, what does this mean
for the urban-rural divide? One, it is not a clear cut divide in terms of preferences for taxes
or public education. In fact, rural residents in the surveys are more likely to prefer increasing
taxes over time. Timing might have something to do with this finding. The year of the 2016
survey also marked the year of the United States presidential election. Dubbed by many as a
rural revolt, the election was considered a function of mainly ideological political preferences
driven by populist policies. However, Monnat and Brown (2017) argue that while place matters
in politics, the national election was mainly a function of the distribution of economic, social,
and health challenges disproportionately affecting more rural areas. My findings indicate that
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national political preferences may differ from local preferences for public goods. Indeed, the
rural sample compared to the urban sample, exhibits increased likelihood to prefer increasing
taxes for public education. When the samples are pooled, we find a more complex picture of
preference formation. Indeed, place-based preferences are shifting in different ways.
Findings from the separate specifications of the models highlight the variables that factor
into preferences for education taxes. In the specification of the 2015 survey model, the key
finding is that there is a difference in the way that the middle-income group in non-metro areas
prefers education taxes compared to their counterparts in metro areas. Living in a non-metro
place increases the likelihood to prefer decreasing taxes for public education, relative to metro
middle-income individuals. The second key finding is that beliefs matter for preferences for
education taxes. The belief that local schools are spending more than average reduces demand
for education, resulting in an increased likelihood to decrease taxes. In contrast, the belief
that local schools are performing better than average increases the demand for education, with
an increased likelihood to prefer more taxes for public education. Comparing these beliefs
between the place-based categories, there is no statistical difference between beliefs about
spending more than average as a factor in regard to changing education taxes. However, the
belief by non-metro individuals that their schools are performing on average increases their
preference for more education taxes, relative to their metro counterparts. Holding all variables
constant, the view that your non-metro, local school is performing on average, compared to
metro, local schools performing on average, increases the likelihood by approximately 3.41
times of preferring to increase taxes for education. Average appears to mean two things based
on where you live. This findings spurs questions about how the relative outcomes of schools
may differ between metro and non-metro individuals.
In the specification of the 2016 model, place based differences are less significant in
predicting education tax preferences. In fact, there is no statistical significance between these
variables that interacted with income groups or beliefs about the challenges facing public education. However, the key finding of this model is telling in a unique way. Mainly, individuals
across the United States prefer to increase taxes for local public education when they believe
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that unequal resources and not enough funding are problematic for public education. Holding all variables constant, the view that unequal resources is problematic for public education,
compared to those who do not think this is a problem, increases the likelihood by approximately 2.31 times of preferring to increase taxes for education. Holding all variables constant,
the view that not enough funding is problematic for public education, compared to those who
do not think this is a problem, increases the likelihood by approximately 4.45 times of preferring to increase taxes for education. On the contrary, the belief that the federal government is
a problem in public education is associated with a preference to decrease taxes. Holding all
variables constant, the view that the federal government is problematic for public education,
compared to those who do not think this is a problem, decreases the likelihood by approximately 56% of preferring to increase taxes for education. Interestingly, there is no statistical
difference in these beliefs across the place-based categories.
While beliefs about the problems in public education may build off ideological positions,
differences in these beliefs between metro and non-metro individuals are insignificant. These
findings indicates that while metro and non-metro individuals may drive their preferences for
local taxes based on unique comparisons across schools, current descriptions of place (urban
and rural) are not fully capturing this variation. In one case, average schools may be good
and increase the preference for education tax increases. In another, average schools are bad
and may reduce the preference for increasing taxes. However, beliefs (that are often associated
with ideological leanings) are not shaped by place in different ways. In this regard, individuals,
regardless of place, are more alike than different.
Income, for example, is considered one of the main determinants of tax preferences. I
argue that income levels across place would result in differential preferences. However, the
models estimated in this chapter show limited support for this conjecture. In the 2015 survey,
I find that being middle-class in a non-metro county, compared to being middle-class in a
metro county, reduces the likelihood by approximately 80% of preferring to increase taxes for
education. In the 2016 survey, I find that being low-income in a non-metro county, compared
to being high-income in a non-metro county, reduces the likelihood by approximately 73% of
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preferring to increase taxes for education. These findings provide limited support for the effect
of income on the likelihood of individuals in non-metro places to prefer decreasing taxes,
compared to those in metro places.
It seems that ideological differences are the main way that we explain differences across
place, in particular, when we compare the urban and rural divide. My findings suggest that differences indeed exist between residents of each place. However, these differences are mainly
associated with individual perceptions of public education, including cross-jurisdictional comparisons and beliefs about problems in public education. While performing on average may be
positively associated with increasing taxes for non-metro individuals, it would be negative for
metro individuals. This indicates a more subtle difference between the political and economic
preferences of residents in each place. Less so about ideology, these individuals may measure
their local public goods using different baselines. These baselines are built on comparisons
across places and beliefs about problems. The argument that ideology is the main contributor
to their preferences for public provisions appears inflated. While beliefs are clearly drivers in
setting tax preferences, there is overall little statistical difference in the effect of these variables
on taxes for public education, when we compare metro and non-metro individuals. Meaning
that whether an individual believes the problem is unequal resources or the federal government,
place does not always define these ideological and political divides.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCAL RETURNS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION: CONNECTING
UNEMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND MIGRATION TO INDIVIDUAL
DEMAND FOR EDUCATION SPENDING
3.1

Overview
Spatial characteristics are relevant for understanding the ways in which individuals place

value on the public goods that surround them. It makes sense that where an individual lives
and experiences collective outcomes, like schools or roads, shapes their standards for what
they may consider adequate and sufficient. As time passes, individuals observe the public
goods around them. They observe increases and decreases in public investment at the local
level. This allows individuals to continue updating their preferences for each good based on
the local experience. These local experiences could be categorized in a number of ways. Place
(urban, suburban, and rural) is one of these categorizations and it could not only be an outcome
for general preferences, but it also could drive individual preferences themselves. Where you
experience goods sets your standard for what you might consider to be good enough or it could
inspire a preference for change in government expenditure.
This article presents an analysis of place-based preferences. Specifically, preferences on
K-12 public education by the state for local schools. This preference for school finance is a
reflection of local demand for education. The effect of locality should be captured by the placebased categories of urban, suburban, and rural. Each category encompasses the local economy
of education, including variation in current spending on schools. While expenditure per pupil
is comparable among rural and urban areas, the highest expenditures are found in suburban
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areas (Cornman et al., 2018). However, expenditure does not account for cost variation among
schools. From 2014-2015, rural schools experienced the lowest percentage change in median
inflation-adjusted total revenue per pupil (1.8 percentage change, compared to 2.5 in urban and
3.9 in suburban– average percent change across the US was 2.2) as well as the lowest percent
change in median inflation-adjusted expenditures per pupil (1.4 percentage change, compared
to 1.8 in urban and 3.8 in suburban– average percent change across the US was 1.7) (Cornman
et al., 2018). Overtime, rural schools (compared to urban and suburban) remain below national
and inter-geographic trends of per-pupil spending and expenditure. However, rural schools
face similar disadvantages to urban schools such as concentrated poverty and challenges in
student achievement (Burdick-Will and Logan, 2017). Furthermore, rural schools tend to serve
large proportions of disadvantaged students, with high rates of low-income students (Logan
and Burdick-Will, 2017). Increasingly, rural schools struggling with insufficient budgets have
moved towards consolidation and reorganization, often creating other costs such as increased
transportation expenses (Tieken, 2014). These unique challenges may shift public preferences
in unique ways- providing insight into the determinants of education demand, and ultimately,
outcomes in rural areas.
It could be that a feedback loop may emerge in some places, where financial constraints
impact educational achievement and opportunity, leading to public preferences that further
constrain adequate funding for rural schools. If this is the case– where an individual resides
is not only an outcome but also a determinate– it could be argued that considering how much
a person prefers to spend on a public good is, essentially, a local calculation. To get at this
idea, I use the case of state spending on public (K-12) education to test how place may drive
preferences. Public education is a relevant topic for this study because it varies across place
(depending on where you live, the funding of education varies) and the complementarity nature of education (related to local employment) allows for some isolation of local economic
effects. This variation in public education across the United States provides some context for
understanding variation in preferences. The logic behind this argument is that individuals will
value local education more, when the local employment opportunity (the return on investment)
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is higher. In other words, individuals value (and prefer to spend more) on public education
when they estimate a positive local economic effect.
This paper seeks to build an empirical understanding of the complementarity economic
considerations for public education (primary and secondary) across place. First, I analyze
social movement across place and discuss the role that movement could have on preference
formation. The discussion of movement is intended to outline the role of place in preference
formation. Second, I analyze nationally representative survey data to empirically test the notion
that where an individual lives factors into how that individual values public goods, focusing
specifically on the local unemployment rate and median household income. Most importantly,
I employ a comparative approach to place (rural, suburban, and urban) to provide insights into
how shifting economic factors impact the so-called spatial divide between preferences.
The goal of this study is to illuminate the way in which preferences are shaped by place
and how that may feed back into the distribution of funding for public goods. Underlying
this research approach is the notion that where one lives shapes the way that they value public
goods. This paper represents a small step in understanding place-based preference variation
in the United States. In addition, this article informs a long-held question of political scholarship that some individuals hold preferences for government that go against their own interests.
Combining survey data and county-level economic and demographic data, I extend the research
on the dynamics between place and preferences for public goods.

3.2

Literature
Public education, primary and secondary, is generally provided as part of a set of public

goods provided by most industrial nations, within a basic welfare state framework (Busemeyer,
2007). Basic education services are provided by the state in a generally consistent manner.
However, variation remains across and within countries. Like most variation among public
policies, there is a potential feedback loop with public support. Income, education, and race
play roles in determining individual support for welfare state policies (Hasenfeld and Rafferty,
1989; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Furthermore, a gap is found to exist along class lines,
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particularly between low and high-income Americans (Gilens, 2009). In addition, preferences
for spending in the welfare state are mainly determined by personal characteristics such as
age, gender, race and socio-economic level, in addition to political ideology and perception of
fairness (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).
Economic theory has long assumed that people are primarily motivated through (material) self-interest, driven by a combination of price and income (Denzau and Grier, 1984).
Partisan ideology, or self-interest, have also been found as a determinant for preferences of
income transfers in the welfare state (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Lynch and Myrskylä, 2009). Income is one of the prevailing determinants for taxation and
spending preferences. Meltzer and Richard (1981) assert that as income increases, individuals
oppose more redistribution; yet as median income drops below mean income, the median voter
will support greater redistribution. This is within the context of current income, but future
income also serves as a strong determinant in preferences for redistribution. Benabou and Ok
(2001) find that the probability of upward mobility is a likely component in the consideration
of redistributive policy by individuals. Accordingly, opposition to redistributive policies is a
function of incomes below the mean, but more importantly, the expectation of a below mean
income in the future. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) argue that inequality serves as a factor
for support of welfare spending; as inequality increases, benefits for the employed maintain
support while benefits for those without earnings decline.
Spatial context provides some insight into variation in economic and political preferences. A growing body of research has demonstrated the relationship between preferences and
political behavior (Citrin and Green, 1990; Frank, 2004; Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Bartels,
2016). Understanding individual preferences and the distribution of public benefits, is furthered by considering heterogeneity in preferences across geographical and spatial divisions.
In contrast to urban and suburban areas, rural areas in the United States are experiencing population decline, whereas urban areas are experiencing consistent gains to population (Cromartie,
2016). Rural communities also experience higher rates of poverty than those found in urban
and suburban areas (United States Department of Agriculture, 2017).
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Place, defined by urban, suburban, and rural categories, is one way to encompass the
common factors that might drive these places to prefer public goods differently. The rural
sentiment of being overlooked or forgotten could be translated into less support for public
provisions. This could be an ideological statement (Cramer, 2016). Certainly, the policy lens
has long-centered on urban places and the many challenges within them. Rural places may be
overlooked, or worse, intentionally discarded as a reflection of perceived economic inefficiency
leading to continual decline and economic hardship (Rodrı́guez-Pose, 2018). Economic growth
and development would then continue to disproportionately benefit growing, urban areas and
potentially, their suburban neighbors.
This territorial imbalance may hinder individuals in putting more faith into government
intervention, but rather sow further discord between the public and public institutions. This
would result in place-based preferences influenced by history to seek increased economic opportunity. More importantly, the contrast between urban and rural policy backgrounds highlights the relationship between local conditions and individual attitudes. In effect, place of
residence serves as a form of local tempering for preferences. This local experience would
closely reflect the conversion by conversation theory, which asserts that minority viewpoints
are likely to be converted by close proximity of majority viewpoints– which arguably, would
differ in urban, suburban, and rural places (Walks, 2004). In the context of public education,
place would capture the variation in spending preferences based on unique, local economic
conditions. General economic understanding builds a case that households sort themselves
based on wealth, preferences, local public goods, and social characteristics (Kuminoff et al.,
2013). In this paper, I argue that place of residence itself further serves to mold preferences
based on local conditions.

3.3
3.3.1

Complementarity Considerations
Movement
When it comes to paying for schools, multiple factors matter. One of these factors is the

ability to become employed and generate future earnings. The intuition behind this comple69

mentary relationship is that public education is more valuable when employment and wages
improve. Following the rationale of Albouy et al. (2018), this argument implies that demand
for education relies on complementary considerations, such as opportunity for social mobility.
While there is certainly intrinsic value in public education, the individual level calculation for
spending would be intertwined with the employment outcomes in close proximity. This approach differs from traditional models of sorting, which generally claim that individuals move
towards their preferences. Rather, variation in demand for public education may be a function
of the local outcomes. Without considering the variation of a local good, preferences (such as
willingness to pay or increased demand) will not be related to observable differences in public good endowments (Albouy et al., 2018). Preferences will be driven by a local calculation,
related to current endowments, rather than a function of individual income, race, or ideology.
There are two primary competing models to describe why we continue to see urbanrural disparities. The first is that people have preferences that drive them to live in a place
where those preferences are met. This is the classic model of voting with your feet (Tiebout,
1956). With market forces at work, individuals are free to move to where their preferences
are optimally met. After individuals sort into these groups, they will shape the characteristics
of that place further. In this model, an individual has perfect mobility and moves to a place
where the local government best meets their needs. Tullock (1971) later expanded this model to
emphasize that individuals select a place based on both government goods or services, as well
as the tax burden on that individual in a specific place. Based on this idea, preferences drive
movement and we would find that a form of self-selection drives preference concentration. This
option reflects the exit option in the exchange between citizens and policy-makers (Hirschman,
1970). Place categorizations further complicate the Tiebout model. Gramlich and Rubinfeld
(1982) argue that while the model may apply to urban and suburban communities, it does
less so to rural areas with limited public sector choice. Indeed, the authors argue the fiscal
incentive to migrate towards more efficient public provisions may be overstated (Gramlich and
Rubinfeld, 1982).
An alternative explanation is that individuals are restricted in places due to friction in
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location choice, and essentially, individuals become stuck to stay. According to this approach,
individuals are financially limited– in particular, low-income individuals, in their choice to
move for better economic opportunity. This means that regardless of their preference, they
are unable to move to another place. This could be due to a lack of economic means or the
opportunity cost placed on looking and relocating. People are unable to move due to social
and economic reasons which result in a set of preferences that are formed by that place. This
second option reflects the voice option Hirschman (1970). Being unable to move, individuals
may be more likely to build preference sets based on local effects, voicing opinions that reflect
these conditions.
Both of these models build support for the relationship between place and preference.
Whether I choose to move into a community that more optimally meets my needs or I am
unable to leave due to limitations, place would factor into our decision-making around local
spending on goods. Based on the Tiebout (1956) model, I would expect to find that within
a sample of individuals, movement would be common across all places. However, based on
economic frictions, low-income individuals would be less likely to have moved than highincome individuals. In addition, it would be likely that the experience of mobility differs
across age.
Using the 2016 CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Survey), I begin by analyzing movement through the lens of the urban-rural divide. First, I find that movement between
place (urban, suburban, and rural) categories is generally uniform. Table 3.1 displays the
weighted rate of movement (years of residence in current city) across place. Across each
place, approximately 27 percent or more have lived in their residence for more than 25 years.
This cohort has lived the longest in their current place of residence. The same finding is true
for the other categories of living in a place of residence. Among those that have resided in their
city for 10 to 24 years, we again find comparable distribution across place, with an average of
31-32 percent in this category. Further, across place, between 23 and 25 percent of individuals
have lived in their current place residence for less than 4 years. This cohort would reflect those
moving between places of residence. In all places, we see comparable movement and tenure
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between groups. There is no striking findings that suggest movement is driving people to or
from places. In contrast, if this sorting behavior is occurring, it appears uniform across place.
Ability to move would arguably affect income groups differently; those with more resources would be more likely to move based on preferences. Table 3.2 displays the weighted
rate of movement (years of residence in a current city) across place by low-income segments of
the survey sample. Among the low-income group, we find that the lowest percentage of individuals who have moved most recently (less than 4 years) is in the rural sample. However, this
group does not necessarily trail far behind their urban and suburban counterparts. Across all
other years of residence, we find comparable rates. Low-income individuals, living in urban,
suburban, or rural areas, appear to be moving in similar patterns. Table 3.3 shows the rate of
movement among middle-income individuals. In the middle income group, each place-based
middle class has comparable rates of movement and residence. In fact, the middle-income
group appears to not be moving or staying anymore often than the low-income group. Compared to the low-income and middle-income groups, we find a slightly different movement
by the high-income sample. Displayed in table 3.4, high-income individuals exhibit a slight
uptick among the percent of individuals residing in a place of residence for 10 to 24 years.
Again, this increase is uniform across all places.
Thus far, movement and length of residence appear to remain uniform across the sampled population. However, it could be that these cross-tabulations do not capture the group
most-likely to move: young people. Table 3.5 displays the weighted rate of movement among
individuals between the ages of 18 and 36, the age group that would most likely reflect movement for educational opportunities. This group certainly highlights the most recent case of
movement (with an increase in the percentage that have moved within the last 4 years). The
descriptive tables show that movement is generally uniform across place. The most likely
young people to move are those from suburban areas, but this is followed closely by the rates
in other places. Indeed, young people moving (from cities, suburbs, or the country) are doing
so in uniform fashion.
Individual preferences would impact educational budgeting through two mechanisms,
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Table 3.1: Duration of Residence Across Place by Full Sample of Individuals
Place
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Total

Less than 4

5 to 9 yrs

10 to 24 yrs

25+ years

14,780

8,632

18,144

15,395

26%

15%

32%

27%

1,167

701

1,402

1,286

26%

16%

31%

28%

714

489

957

848

24%

16%

32%

28%

16,661

9,822

20,503

17,530

26%

15%

32%

27%

Table 3.2: Duration of Residence Across Place by Low-Income Individuals
Place
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Total

Less than 4

5 to 9 yrs

10 to 24 yrs

25+ years

7,061

3,782

7,414

7,275

28%

15%

29%

28%

676

371

701

681

28%

15%

29%

28%

388

265

502

444

24%

17%

31%

28%

8,136

4,431

8,637.

8,414

27%

15%

29%

28%

Table 3.3: Duration of Residence Across Place by Middle-Income Individuals
Place
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Total

Less than 4

5 to 9 yrs

10 to 24 yrs

25+ years

4,631

2,75

5,541

4,690

26%

16%

31%

27%

313

207

427

383

24%

16%

32%

29%

208

138

258

242

25%

16%

31%

29%

5,148

3,096

6,225

5,318

26%

16%

31%

27%
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Table 3.4: Duration of Residence Across Place by High-Income Individuals
Place
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Total

Less than 4

5 to 9 yrs

10 to 24 yrs

25+ years

2,011

1,336

3,535

2,213

22%

15%

39%

28%

62

47

89

65

23%

18%

34%

25%

24

22

45

45

18%

16%

33%

32%

2,084

1,397

3,646

2,310

22%

15%

39%

24%

Table 3.5: Duration of Residence Across Place by Young Individuals (age 18-36)
Place
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Total

Less than 4

5 to 9 yrs

10 to 24 yrs

25+ years

7,370

3,042

4,554

2,992

41%

17%

25%

16%

542

202

252

204

45%

17%

21%

17%

295

136

159

112

42%

19%

23%

16%

8,201

3,378

4,954

3,304

41%

17%

25%

16%
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voice or exit (Hirschman, 1970). According to Hirschman (1970), within the context of budgeting, individuals will leave a community (exit) where public expenditures do not meet their
preferences or use political influence (voice) to change budget levels to meet their preferences.
In this paper, I seek to build a model of preference variation (over geography) rather than
a model of how a school budget came to be (through movement of individuals or political
activism around budget levels). Following the rationale of Brown and Saks (1983), both mechanisms likely work simultaneously.1
Across the spatial divide we find that movement is comparable. These findings do not
contradict the theories of movement, but rather inform of our understanding of movement, or
how little there actually is across income groups, young people, and place. Movement is not
as common as may be suggested by theory, at least among the general population. In nearly
all cross-tabulations, beside the youth, the majority of respondents are staying in their place of
residence for over 10-25 years. A limitation of this data is that we do not know the direction
of movement (for example, rural to rural or urban to urban). Should place factor into their
preference for public education, it is likely that those decisions are made on the local-level
with a local consideration of economic opportunity. In this analysis, this local calculation of
complementary outcomes relative to public education spending are captured by county level
unemployment rates and median household income– both of which reflect local, economic
prosperity.
Underlying local preferences are three considerations outlined by Brown and Saks (1983).
The first is that the kinds of public goods or bundles of policies are not available in all places.
This means that the opportunity for movement across place does not always result in the same
policy outcomes, access to certain goods could be lost along the way. The second is that elements of public provisions and goods change continually within the local economy. Neighbor1

A concern of this analysis was reverse causality. Decreases in spending on education could reduce local employment and wages. In contrast, decreases in local employment and wages could reduce spending on education
(for example, fiscal constraints that limit revenue generation). To mitigate possible endogeneity, including reverse
causality, I constructed a shift-share (Bartik instrument) based on trends in county-level employment wages overtime. The idea was to improve the causal relationship between economic conditions in a county and demand for
education. However, due to the limitations of using a cross-sectional dataset as well as the theoretical notion that
preferences are forward-looking, the instrumental variable results are not included. Instead, I key independent
variables are lagged from 2015.
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hoods, job markets, and availability are in constant flux. Finally, there are costs to movement.
Individuals may pay with opportunity costs, relocation expenses, or personal costs, such as
loss of familiar ties. The point of this analysis is the inter-place differentiation leading to variation in preference for education spending, specifically focusing on the distinctions of urban,
suburban, or rural.

3.4

Empirical Results

3.4.1

Ordered Logit Model
The empirical strategy of this paper is employed to analyze individual and county-level

dynamics as factors in preferences for state spending on education. The dependent variable
asks respondents to select their preferred course of action by the state government for public
education funding, moving from a great decrease to great increase. In this paper, I use an
ordered logit model which relies on the natural ordering to the dependent variable, greatly decrease to decrease to leave the same to increase to greatly increase.With this model, I estimate
state spending preferences as a linear function of individual and county level variables. The
ordered logit model is based on the following specification.

yic = β1 (X1i ) + β2 (X2c ) + β3 (X3c ) + ic

(3.1)

yi = 0 if y ≤ µ0 ,
1 = µ0 < y ≤ µ1 ,
2 = µ1 < y ≤ µ2 ,
3 = µ2 < y ≤ µ3 ,
4 = µ3 < y ≤ µ4
where yi is the observed preference for individual i within county c. The state spending preference function for each individual is composed of a one main individual component and two
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county level economic component plus the error component, i c. In the model, β1 (X1i ) is
the length of duration of the individual, β2 (X2c ) is the county median income, β3 (X3c ) is the
county unemployment rate. Additionally, each model includes a vector of individual traits and
county-level economic factors in which the individual resides.
Another level of complexity in this model is the nesting of respondents into their respective counties. The multiple levels of aggregation can cause heteroscedasticity within estimates.
While the total number of observations vary across counties, less than one percent of the sample
has only one observation in a county and less than 15 percent of the sample has ten observations
in each county. Survey data is collected through a nationally stratified sample of the United
States. However, I am not only interested in the sampled population, but rather the broader
population. Since there are counties in the population that are not included in this sample, it
is advised to cluster standard errors at the county level (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Although
there are multiple methods to cluster standard errors, the models in this paper are specified to
include county-level fixed effects, meaning a separate intercept is estimated for each level of
the aggregate clusters (counties). I chose to include cluster-specific fixed effects because I want
to control for correlated error between the regressors and error term. Including county-level
fixed effects, basically a dummy variable for each county, reduces inconsistent estimation of
coefficients by including mean-differencing at the cluster level (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Estimated models include a separate intercept for each county, but these are not listed in the
output tables.
3.4.2

Data
For the empirical analysis, I use survey data (cross-sectional) collected through the 2016

Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Figure 3.1 shows the 2016 CCES common
content survey respondents by county, mapped across the United States. In this survey, individuals from across the country are randomly selected and polled regarding their attitudes towards
political, social, and economic issues. The key variable measures individual attitudes towards
spending on education. Respondents were asked the following: “State legislatures must make
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Figure 3.1: 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) Common Content
Respondents

choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. How would you like
your legislature to spend money on education?” Responses ranged from greatly decrease (1) to
greatly increase (5). The average value of the total sample is 3.8, indicating that respondents
prefer only slightly more than the status quo. Table 3.6 outlines the descriptive statistics of this
variable by place. I include a second dependent variable as a point of contrast. In this question,
respondents were asked how they would grade (A=excellent to F=Fail) local schools in their
community. Table 3.7 outlines the descriptive statistics of this variable by place. The percents
listed below are among each place group (urban, suburban, and rural).
Using zip codes from survey respondents, I match each individual to the economic char-
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Table 3.6: Dependent Variable (total and percent): How would you like your state
legislature to spend money on education?
Place

Great Decrease

Decrease

Keep Same

Increase

Great Increase

Urban

1,687

2,725

12,911

13,353

15,727

3.64

5.87

27.82

28.78

33.89

142

255

1124

1140

1122

3.76

6.75

29.7

30.13

29.66

77

159

785

776

683

3.1

6.4

31.66

31.29

27.55

1,906

3,139

14,819

15,268

17,532

3.62

5.96

28.14

28.99

33.29

Suburban
Rural
Total

Table 3.7: Alternative Dependent Variable (total and percent): How would you grade
your local schools?
Place

A: Excellent

B: Above Average

C: Average

D: Below Average

F: Poor

Urban

6,533

14,818

18,090

5,284

1,922

14.01

31.77

38.78

11.33

4.12

388

1,107

1,569

406

151

10.72

30.57

43.33

11.21

4.17

297

652

996

249

102

12.94

28.40

43.38

10.84

4.44

7,218

16,577

20,655

5,939

2,175

13.73

31.54

39.29

11.30

4.14

Suburban
Rural
Total
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acteristics of their county. For this analysis, I rely on US Census data through the Department
of Agriculture Economic Research Service (ERS). County-level data includes measures of
poverty, population, education, and race. Poverty estimates are model-based estimates from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimate (SAIPE) program. Population
estimates were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau County Population Estimates. Additionally, I include school financial data through the US Census Bureau 2015 Annual Survey
of School System Finances. Due to a collection of schools districts in each county, measures
such as local, state, and federal revenue are average estimates among the county. Table 4.1
outlines the key independent variables and the distribution of revenue sources for all counties
(and school districts) of individuals in the sample). Table 4.2 outlines these variables for urban
counties, table 4.3 outlines these variables for suburban counties, and table 4.2 outlines these
variables for rural counties.
Two key independent variables are included to analyze the complementarity relationship between schools and economic opportunity, county level unemployment rates and median
household income– both of which reflect local, economic prosperity. These measures were
collected at the county level by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment
Statistics (LAUS) program. These variables measure local area employment opportunity and
compensation. The expected relationship between these variable and the dependent variable
is that as unemployment rates increase (less work), the demand for education spending decreases. As median household income increases (improved economic activity), the demand for
education spending will also increase.d
Variation in the magnitude of these relationships across place would imply a stronger
mechanism of inverse demand for education during times of economic hardship. Figure 3.2
illustrates the unemployment rate in 2015 by place and 3.3 illustrates the median household income distribution. In figure 3.2, across each place, the unemployment rate is similar, clustering
around 5 percent. However, there is a larger distribution of this variable in the urban sample
compared to the suburban and rural sample. Additionally, the median household income is
much more widely distributed in the urban and suburban samples (as seen in figure 3.3) than in
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the rural sample. Among the rural sample of counties, the local distribution of income is clustered and lacks the long tail of the kernel density function, suggesting that the higher income
earnings found in urban areas, and to a degree suburban areas, are not found in rural areas. The
underlying question of this analysis is 1) about the effect of these variables as determinant of
education spending preferences and 2) if this effect varies by place.
A secondary independent variable is the duration of residence by the individual. This
variable is intended to build some understanding of the relationship of movement as a factor in
education demand. In particular, does living in a place during a longer time result in increased
interest in investment in public education? Additionally, would the relationship between this
variable and demand for education vary across place. Control variables include the individual’s income level (compared to low-income), age (in 10 years), status as a parent (being a
parent=1), an interaction of age and being a parent, education level, gender (female=1), work
status (not working=1), status as a homeowner (owner=1), race dummy variables, immigration
status (immigrant=1), and ideology scale (increasingly conservative). At the county level, control variables include percent of Black county residents, percent of Hispanic county residents,
median income (in 10,000s), percent of county poverty for all residents, and percent of county
poverty for all school age children (age 5-17). These variables are largely in line with the
redistribution and education literature, but are not the main focus of this analysis.
All data is weighted in these models and presented as odds ratios (meaning a number
larger than one is positive and a number less than one is negative). In an ordered logit model,
the odds ratio coefficient is the the exponential function of the regression coefficient.

3.5

Results of Demand by Place and Local Economic Conditions
In the first iteration of the model, individual and county-level economic variables are

included to predict the preference of increasing state spending on education. Table 3.5.1 displays these results. Odds ratios can be interpreted as percent likelihood, a coefficient above 1 is
more likely to prefer an increase in state spending and less than 1 is less likely to prefer. Place
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Figure 3.2: 2015 Unemployment Rate Distribution across Urban, Suburban, and Rural
Places

Table 3.8: Summary Statistics of Full Sample
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

5.3

1.4

1.8

24

52564

57816.3

15092.8

23014

125900

52564

Duration of Residence

17.2

15.6

0

100

51269

Percent of Revenue: Federal

8.5

3.7

1.261

57.0

51563

Percent of Revenue: State

46.7

14.0

0

88.0

51563

Percent of Revenue: Local

44.6

15.3

0.612

96.6

51563

Percent of Revenue: Property Tax

29.1

18.2

0

91.9

51563

Unemployment Rate 2015
Median Household Income 2015
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Figure 3.3: 2015 Median Household Income Distribution across Urban, Suburban, and
Rural Places

Table 3.9: Summary Statistics of Urban Sample
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

5.2

1.3

2.2

24

46647

Median Household Income 2015

59508.4

15030.9

23968

125900

46647

Duration of Residence

17.168

15.632

0

100

45511

8.4

3.5

1.2

42.1

45647

Percent of Revenue: State

45.87

13.9

0

88.0

45647

Percent of Revenue: Local

45.71

15.1

2.3

96.6

45647

Percent of Revenue: Property Tax

29.8

18.5

0

86.6

45647

Unemployment Rate 2015

Percent of Revenue: Federal
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Table 3.10: Summary Statistics of Suburban Sample
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

5.7

1.5

2.4

17.6

3621

46530.4

7620.9

26218

107126

3621

Duration of Residence

17.4

16.0

0

100

3522

Percent of Revenue: Federal

9.2

4.2

2.7

44.0

3620

Percent of Revenue: State

53.3

12.1

3.7

83.6

3620

Percent of Revenue: Local

37.4

13.3

8.0

93.4

3620

Percent of Revenue: Property Tax

24.1

14.8

0

91.3

3620

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

6

1.8

1.8

15.5

2296

43361.5

8048.6

23014

82906

2296

Duration of Residence

17.9

16.0

0

79

2236

Percent of Revenue: Federal

10.0

5.3

1.54

57.0

2296

Percent of Revenue: State

53.3

14.8

3.293

87.3

2296

Percent of Revenue: Local

36.6

16.4

0.6

93.8

2296

Percent of Revenue: Property Tax

25.37

16.8

0

91.9

2296

Unemployment Rate 2015
Median Household Income 2015

Table 3.11: Summary Statistics of Rural Sample
Variable
Unemployment Rate 2015
Median Household Income 2015
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is included as a dummy variable, comparing counties that are urban and suburban to rural.
Compared to urban and suburban counties, being in a rural county reduces the preference for
increasing state spending on public education. In the case of the place-based dummy variable,
for the rural county group the outcome of preferring an increase in state spending on education
is approximately 6% less likely, compared to the urban and suburban county group and holding
all variables constant.
The key independent variable is the unemployment rate from the previous year. The hypothesis is that local economic opportunity (less unemployment and higher average income)
will positively impact individual demand (spending) on education. The inverse intuition is
that as the unemployment rate increases, so does the likelihood of preferring to decrease state
spending on education. As the county unemployment rate increases, the likelihood of preferring an increase in state spending on education is approximately 6% less likely, holding all
variables constant. This supports the hypothesis of the complementarity effect. As the local
economic conditions in employment opportunities decline, so does the preference to increase
state spending on local public schools. Furthermore, in the urban and suburban samples, we
find that unemployment drives down demand for more public education through increased
spending. As the county unemployment rate in the urban sample increases, the likelihood of
preferring an increase in state spending on education is approximately 5% less likely, holding
all variables constant. More striking, as the county unemployment rate in the suburban sample
increases, the likelihood of preferring an increase in state spending on education is approximately 14% less likely, holding all variables constant. This variable is not statistically significant in the rural sample, highlighting that complementarity mechanisms may have a different
effect in rural places.
However, the findings for county median income are inverse to the complementarity effect. As the median household income increases, the demand for education will subsequently
decrease– rather than increase. As the county median income increases, the likelihood of preferring an increase in state spending on education is approximately 3% less likely, holding all
variables constant. This contrasts the hypothesis that greater earnings will generate greater
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local investment in education. Rather, as median income increases, we find the opposite effect
on spending preferences; individuals prefer to reduce state spending on education. Additionally, duration of living in a place appears to have no effect on the likelihood of preferring
increased state spending on education. In this iteration of the model, duration of residence is
not significant in any of the specifications.
In order to understand how unemployment and median income earnings impact places in
a comparative analysis, I introduce these variables into the model as interaction terms. These
are outlined in table 3.5.2. Place is included as a dummy variable, with suburban as the baseline value. Only rural is significant in this model. Compared to the suburban sample, being in a
rural county reduces the likelihood of preferring an increase in state spending on education by
approximately 61%, holding all variables constant. This finding indicates that compared to suburban places, rural areas are less likely to prefer increased state spending on education. There
is no significant difference in median household income. In fact, this variable loses significance
when I introduce revenue sources into the model. Unemployment remains significant in this
model, although the effect does not differ across place. As the county unemployment rate increases, the likelihood of preferring an increase in state spending on education is approximately
9% less likely, holding all variables constant. It could be argued that the inverse relationship
between unemployment and spending on education is not a place-based phenomenon. Regardless of place, this relationship appears to impact this sample of Americans in their preference
for state spending on education.
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3.5.1

Individual and County Determinants on Education Spending
Depending Variable: Increase State Spending on Education
Total

Urban

coef.

s.e.

Place (Increasingly Rural)

0.94∗∗

(0.02)

Unemployment Rate 2015

∗∗∗
∗∗

Median Household Income 2015
Duration of Residence
Low-Income
Middle-Income
Age (10 years)
Being a Parent
Parent*Age

0.94

0.97

1.00
∗∗

0.92

0.99
∗

0.98

∗∗∗

1.79

∗∗

0.94

∗∗∗

Rural

s.e.

coef.

s.e.

coef.

s.e.

(0.01) 0.95∗∗∗

(0.01)

0.86∗∗∗

(0.03)

0.97

(0.03)

∗∗

(0.01)

1.06

(0.10)

1.08

(0.14)

+

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

(0.03)

0.75

∗

(0.11)

1.47

(0.29)

(0.03)

0.92

(0.13)

1.22

(0.24)

(0.03)

1.01

(0.04)

∗

(0.82)

(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.01)

coef.

Suburban

0.96

1.00
0.92

∗∗

0.99
0.99

(0.01)

0.93

∗∗

+

∗∗∗

(0.17)

1.13

(0.38)

2.20

∗∗∗

(0.02)

1.05

(0.08)

0.93

(0.08)

∗∗∗

(0.15) 1.87

(0.02) 0.93

Education

1.04

(0.01) 1.05

(0.01)

1.04

(0.03)

0.96

(0.03)

Female

1.23∗∗∗

(0.02) 1.24∗∗∗

(0.02)

1.17∗

(0.09)

1.25∗

(0.12)

Not Working

0.91∗∗∗

(0.02)

0.91∗∗∗

(0.02)

0.90

(0.07)

0.90

(0.09)

Home Owner

0.77∗∗∗

(0.02)

0.77∗∗∗

(0.02)

0.67∗∗∗

(0.06)

0.93

(0.11)

White

1.17∗∗∗

(0.04) 1.16∗∗∗

(0.04)

1.92∗∗∗

(0.37)

1.03

(0.24)

Black

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

(0.12)

∗∗∗

(1.36)

∗∗∗

(1.76)

1.46

(0.70)

(0.41)

0.75

(0.20)

Hispanic
Immigrant
Ideology Scale
County Percent Black
County Percent Hispanic
Percent in Poverty 2015
Percent of Families w/ Children in Poverty 2015

2.56

∗∗∗

1.73

0.98
∗∗∗

0.66

1.14
∗

1.16

∗∗∗

1.04

∗

0.99

(0.12) 2.49
(0.09)
(0.04)

∗∗∗

1.69

0.98
∗∗∗

(0.01) 0.65
(0.12)
(0.09)

+

1.21

(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.13)

5.40

1.48
∗∗∗

0.72

0.91

(0.09) 4.70

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

(0.01)

∗∗

∗

(0.00)

1.12

(0.01) 1.04
(0.00)

(0.09)

5.06

0.99

1.05

1.01

(0.02)

∗∗∗

3.23

∗∗∗

(0.03)

+

0.76

(0.41)

0.41

(0.19)

(2.02)

2.06

(1.36)

(0.02)

1.02

(0.02)

(0.01)

1.01

(0.02)

County Fixed Effects

yes

yes

yes

yes

R2

0.05

0.04

0.11

0.10

N

44539

39426

3116

1997

Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(1.03)

3.5.2

Determinants on Education Spending with Interactions
Dependent Variable: Increase State Spending on Education
Full Sample (urban, suburban, and rural)
coef.

s.e.

Urban

0.66

(0.25)

Rural

0.39+

(0.22)

Unemployment Rate 2015

0.91∗∗∗

(0.02)

Urban × Unemployment Rate 2015

1.04

(0.03)

Rural × Unemployment Rate 2015

1.06

(0.04)

Median Household Income 2015

0.93

(0.05)

Urban × Median Household Income 2015

1.05

(0.06)

Rural × Median Household Income 2015

1.12

(0.10)

Duration of Residence

1.00

(0.00)

∗∗

Low-Income

0.92

(0.03)

Middle-Income

0.99

(0.03)

Age (10 years)

0.98∗

(0.01)

Being a Parent

∗∗∗

(0.15)

∗∗

(0.02)

1.78

Parent*Age

0.94

Education

∗∗∗

1.04

(0.01)

Female

1.23∗∗∗

(0.02)

Not Working

0.91∗∗∗

(0.02)

Home Owner

∗∗∗

(0.02)

∗∗∗

(0.04)

Black

∗∗∗

2.57

(0.13)

Hispanic

1.70∗∗∗

(0.09)

0.98

(0.04)

0.77

White

1.17

Immigrant
Ideology Scale (Increasingly Conservative)
County Percent Black

∗∗∗

0.66

1.09

(0.01)
(0.11)

County Percent Hispanic

1.13

(0.09)

Percent in Poverty 2015

1.04∗∗∗

(0.01)

Percent of Families w/ Children in Poverty 2015

0.99∗∗

(0.00)

∗∗∗

(0.00)

Percent of Revenue: Federal

1.02

Percent of Revenue: State

1.00

County Fixed Effects

yes

R2

0.05

N

39440

Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(0.00)

3.6

Results of Grading Schools by Place and Local Economic Conditions
In the second iteration of the model, individual and county-level economic variables are

included to predict how an individual will grade their local public schools. Survey respondents
are asked to grade their local public goods including schools, police, zoning, mayor, and city
council. The scale of these grades follow those used in American school systems, with A
representing excellent and F representing failure. The key dependent variable is this grade
for public schools. However, to control for preferences that might generally mark all items in
the same manner, the other local public goods are included in the analysis. This is a way of
controlling for survey responses that might not fully reflect preferences. The order of these
values are one (1) equivalent to failure (F) and five (5) equivalent to excellent (A). Thus, the
interpretation of these grading (or valuing) variables is that as an individual grades a public
good higher (towards excellent), the estimated effect will also improve the grading of local
public schools (towards excellent).
Table 3.6.1 displays the result of the full survey sample and each place-based sample. As
in the first models that estimate spending on education, the key independent variables are the
unemployment rate and median household income (measured from the previous year, 2015).
The hypothesis is that local economic opportunity (less unemployment and higher average income) will positively impact how individuals value and grade their local education institutions.
This is another way to get at the notion of the complementarity effect in spending preferences.
As before, Table 3.6.1 outlines the findings from the model run with the full sample and
then, each place-based samples. In this iteration of the full model, place is significant in how
individuals grade their local schools. As a place moves from urban to rural, the grading of
local schools increases. Compared to urban and suburban counties, being in a rural county
increases an individual’s grading of their local schools, effectively moving towards an A mark
which represents excellent. In the case of the place-based dummy variable, being in a rural
increases the likelihood of grading your local school excellent by approximately 22%, holding
all variables constant.
The intuition between this form of estimating the complementarity effect is that as local
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economic conditions improve, the grading of local schools (as a proxy for valuation) will subsequently improve. The results of this model differ strikingly to those in the model for spending
preferences. In this model, the unemployment rate is not statistically significant. However,
county median household income is significant and positive. As the county median income increases, the likelihood of grading your local school excellent also increases by approximately
11%, holding all variables constant. Duration of residence is also not significant. However,
among the rural sample, living in a place for a longer duration results in a higher grade for
local schools. Among rural respondents, living in a county longer increases the likelihood that
an individual will grade their local schools as excellent by approximately 1%.
Among control variables, the county level variables are highly significant in this model.
Increasing the percent of non-white community members reduces the grade that individuals
give their public schools. The poverty indicators at the county-level estimate inverse effects
on public school grades. Increasing the percentage of families in poverty within a county is
associated with better grades for local schools. In contrast, increasing the number of children
in poverty within a county is associated with worse grades for local schools. All variables of
other public good values are positive and significant (although low in magnitude). The largest
effect is valuing police as a public good with a positive impression is associated with higher
likelihood of grading public schools as excellent.
Table 3.6.2 illustrates the interactions of key variables with place in grading local public schools. Among the place variable (suburban is again the baseline variable), these are not
statistically significant. There is no indication of statistical differences among these variables
when estimating grades for schools. Median income is also insignificant in this model. However, when interacted with place, there is a statistically significant difference between the rural
and suburban samples. Compared to the suburban sample, being in a rural county increases
the likelihood of grading your local schools as excellent by approximately 20%, holding all
variables constant. The unemployment rate remains insignificant in this model and while the
duration of residence is significant, the effect is close to zero.
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3.6.1

Individual and County Determinants on Grading Public Schools
Depending Variable: Increase Grade on Public Education
Total

Urban

coef.

s.e.

Place (Increasingly Rural)

1.22∗∗∗

(0.03)

Unemployment Rate 2015

1.00

(0.01)

Median Household Income 2015
Duration of Residence
Low-Income
Middle-Income
Age (10 years)
Being a Parent
Parent*Age
Education
Female

∗∗∗

1.11

∗

1.00

∗∗∗

0.90

∗∗∗

0.86

∗

1.02

∗∗∗

1.72

∗∗∗

0.93

1.01
0.94∗∗

Not Working

0.99

Home Owner

1.18∗∗∗

White
Black
Hispanic
Immigrant
Ideology Scale (Increasingly Conservative)
County Percent Black
County Percent Hispanic
Percent in Poverty 2015

1.10∗
∗∗∗

1.44

∗∗∗

1.40

∗

1.09

∗∗∗

0.94

∗∗∗

0.43

∗∗∗

0.71

∗∗∗

1.02

∗∗∗

Percent of Families w/ Children in Poverty 2015 0.97
Grading: Police
Grading: Roads

∗∗∗

2.41

∗∗∗

1.31

∗∗∗

Rural

coef.

s.e.

coef.

s.e.

coef.

s.e.

1.00

(0.01)

1.04

(0.04)

0.99

(0.03)

(0.01)

0.98

(0.10)

1.15

(0.15)

∗

(0.00)
(0.18)

∗∗∗

(0.01) 1.12
(0.00)

Suburban

∗

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.01

∗∗∗

(0.03)

1.15

(0.17)

0.87

1.00

(0.03) 0.89

∗∗∗

(0.02) 0.86

+

(0.03)

1.13

(0.17)

0.70

(0.15)

+

(0.01)

1.06

∗

(0.03)

1.05

(0.04)

∗∗∗

(0.16)

1.34

(0.46)

1.49

(0.60)

∗∗∗

(0.02) 0.93

(0.02)

0.98

(0.08)

0.94

(0.08)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.99

(0.03)

0.97

(0.04)

(0.02) 0.93∗∗∗

(0.02)

0.99

(0.08)

1.10

(0.11)

(0.02)

(0.02)

1.12

(0.09)

0.98

(0.11)

(0.03) 1.19∗∗∗

(0.03)

1.00

(0.09)

1.24+

(0.15)

1.12∗∗

(0.04)

0.53∗∗

(0.11)

1.85∗∗

(0.44)

∗

(0.61)

(0.01)

1.01

(0.15) 1.78

(0.04)

1.01

0.98

∗∗∗

(0.07)

1.35

(0.38)

1.91

∗∗∗

(0.08)

0.82

(0.26)

1.19

(0.60)

(0.29)

∗

(0.14)

∗∗∗

(0.07) 1.45
(0.07)
(0.04)

1.41

1.11

∗∗

∗∗∗

(0.01) 0.94

(0.01)

∗∗∗

(0.04)

∗∗∗

(0.05)

(0.04) 0.40
(0.06) 0.66
(0.01)

(0.04)

1.02

∗∗

∗∗∗

(0.00) 0.98

∗∗∗

(0.03) 2.41

∗∗∗

(0.02) 1.31

∗∗∗

(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.03)

1.12

(0.03) 0.83

(0.03)

∗∗

(0.14)

0.72

(0.35)

0.95
0.31

0.53

+

0.79

(0.33)

0.68

(0.48)

∗∗

(0.02)

0.99

(0.02)

∗∗∗

(0.01)

0.97

(0.02)

1.05
0.93

∗∗∗

2.54

∗∗∗

(0.02) 1.32

∗∗∗

(0.14)
(0.07)

∗∗∗

(0.15)

∗∗∗

(0.08)

∗

(0.09)

2.43
1.27

Grading: Zoning

1.30

(0.02) 1.30

Grading: Mayor

1.14∗∗∗

(0.02)

Grading: City Council

1.39∗∗∗

(0.02) 1.39∗∗∗

County Fixed Effects

yes

yes

yes

yes

R2

0.16

0.15

0.22

0.22

N

43936

38888

3072

1976

Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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1.14∗∗∗

(0.02) 1.35

(0.08)

1.19

(0.02)

(0.07)

1.28∗∗

(0.10)

(0.10)

1.32∗∗

(0.11)

1.09

(0.03) 1.47∗∗∗

3.6.2

Determinants on Grading Public Education with Interactions
Dependent Variable: Increase Grade on Public Education
Full Sample (urban, suburban, and rural)
coef.

s.e.

Urban

0.63

(0.25)

Rural

0.64

(0.38)

Median Household Income 2015

1.06

(0.06)

Urban × Median Household Income 2015

1.05

(0.06)

Rural × Median Household Income 2015

1.20∗

(0.11)

Unemployment Rate 2015

0.99

(0.03)

Urban × Unemployment Rate 2015

1.01

(0.03)

Rural × Unemployment Rate 2015

0.99

(0.04)

Duration of Residence

1.00∗

(0.00)

Low-Income

∗∗∗

0.90

(0.03)

Middle-Income

0.86∗∗∗

(0.02)

∗

Age (10 years)

1.02

(0.01)

Being a Parent

1.73∗∗∗

(0.15)

∗∗∗

(0.02)

Parent*Age

0.93

Education
Female
Not Working

1.01

(0.01)

0.94∗∗

(0.02)

0.99

(0.02)

∗∗∗

Home Owner

1.18

1.10∗

White
Black

(0.07)

∗∗∗

(0.07)

1.40

1.09∗

Immigrant

(0.04)

∗∗∗

1.44

Hispanic

(0.03)

(0.04)

Ideology Scale (Increasingly Conservative)

∗∗∗

0.94

(0.01)

County Percent Black

0.42∗∗∗

(0.04)

∗∗∗

(0.06)

Percent in Poverty 2015

∗∗∗

1.02

(0.01)

Percent Families in Poverty 2015

0.97∗∗∗

(0.00)

∗∗∗

(0.03)

Grading: Roads

∗∗∗

1.31

(0.02)

Grading: Zoning

1.30∗∗∗

(0.02)

∗∗∗

(0.02)

∗∗∗

(0.02)

County Percent Hispanic

0.69

Grading: Police

2.41

Grading: Mayor

1.14

Grading: City Council

1.39

County Fixed Effects

yes

R2

0.16

N

40205

Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.7

Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the role of place in preferences for spending on public education.

First, this analysis considers the effect of movement as a form of spatial sorting. Outlining
the descriptive statistics of the 2016 CCES survey data, rates of movement among individuals
and places are outlined. Among each place, I find that the rate of movement is consistent.
These findings show that individuals move at comparable rates. This means that both theories
of movement (self-sorting and income constraints) generally lead to similar effects in terms
of movement across each place-based distinction. Indeed, once the data is separated along
income lines, I find similar rates of movement hold across place. While I find an increase in
movement among young people, these rates remain comparable across place. This indicates
that movement patterns are not necessarily an urban or rural phenomenon. An individual could
either choose to move or be unable to move between places. However, this does not detract
from the argument that local economic conditions would center an individual’s preference for
school funding. In both cases, preferences will likely be a local calculation.
To consider this local calculation, I examine the complementarity nature of public goods,
in this case, public education. The logic is that public education will be driven by local benefits,
more specifically, employment and higher earnings. Simply put, local public education will be
more valuable to individuals when there is increased local employment and better earnings. For
the empirical analysis, I rely on individual level survey data nested in counties. This requires
the employment of an ordered logit model including cluster-specific fixed effects. The first
iterations of models tests the relationship between key variables and demand for education
(expressed as a preference to increase state spending on education). The second iteration of the
models tests the relationship between local benefits and valuing public education, expressed as
a grade for public schools (literally, school grade scales of F (failure) to A (excellent)).
In the models estimating preferences for education spending, I find that increasing the
unemployment rate results in a decreased likelihood of preferring more state spending on education. The hypothesis is that local economic opportunity (more employment) will positively
impact individual demand (spending) on education. I find support for this hypothesis by a ro93

bust inverse coefficient that indicates local economic conditions impact state spending preferences by individuals on local public schools. However, this does not statistically differ between
urban, suburban, and rural counties. In contrast, I find that as median household income increases, individuals express a preference to decrease state spending on education. In this case,
I do not find support for the complementarity nature of public education preferences. These
findings show that the effect of employment and earnings may generate unique preferences for
education spending. While higher employment leads to decreased demand, higher income also
leads to decreased demand. Additionally, I consider the duration of residence as a determinant
and find that this variable is not statistically significant. This means that living in a place longer
does not factor into an individual’s demand for public education.
In the next model, I interact key variables with place (urban, rural, and suburban) which
serves as the base category. Including place as an interaction variable allows for comparison
across models, effectively testing whether the effect of key variables (unemployment rate and
median household income) is different in each of the three locations. In these models, there is
no statistical difference in the relationships between key variables and place-based categories.
Comparing urban and rural places to suburban areas indicates no difference in the magnitude of
effect. Furthermore, I also run these models comparing urban and suburban to rural or suburban
and rural to urban with no statistical difference found. While the notion that complementarity
effects impact preferences for educational spending is consistent in terms of the unemployment
rate, these latter findings suggest that, among survey respondents defined by place, there is no
difference. In effect, respondents are more similar in this estimation than different. Unemployment drives down demand for state spending, but does not vary across place. In this regard,
rural Americans are no different than their urban or suburban counterparts.
Finally, I analyze how these key variables may correlate to the grading of local public
goods. Survey respondents are asked to grade their local public schools with a score ranging
from F (failure) to A (excellent). I find that more rural places are related to higher grading of
their public schools. In this estimation, rural Americans hold a higher value for their public
educational institutions. Additionally, as median household income increases, the grading of
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local public schools also increases. Thus, earnings correlate to more positive perceptions of
local public schools. However, when I add these key variables to the place-based categories,
I do not find a statistically significant difference in these estimation effects. Again, while the
effect of economic complementarity factors appear to impact how individuals value the quality
of their public schools, individuals are found to be more similar than different. Again, rural
Americans are no different than their urban and suburban counterparts.
These findings suggest that individuals value education differently due to their ability to
turn educational attainment into economic prosperity, a reflection of complementary considerations. While the preferences between urban, suburban, and rural individuals may vary based
on a variety of factors, the current categories of place do not fully capture preference variation between individuals. Rather, the findings from this study illustrate more commonalities
between individuals. The results suggest shared experiences by Americans, more specifically,
that demand for more spending in public education is inversely linked to local economic opportunity. In contrast, median household income improves how individuals grade (and value
the quality of) their public schools but this variable, across place, results in less demand for
additional state spending.
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CHAPTER 4
VOTING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS: ANALYZING TEXAS BOND
ELECTIONS ACROSS THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE
4.1

Overview
In the United States, public schools are funded through varying formulas of federal, state,

and local revenue. In addition, school funds for capital-improvement, renovations, or technological improvements are used by school districts to generate additional funds. School bonds
are debt taken on by the school district and must be approved by voters through a simple majority, or fifty percent of voters. The occurrence of school bond elections is a case in which
public finance decisions and collective election outcomes intersect in the policy arena. This
provides a unique opportunity to analyze the nature of collective decision-making for the funding of a public, or publicly-provided, good as well as examine the underlying factors that may
differ across communities and dictate election outcomes. This article presents an analysis of
place-based preferences through a comparison of urban and rural election outcomes for school
bond measures. In particular, this work focuses on the underlying factors that differentially
determine individual preferences based on where one lives. Through the analysis of school
bond elections, it is possible to underscore variation in election outcomes across place. The
intersection of voters and funding is useful in understanding collective decision-making and
the institutional (community) arrangement in which decisions are made.
Understanding political institutions, such as elections, is useful in understanding how
political institutions impact the public. Derived from Browne (2001), institutions are created
through tradition and political action. They govern behavior, specify who bears risks, and have
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a bias towards one interest over others. The objective of this study is to increase understanding
about the interaction between demographic characteristics (income, age, race, etc.) as factors
in election outcomes across place (urban versus rural). Demographic changes across place may
affect voters differently in their preferences for schools bonds. For example, rural American
locales have long struggled with population decline. Rural populations tend to be older than
urban and suburban areas (Johnson, 2013). Poverty also tends to be higher in non-metropolitan
counties than in metropolitan counties (Farrigan et al., 2014). Finally, while rural America
is mainly white, rural minority groups tend to remain concentrated near historical institutions
that subjugated these groups (Rural Sociological Society, 1993). Considerations of how many
residents pay, who among them pays, and finally, who benefits from public spending can impact
whether individuals support passage of a bond.
Additionally, the needs of rural schools vary from those in urban places. The amount
spent per pupil is generally higher in urban areas than in rural communities, even when other
economic and social factors are comparable. Both access to education and educational gains
also impact populations also vary across place. Broadly speaking, as rurality increases, the
percentage of rural adults with higher education decreases. Rural educational gains also vary
across demographic groups; rural women are more educated than rural men and rural whites are
more educated than racial and ethnic minorities (Marré, 2017). Nearly 79 percent of counties
deemed as “low education” are rural (Marré, 2017). Low educational attainment in rural places
is also closely related to higher poverty and child poverty rates as well as higher unemployment
rates and lower earnings. Each of these factors may drive election outcomes differently as
populations deal with demographic change in their communities and educational systems.
Relying on a unique dataset, this study will begin with an analysis of the state of Texas.
Data includes all elections from the year 2000-2016 across all school districts in Texas. The
Texas dataset, accessed through the Texas Bond Review Board, has been the subject of past
analyses of bond election determinants. Bowers and Lee (2013) analyze Texas bond elections
(1997-2009) to determine the factors that are more associated with bond passage, including
place-based characteristics such as city or town and demographic characteristics such as per-

97

cent of minority students. Building off this study, I include the comparison of urban versus rural
districts to consider how demographic changes captured by these place-based characteristics
impact bond election outcomes. To assess these effects, including how they comparatively affect election outcomes, I estimate time-series logit models on the likelihood of bond passage,
based on change in school district composition and county-level economic indicators.
I find that communities with higher median income are more likely to pass bond elections. As the local economy improves, so does the odds of passing a school bond. However,
there is no difference in the effect of this variable between rural and urban districts– meaning
this is not a phenomenon to one place. In each of the models, there is no effect based on older
cohorts (in rural areas) compared to younger cohorts (in urban areas). I also find support that
communities with more diverse students populations (in particular, rising rates of Hispanic
students) increases the likelihood of passing a school bond measure. However, like median
income, there is also no statistical difference across place.

4.2

Literature
In 2017, 50.7 million children attended public elementary and secondary schools, cost-

ing the nation roughly $623.5 billion for the school year (resulting in an average expenditure
of $12,300 per student) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2018). While only about
10 percent of education funding is through the federal government, the remaining money is
received through local and state taxes. At the local level, this revenue is primarily generated
through property taxes and at the state level, mainly through state income taxes. Funding formulas at the state and local level vary across states, however, states typically employ a method
for targeting funding to districts based on student characteristics (special education, English
language learners, economic disadvantage, and concentration of low-income students) (Chingos and Blagg, 2017). A supplement to these funds are local bond elections in which citizens
directly vote to increase funding, through a form of district-wide debt.
Voter behavior has mainly been understood as a general expression of self-interest (Sears
and Citrin, 1982; Brodsky and Thompson III, 1993; Shabman and Stephenson, 1994). In stud98

ies on school financing, income is the common way in which self-interest from schools is
operationalized. The influential research of Piele and Hall (1973a) and Piele and Hall (1973b)
on voter behavior and school finance elections highlighted partial-theories of factors that impact bond election outcomes. The authors find that school district characteristics (amount of
bond, per pupil expenditure), voter demographic characteristics (age, income), and election
characteristics (time of year, turnout) all determine bond outcomes.
However, age is another consideration when we consider voters at the ballot box deciding
to increase funding for public schools. This is known as the ”Gray Peril” hypothesis which
asserts that aging citizens will be less likely to support funding public goods, such as education,
because they do not directly benefit (Serow, 2003). Studies have found mixed evidence of this
phenomenon; some support the notion (Poterba, 1997; Cattaneo and Wolter, 2009) while others
find inconclusive results (Duncombe et al., 2003; Berkman and Plutzer, 2004). Lambert et al.
(2009) find support for the notion that funding for local public education is different in counties
that attract and retain seniors in large numbers, as opposed to those that do not.
Bowers et al. (2010b) analyze the factors that are mainly associated with the passage of
school bonds by local district elections. The authors find that the bond amount, percentage
of students receiving free and reduced lunch, voter turnout, and a low placement on the ballot
negatively impact the likelihood of passage. Further, the authors find that being in a small town
or rural community also reduces the likelihood of passage. Bowers et al. (2010a) analyze the
parameters driving the success of passing a bond measure. The authors find that urbanicity is a
key factor. More specifically, rural districts have worse chances of passing bond elections than
urban and suburban districts. In an analysis of school spending equity, (Zimmer and Jones,
2005) find that high-spending districts have greater probability of issuing bonds after policy
change for greater equity.
This article uses the urban-rural lens to highlight the dynamics which allow some communities to overcome collective action problems around funding a public good– one where
only a portion of the population directly benefits. Ostrom (2000) highlights the importance
of institutions (consider communities, elections, and place) as a determinant in understand-
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ing co-production, or the ways in which citizens (consumers in economic terms) participate
in the production of public goods or services, such as education. Olson (1965) argues that
communities face dilemmas of participation because some individuals will withhold contributions. While this might be rational on the individual level, it produces a collectively irrational
outcome. Overcoming these dilemmas falls into the realm of the public choice theory which
argues that individuals are rational human beings that seek to maximize their utility (Mueller,
2003). The basic idea is that individuals reveal their preferences at the ballot box. However,
considering that the outcomes are at the collective level, certain factors might deter individuals
from overcoming collective action problems.
Group identity, particularly around race distinctions, has been asserted as a factor in perpetuating collective action problems around public goods. Habyarimana et al. (2007) argue
that ethnicity matters. However, the authors find that individuals of the same group cooperate due to within-group norms and institutions with lead to successful collective endeavors.
Boustan et al. (2010), in contrast, find that spending and levels of public goods increase in
diverse communities. Silverman (2011) analyzes bond elections in New York and finds that
districts with a higher percentage of minority residents are less likely to pass budget referendums. These findings counter the notion that group diversity, in this case racial groups, creates
negative outcomes for collective action. Rugh and Trounstine (2011) analyze bond elections in
diverse communities finding that less bonds are proposed, yet these bonds pass at a higher rate.
The literature provides a basis for the theoretical underpinnings of this article. The
central question of this research asks how the determinants for passing local bonds through
elections vary across place. More specifically, the effects that we expect to drive collective
outcomes (income, age, and racial diversity) will be measured across place as factors in the
likelihood of passing bond measures for local public schools. The income effect draws on
the self-interest of rational voters. The age effect will test the variation in demographic shifts
across populations and consider how this maps into the likelihood of passing additional funding
for schools. Finally, the race effect will consider how changing group identities by the beneficiaries of education impact the collective outcomes of bond elections across place. These

100

variables are key in understanding how the demand side for public education may shift. This
provides for the following hypotheses which will be analyzed through the comparison of urban
and rural communities:
Hypothesis 1: Communities with higher incomes (measured by median income) will be less
likely to pass bond measures.
Hypothesis 2: Communities with older cohorts (measured by median age) will be less likely to
pass bond measures.
Hypothesis 3: Communities with more diverse student populations (measured by minority percentage) will be more likely to pass bond measures.

4.3

Analysis
Primary data was collected through the state of Texas Bond Review Board. This dataset

included all bond elections from 2002-2016 by independent school districts in the state, creating an unbalanced panel dataset. Ultimately, due to limitations of matching data, only the
years 2002-2016 were used for estimation. This data includes county of the school district,
total required amount, purpose of election, total number of votes, and breakdown of support
and opposition in the election. At the county level, election data was merged with demographic
data. Population estimates were collected through the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture. Median Household Income and poverty data was collected through the
US Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates Program (SAIPE). At the school
district level, data was merged with school characteristics and public finance variables. School
characteristic data was collected from the National Center for Education Statistics Common
Core of Data. Additional public finance variables were collected from the Texas Bond Review Board. This dataset includes a total of 2,213 elections in local school districts throughout
Texas. Using the designation of urban and rural counties provided by the Texas Department
of State Health Services, counties were then coded as urban/rural and border/non-border, displayed in figure 4.1. Table 4.1 outlines descriptive statistics of key variables of all districts in
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Figure 4.1: Urban and Rural Texas Counties, 2015

the state of Texas. Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics of rural districts and table 4.3
outlines the urban districts.
Bond amounts are greatest among the urban sample, with an average required amount of
approximately greater than 70 million dollars. In contrast, the proposed amount for the bond
in the rural sample is on-average approximately greater than 1 million dollars. The margin for
carried bonds is generally the same across the urban and rural sample, however, the percent of
carried bonds is highest in the urban sample (74.8 percent) compared to the rural sample (70.7
percent). Urban districts propose more costly bonds, have a higher likelihood of passing the
bonds, and carry the most outstanding debt. The distribution of bond requests across urban and
rural counties are displayed in figure 4.2. Figure 4.3 displays the trends in bonds over time.
Median income, on average and over time, is highest in urban areas, compared to rural
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Figure 4.2: Total Bond Requests across Urban and Rural Texas Counties, 2002-2016
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areas. Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of median income across each place-based category.
Median Age in rural districts is highest in the rural sample, with a mean age of 37.9 years
compared to 33.5 in urban areas. Figure 4.5 illustrates the distribution of median age across
each place type. In contrast, the poverty rate is minimally higher in rural counties compared to
urban counties. Figure 4.6 shows how the poverty rate has changed over time in each of these
district types. Figure 4.7, figure 4.8, and figure 4.9 show the make-up of non-white students
in each district. Among districts, the percentage of Hispanic students that make up the student
body are similar, around 35 percent in each. Urban districts have a slightly higher percentage
of Black students, while rural districts have a higher percentage of American Indian students.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Texas Districts
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

0.71

0.44

0

1

2213

Proposed Bond Amount

4,9092,162

117,722,828

839

1,890,000,000

2,213

County Median Income

44,213

11,949

17,239

87,901

2,213

County Median Age

35.2

4.62

22

55

2,213

County Poverty Rate

0.18

0.21

0.002

3.42

2,213

Debt Service Outstanding

132,704,891

319,608,325

0

4,236,902,532

2,213

Rate of Hispanic Students

0.35

0.267

0.01

0.999

2,209

Rate of Black Students

0.09

0.12

0

0.86

2,209

Rate of American Indian Students

0.01

0.01

0

0.28

2,209

Total Number of Students

7730

16,957

61

210,950

2,213

Bond Passage Rate

4.3.1

Empirical Method
The central question of this paper is concerned with the likelihood of passing local bonds

for public schools. Is the likelihood of bond passage constant across place or is there variation
in collective outcomes across place? If the likelihood of bond passage varies across place, what
are the main variables by which collective preferences depend? To analyze these questions, I
employ a series of logit regression models. The dependent variable is the passage or failure of
the bond measure in each school district; a discrete choice model. Throughout the time-series
(2000-2016), some school districts proposed multiple bonds to voters. Further, some school
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Rural Districts
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

0.69

0.45

0

1

820

Proposed Bond Amount

12,251,510

15,143,508

839

150,000,000

820

County Median Income

38,052

7,498

17,239

70,127

820

County Median Age

37.9

4.7

25

55

820

County Poverty Rate

0.18

0.14

0.002

1.483

820

Debt Service Outstanding

14,053,850

21,736,763

0

185,960,929

820

Rate of Hispanic Students

0.35

0.26

0.01

0.999

818

Rate of Black Students

0.07

0.10

0

0.59

818

Rate of American Indian Students

0.01

0.02

0

0.28

818

Total Number of Students

1,391

1,533

61

13,808

820

Bond Passage Rate

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Urban Districts
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

0.72

0.43

0

1

1,393

Proposed Bond Amount

70,778,691

143,587,752

150,000

1,890,000,000

1,393

County Median Income

47,839

12,581,

24,115

87,901

1,393

County Median Age

33.5

3.65

22

49

1,393

County Poverty Rate

0.17

0.24

0.01

3.42

1,393

Debt Service Outstanding

202,549,724

385,837,829

0

4,236,902,532

1,393

Rate of Hispanic Students

0.35

0.28

0.01

0.999

1,391

Rate of Black Students

0.10

0.13

0

0.86

1,391

Rate of American Indian Students

0.004

0.004

0

0.07

1,391

Total Number of Students

11,461

20,443

95

210,950

1,393

Bond Passage Rate

105

Figure 4.3: Average Requested Bond Amounts Across Urban and Rural Districts

Figure 4.4: Average of County Median Income Across Urban and Rural Districts
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Figure 4.5: Average of Median Age Across Urban and Rural Districts

Figure 4.6: Poverty Rates of Urban and Rural Districts
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Figure 4.7: Hispanic Student Rates of Urban and Rural Districts

Figure 4.8: Black Student Rates of Urban and Rural Districts

108

Figure 4.9: American Indian Student Rates of Urban and Rural Districts

districts may propose multiple bonds in the same year. In contrast, some districts only have
one occurrence of a bond during the entire time-series. To account for this differentiation, the
dependent variable was modified to reflect a percentage for failure and success of bonds during
each year. Thus, the dependent variable is the likelihood of a success of the total percentage
of bonds passed for each district during each year. Following the rationale of Bowers et al.
(2010b), this modification to the dependent variable takes into account the notion of bond
floats which occurs when bonds are brought back to voters after failure of passage. While the
occurrence of floats were not identified in this data, the failure of different bonds was more
likely after the initial passage of other bonds during the same year, or in previous years. In
the dataset, 64 percent of school districts only had one bond election, 17 percent had two bond
elections, and 10 percent had 3 bond elections. However, 36 percent of districts had a maximum
number of 8 bonds elections. The majority of bonds pass on the first election occurrence, with
82 percent of the sample being passed by voter approval. However, among counties with
multiple bond elections, the likelihood of passing a second bond decreases slightly. After the
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first bond, the margin of success closes in each election– overall, 60 percent are successful and
40 percent fail to gain voter approval.
All models were run as fixed effects ordered logit models. Two iterations of the model
are run. The first includes variables that are characteristics of the community; median income,
change in poverty rate, and median age are included. I rely on median age for this analysis
because it is common in the literature. However, future work will include shares of the populations that belong to age categories, which may provide more variation between counties.
Furthermore, the required amount of the bond and the total number of students in the district
are also included as control variables. Each model is run for the rural and urban counties of
Texas. The second iteration of the model focuses on characteristics of the district including the
debt principle, debt interest and minority rate of students. In addition, the date of the election
and the purpose of the bond (1=building, 2=other, 3=programs, 4=refund, and 5=renovation)
are also included. The following regression tables display parameter estimates and measures
of fit including statistical significance and standard errors. All results are in odd ratio forms,
which can be interpreted as coefficients greater than one are associated with higher odds of
outcome (bond passage) and coefficients less than one are associated with lower odds of outcome (bond passage). If the coefficient equals one, this indicates that change the impact on the
odds of an outcome.
First, all models are run with interactions to compare across place. Does a variable have
a statistically different effect on the likelihood of passage comparing urban to rural districts?
In each of these interactions, the baseline variable is urban. Coefficients can be interpreted as:
compared to urban, what is the effect of each variable in rural districts? Then, I run each model
using only the urban and rural sample. These models are not meant to compare coefficients, but
to allow for some understanding of the magnitude of coefficients in each place-based model.
Age, income, and minority percentage of students are the key variables to test the hypotheses of this research. This is for two reasons. First, age and income are related directly
back to the collective action paradox of passing an additional bond for public education. Following this logic, I also include current minority rate of students to test the argument that
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communities with higher rates of diversity will reduce the likelihood of bond passage. The
models presented in this paper are a simple empirical approach to analyze heterogeneity in
preferences across place, aiming to provide some understanding as to why individuals support
or oppose expanded public spending. These models seek to outline variation in preferences for
spending on education by place. Overall, each of these variables included in the model relate
to collective demand for education. The following table 4.3.1.2 outlines the regression findings
for each model specification for each place-based group (urban and rural). Year fixed effects
are included in each model to account for change in variables over time.
4.3.1.1

Time-Series Logit Regression Models

In the first specification of the model, I only include county level determinants and election information. Table 4.3.1.2 outlines these results. The full sample includes the interaction
of place, comparing rural to urban. In this model, I find that increasing the total proposed
amount for a bond has a positive, but null effect, on bond passage. The value of one indicates
a very small effect. There is a significant difference in bond passage across rural and urban
districts, however, this is again very small.
Across all districts, as county median income increases, the likelihood of bond passage
also increases. As the county median income increases, the likelihood of passing a school bond
increases by 2.69 times, holding all variables constant. However, this is not significant when
interacted with place, indicating no difference among urban and rural districts. Among the rural
sample, the effect of increased median income is considerable. As the county median income
increases in the rural sample, the likelihood of passing a school bond increases by 9.35 times,
holding all variables constant. This finding indicates that local economic improvement has a
subsequent positive effect on school bond passage. Simply put, individuals in all districts are
more likely to pass school bonds when the economy, earnings, and opportunity are improving.
In this model, I do not find that increases in median age or increases in the poverty rate are
statistically significant.
In the second model, I include the characteristics of minority students and the purpose of
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the proposed bond. For the purpose variables, the baseline category is infrastructure (related
to the school building). Table 4.3.1.3 outlines these results. In this model, the proposed bond
amount is not statistically significant. Furthermore, this variable is also significant when interacted with the rural district variable. However, as in the first model, there is a significant effect
for county median income. This coefficient indicates that as county median income increases,
the likelihood of bond passage also increases. As county median income increases, the likelihood of passing a school bond increases by 2.73 times, holding all variables constant. However,
there is no difference in the effect of this variable between rural and urban districts. Among the
rural districts, increased median income is a major factor in increasing the likelihood of bond
passage. As the county median income increases in rural counties, the likelihood of passing a
school bond increases by 16.46 times, holding all variables constant. Again, median age and
the county poverty rate are not significant factors in increasing the likelihood of bond passage.
Among the student composition variables, the only variable that is significant is the rate
of Hispanic students. I find a substantial and positive effect on the likelihood of bond passage
as the rate of Hispanic students in a district increases. As the rate of Hispanic students in a
district increases, the likelihood of passing a school bond increases by 4.45 times, holding all
variables constant. These effects appear constant over place. As the rate of Hispanic students
in a rural district increases, the likelihood of passing a school bond increases by 4.74 times,
holding all variables constant. As the rate of Hispanic students in an urban district increases,
the likelihood of passing a school bond increases by 4.32 times, holding all variables constant.
Thus, the effect of increasing the rate of Hispanic students in a district is not an urban
or rural phenomenon– but rather a state phenomenon. These findings echo the findings of
Bowers and Lee (2013) which find that a higher proportion of Hispanic students increases the
likelihood of passing a bond, all else being equal. Hispanic families are also likely to live
in the community where their children are being schooled- this could lead to an increased
support for school bonds that will benefit these students. In contrast, this finding could also
indicate increased reliance on bond measures as the rate of Hispanic students in a school district
increase. Figure 4.10 shows the marginal effects of this variable over time on the likelihood
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of bond passage. Over time, the effect of this variable has remained positive. After the 2008
financial crisis, the following years saw an up-tick in the effect of this variable. In 2015,
it had the lowest impact on increasing the probability of bond passage in the Texas sample.
Furthermore, the effects of an increasing county median income have also remained positive
throughout this time-series dataset. Figure 4.11 shows the marginal effects of county median
income over time on the likelihood of bond passage
4.3.1.2

Logit Regression Results of Bond Elections with County Determinants
Dependent Variable: Likelihood of Passing a School Bond
Full Sample

Rural

0.01

(0.08)

Proposed Bond Amount

1.00+

(0.00)

Rural × Proposed Bond Amount

1.00∗∗

(0.00)

County Median Income (Log)

2.69∗

(1.21)

Rural × County Median Income (Log)

1.60

(1.19)

County Median Age

0.98

(0.03)

Rural × County Median Age

1.00

(0.04)

County Poverty Rate

1.07

(0.42)

Rural × County Poverty Rate

0.60

(0.52)

Border County

1.63

Election Date

Rural Sample

Urban Sample

9.35∗

(8.84)

2.04

(0.95)

1.01

(0.03)

0.96

(0.03)

0.57

(0.51)

1.00

(0.39)

(0.50)

1.80

(0.93)

1.31

(0.54)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Debt Service Outstanding

1.00

(0.00)

1.00∗∗∗

(0.00)

1.00∗

(0.00)

N

2069

772

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.3.1.3

Logit Regression Results of Bond Elections with Student Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Likelihood of Passing a School Bond
Full Sample

Rural Sample

Proposed Bond Amount

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Rural

0.05

(0.37)

Rural × Proposed Bond Amount

1.00∗∗

(0.00)

County Median Income (Log)

2.73∗

(1.26)

16.46∗∗

(15.40)

2.09

(0.97)

Rural × County Median Income (Log)

1.36

(1.04)

County Median Age

1.00

(0.03)

1.00

(0.03)

0.98

(0.03)

Rural × County Median Age

1.01

(0.04)

County Poverty Rate

0.97

(0.38)

0.35

(0.30)

0.93

(0.37)

Rural × County Poverty Rate

0.60

(0.52)

Border County

0.72

(0.26)

1.27

(0.73)

0.45

(0.23)

Election Date

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Debt Service Outstanding

1.00

(0.00)

1.00∗∗∗

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Rate of Hispanic Students

4.45∗∗

(2.12)

4.74∗

(3.18)

4.32∗∗

(2.27)

Rural × Rate of Hispanic Students

0.78

(0.52)

Rate of Black Students

0.39

(0.29)

1.33

(1.76)

0.33

(0.25)

Rural × Rate of Black Students

0.45

(0.63)

Rate of American Indian Students

0.00

(0.01)

0.02

(0.11)

0.01

(0.20)

Total Number of Students

1.00

(0.00)

1.00∗∗∗

(0.00)

1.00

(0.00)

Building

1.00

(.)

1.00

(.)

1.00

(.)

Other

0.63∗

(0.11)

0.92

(0.32)

0.53∗∗

(0.12)

Programs

0.52

(0.38)

1.57

(1.60)

0.29

(0.32)

Refund

1.40

(0.52)

0.80

(0.51)

2.02

(0.99)

Renovations

1.22

(0.31)

1.78

(0.84)

1.07

(0.33)

N

2065

770

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+

p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Urban Sample

1295

Figure 4.10: Marginal Effects of Rate of Hispanic Students (2003-2016)

Figure 4.11: Marginal Effects of County Median Income (2003-2016)
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4.3.2

Decomposition Method
In addition, I further employ a decomposition model based on the work of Oaxaca (1973)

and Blinder (1973). This approach allows us to compare groups and ask, how much of the
variation in spending preferences can be explained by observable individual differences of
residents’ urban and rural place? How much can be explained by the observable economic
differences of each place? Finally, I use estimates to construct a counterfactual preference for
spending on education, such as “what would be the average preference of a rural voter if they
had the same characteristics as an urban voter?”
Decomposition models are typically used in labor economics to study wage differentials.
There are limitations to this model, mainly that this model yields the mean gap in preferences
across place and does not portray a full picture of differences between groups. However, this
approach indicates the factors that are quantitatively important in group comparisons. Furthermore, this approach is useful to indicate potential explanations and hypotheses that might be
explored in the future (Fortin et al., 2011). For this paper, the counter-factual is composed
of comparing states of the world to simulate what the distribution of preferences for spending
would look like if the individuals in one place had the characteristics of individuals in a different place. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique decomposes differences among two
comparison groups, on average. A decomposition model asks the questions of how much the
mean difference between the two groups, denoted by E(Y) or the expected value of the outcome
variable is due to group differences in the predictors. This method permits the identification
of factors between observable characteristics (endowment) and the return to those characteristics (coefficient). Adapted from Jann et al. (2008), the decomposition model consists of two
groups, for urban and rural (U,R), with a three-fold output producing an endowment effect (E),
coefficient effect (C), and the interaction effect (I).

R=E+C +I
E = (E(XU ) − E(XR ))0 βR
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(4.1)

C = E(XR )0 (βU − βR )
I = E(XU ) − EXR )0 (βU − βR )

The first part of the decomposition analyzes the difference between the initial features
of groups. The second part is linked to the productivity of factors between groups (Bonnal
et al., 2013). A brief explanation of each output provides some context for understanding this
method when comparing the two groups, urban and rural. The endowment effect will measure
the expected change to the rural group mean outcome, if this group had the predictor levels of
the urban group. In simpler terms, this means that we simply switch the predictor levels (value
of each variable) between groups. The coefficient effect, in contrast, measures the expected
difference in coefficients (the return on the dependent variable) on the mean outcome of the rural group, if the rural group had the coefficients of the urban group. If the endowment effect is
most prevalent between models, it indicates that there are minimal differences between groups.
In effect, we could keep the coefficients the same between models. However, if the coefficient
effect is more pronounced, it indicates that the impact and contribution of the variables in the
model are different between groups. The coefficient effect is referred to as a measure of labor market discrimination in labor economics. In the case of this paper, that would indicate
that indeed, these places are systematically different. To put this in the context of popular
culture, the commonly noted political polarization between urban and rural places is based on
underlying and systematic differences between place. The estimated decomposition takes into
account required bond amount, median income, median age, poverty rate, number of students,
minority rate of students, and outstanding debt for each place sample. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition offers us an understanding of the differences between groups. Using the results from
the regression models, I can analyze the relative importance of the endowment and coefficient
effects. Outlined are the mean decomposition results for each group. Standard errors allow
for intra-group correlation among states, indicating that observations are independent across
groups but not necessarily within groups.
Table 4.4 outlines the findings. In this sample, the mean of bond passage for public
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Table 4.4: Results from Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Model
Results

Urban/Rural

Mean High

0.722

Mean Low

0.693

Difference

0.030

Endowment

0.316

Coefficient

-0.032

Interaction

-0.255

education is 0.722 for the urban group and 0.693 for the rural group, yielding a gap of 0.029.
This is mainly due to the endowment effect, indicating that preference formation across place
is more similar than different. The interpretation of the decomposition technique can be challenging to understand in the context of voter behavior. If we consider the example of gender
wage differentials, the situation would be that increases in wages based on the same characteristics are due to labor market discrimination. In contrast, the endowment effect would be due
to less schooling by women leading to lower wages. We can think of places in the same way.
Voter behavior in rural areas is not due to some form of differential treatment, but rather due
to differences in resources. I push the argument to consider voter behavior. It might be that
rural areas, compared to urban areas, result in differential election outcomes because of some
unobserved, systematic differences. For example, country people are just different from city
people. However, finding that the endowment effect is dominant in the decomposition model
tells a story of capacity differences. That is, it could be the voter outcomes are different because the fiscal and government capacity vary between places, resulting in variation in voter
behavior and election outcome.
Furthermore, to test another variation of these findings, I decompose the group difference
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan groups. These groups were constructed based on
the method of definition employed by the United States Department of Agriculture and the
United States Census Bureau. The model specification is the same as above, but the decomposition compares metro to non-metro. I find that the coefficient effect is dominant in this
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decomposition. This means that there are underlying differences in the way that variables
impact individual preferences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan places. While minimal, the findings of this paper warrant further investigation of spatial differences as a factor
in preference for public intervention. It could be that relevant variables are left out of this
decomposition model, however, it can be thought of as a baseline for policy analysis. Indeed,
if the only difference between urban and rural places leading to differential election outcomes
are governmental characteristics, change can happen. Rural and urban educational and governance capacity and characteristics can be equalized through public policy, creating more
equitable schooling outcomes.

4.4

Conclusion
This study provides an analysis of local bond elections in Texas, with a focus on the urban

and rural divide. Using data collected from over 2,000 bond elections in the state of Texas
over the years 2000-2016, fixed effect logistic regression models are estimated to determine
the factors associated with the likelihood of passing a school district bond by local district
election. Among the hypothesis, I find that communities with higher median income are more
likely to pass bond elections– a finding opposite to the proposed hypothesis. As the local
economy improves, so does the odds of passing a school bond– with a substantial effect in the
rural sample. However, there is no difference in the effect of this variable between rural and
urban districts– meaning this is not a phenomenon to one place. In each of the models, there is
no effect based on older cohorts (in rural areas) compared to younger cohorts (in urban areas).
Increasing median age of a community is a significant determinant in passing (or denying)
school bond passage.
Finally, I find support for the relationship asserted in the third hypothesis; communities
with more diverse students populations (in particular, rising rates of Hispanic students) increases the likelihood of passing a school bond measure. I find a substantial and positive effect
on the likelihood of bond passage as the rate of Hispanic students in a district increases. However, like median income, there is also no statistical difference when this variable interacts with
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place. Thus, the effect of increasing the rate of Hispanic students in a district is not an urban
or rural phenomenon. Regardless, this finding echoes past studies that have shown increased
student diversity positively impacts bond passage likelihood (Rugh and Trounstine, 2011).
Each of these findings lend support to the notion that place-based characteristics matter in
collective preferences for public goods, but does not dictate the likelihood of passing a school
bond. Generally, the impact of variables in the urban and rural model behave in similar directions. Variation results from the magnitude of effects, where parameters are found to hold larger
sway in more rural places, compared to urban counterparts. Using a decomposition model, I
find the urban and rural places are not behaving differently based on different economic and
social developments. Rather, the story is one of different inputs and outcomes. Voters in rural
places are not behaving differently from urban voters based on some unobserved characteristic
(such as ideology or personal traits). Resource differences are the underlying and fundamental
differences. School bond elections are driven mainly by the differences in resources, capacity,
and governmental ability– all the factors that drive education policy. In effect, the rural and
urban divide is not a significant characterization to explain differences in preferences and voter
behavior.
There are limitations to this study. First, politics at the local level are undoubtedly more
varied than similar. The intention of this work is not to assert that all rural or urban communities
are cut from the same cloth. Rather, this work aims to inform our understanding of the variation
in voters across place and how that maps into collective outcomes. In fact, much of what we
think we know about rural areas may be misguided. Consider the findings about race, which
lend support to the idea that the probability of passing a bond election increases as students
become less white.
There are two major implications from this research. The first is that the beneficiaries of
public education matter. In both the urban and rural sample, an increase of Hispanic students is
found to increase the likelihood of bond passage. Two potential explanations may be explored
in future work. Hispanic families are likely to live in the community where their children are
being schooled- potentially leading to increased support for school bonds that will benefit these
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students. In contrast, this finding could also indicate increased reliance on bond measures as
the rate of Hispanic students in a school district increase. In addition, the effect of Hispanic
students is substantially large in the rural sample. Indeed, a higher proportion of Hispanic
students has been found to increase the likelihood of passing a bond (Bowers and Lee, 2013).
Future research should explore the underlying mechanisms for this relationship.
Second, place matters. The likelihood of bond passage reflects the community in which
public goods are experienced. In particular, the economic health of the community. There
is a significant and consistent effect for county median income in each model. As median
income increases in Texas counties, the likelihood of bond passage increases by 2.73 times,
holding all variables constant. However, there is no difference in the effect of this variable
between rural and urban districts. Increased median income appears to increase bond passage
likelihood across the entire state. Among the rural districts, increased median income is a major
factor in increasing the likelihood of bond passage. As the county median income increases
in rural counties, the likelihood of passing a school bond increases by 16.46 times, holding all
variables constant. Again, median age and the county poverty rate are not significant factors
in increasing the likelihood of bond passage. Again, the underlying factors that increase the
likelihood of needing supplement bonds, such as decreasing school funds, could be analyzed
in future research.
Optimistically, the findings in this paper are not one of fundamental and underlying differences between urban and rural people that lead to variation in political preferences. Rather,
this story is one of differing capacity in terms of the local economy and student beneficiaries–
which seemingly have a feedback loop into voter decisions surrounding more resources for
local schools but do not differ across the Texan urban-rural divide.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1

Policy Implications
The objective of this research was to bring forth insights about the collective decision-

making in the complex rural environment; one in which, changing economic, social, and political dynamics converge to create challenges for the public financing of public goods. This
project was an exploration of the relationship between preferences and spending in rural places,
with urban and suburban communities as the default counterpoint. Reflecting the overall composition of the United States population, rural respondents are less in numbers compared to
urban and suburban residents. A limitation of this study is the lack of data from rural residents.
However, this study lends itself to the notion that place-based characteristics and local issues
deserve place-based responses. Each of the pieces of analyses in this dissertation improve
our understanding of the unique dynamics that motivate individual preferences and ultimately,
impact the policy outcomes and design of government services for public goods, in this case
public education.
The main policy domain, primary and secondary education, underscores the dynamics
that surround school funding in rural communities compared to urban and suburban areas.
Funding is the simplest measure of denoting differences in education. It is both nominal and
easily comparable across districts and communities. The focus on this policy domain highlights
variation in school funding across place and ask the core question: what are the key determinants in school funding preferences in rural areas and what factors drive education funding
levels for rural schools, compared to urban and suburban counterparts? This particular policy
domain focuses on the micro-level (income, etc.) and macro-level (migration) determinants
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that impact rural communities and potentially impact attitudes towards education spending.
An alternative route for this policy domain will be an analysis of current funding for schools in
rural areas in relation to demographic, social, and economic factors.
In the first chapter, I analyze the determinants of tax preferences for public education,
comparing individuals who live in urban (metro) areas with those who live in rural (non-metro)
areas. This analysis seeks to fill gaps in empirical research about education in terms of the political economy of redistribution, in particular individual preferences for redistributive spending
on education. I utilize two waves of nationally representative survey data to measure public preferences for education spending, analyzing differences in taxation preferences based on
place. I find that there is a difference in the way that the middle-income group in non-metro
areas prefers education taxes compared to their counterparts in metro areas; they prefer to decrease taxes for public education relative to metro middle-income individuals. Second, beliefs
matter for preferences for education taxes. The belief that local schools are spending more than
average reduces demand for education (with the preference to decrease taxes). In contrast, the
belief that local schools are performing better than average increases the demand for education.
However, the belief by non-metro individuals that there schools are performing on average increases their preference for more education taxes, relative to their metro counterparts. Third,
individuals across the United States prefer to increase taxes for local public education when
they believe that unequal resources and inadequate funding are problematic. On the contrary,
the belief that the federal government is a problem in public education is associated with a
preference to decrease taxes. However, there is no statistical difference in these beliefs across
the place-based categories. Finally, I find that living in a rural area over time intensifies individual preferences to increase taxes for public education more than those living in an urban
area. When the samples are pooled, we find a more complex picture of preference formation.
Indeed, place-based preferences are shifting in different ways. However, the ways in which
preferences shift indicate that rural respondents, more so than urban respondents, are more
likely prefer increasing taxes for public education. These findings indicate that the differences
estimated in these models, based on the place categories, do not aptly define political divides
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in school funding debates. Rather, factors such as cross-jurisdictional perceptions are stronger
determinants in individual tax preferences.
In the second chapter, I analyze the local calculation that drives individual preferences for
increasing state spending on public education. The logic behind this argument is that individuals are willing to increase spending on local education when local employment opportunities
or returns on investments, are higher. This approach is based on a complementarity relationship between public goods and collective outcomes. Using individual level survey data, school
district funding averages, and county level economic variables, I perform a series of ordered
logit models that find, across all places, as the unemployment rate increases, demand for education declines. Furthermore, when unemployment interacts with places, I find that there is
no statistical difference between place (urban, suburban, and rural) in the causal mechanism of
unemployment as a factor in spending preferences. To consider another measure of public preferences towards education, I run the same models with a dependent variable that measures how
individuals ”grade” their local schools– a proxy measure of perceived school quality and value.
As was the case of spending on public schools, increasing that rurality of a place reduces the
individual value placed on local, public schools. These findings suggest that individuals value
education differently due to their ability to turn educational attainment into economic prosperity, a reflection of complementary considerations. However, while preferences between urban,
suburban, and rural individuals may vary based on a variety of factors, the current categories
of place do not fully capture preference variation between individuals. Rather, the findings
from this study illustrate more commonalities between individuals. These findings contrast the
narrative that political ideology largely determines preferences on public good investments.
Rising county-level unemployment and median household incomes both affect the likelihood
of an individuals preferring to increase state spending on public schools.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I analyze local bond elections in Texas, with a
focus on the urban and rural divide. Focusing on place aims to measure occurrence of preference variation, where individuals do not always collectively demand more from government
to fund their public schools. First, using data collected on over 2,000 bond elections in the
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state of Texas over the years 2000-2016, time-series logistic regression models are estimated
to determine the factors associated with the likelihood of passing a school district bond by a
local district election. I find that increasing the median income of a county positively improves
the likelihood of bond passage. However, there is no difference in the effect of this variable
between rural and urban districts. Simply put, the effect is not a place-based phenomenon. I
also analyze the student body composition as a determinant affecting the likelihood of bond
passage. I find a substantial and positive effect on the likelihood of bond passage as the rate of
Hispanic students in a district increases. However, like median income, there is also no statistical difference when this variable interacts with place. Thus, the effect of increasing the rate
of Hispanic students in a district is not an urban or rural phenomenon. Each of these findings
lend support to the notion that place-based characteristics matter in collective preferences for
public goods, but it does not dictate the likelihood of passing a school bond. Voters in rural
places are not behaving differently from urban voters based on some unobserved characteristic
(such as ideology or personal traits). To analyze this further, I employ the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition model to consider how collective preferences may be shaped differently across
place. Again, I find that rural and urban divide is not a significant characterization to explain
differences in preferences and voter behavior. Optimistically, this story is not one of fundamental and underlying differences between urban and rural people, but rather one of differing
capacity in terms of the local economy and student beneficiaries.
5.1.1

Policy Recommendations

5.1.1.1

Defining Place

Each of these studies reveal variation in funding public schools. However, the findings of
each paper reveal that place-based differences are not fully explained by the urban-rural divide.
While these places may theoretically build a unique preference set for individuals in their
estimations of schools spending levels, these studies empirically highlight the complexities
in how place shapes preferences. This could be due to a limitation with the definition of
place used in these studies. For example, these studies rely on the United States Department
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of Agriculture Rural-Urban Continuum Codes. These codes create a classification of place
that distinguishes the difference between metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties. In this
classification format, metropolitan counties are defined by the population size of the metro area.
In contrast, non-metropolitan counties are defined by the degree of urbanization and adjacency
to a metro area. The limitation of this classification scheme is that it over-simplifies place.
I suspect that the main issue in the confounding findings is the definition of place as urban,
suburban, and rural. Simply put, these definitions are too simple for the complex economic,
social, and political changes across geography.
The key policy recommendation is to create an index of place, rather than relying on definitions such as metropolitan/non-metropolitan and urban/suburban/rural. This index should
rely on a variety of variables to analyze the relationship between place and preferences. For
example, variables such as levels of economic development, demographic change, broadband
access, social capital indicators, and distance from amenities would improve our understanding
of place. These variables, combined as a developmental index, may provide greater insight into
the underlying factors that drive place-based preferences for spending. Two existing datasets
provide insight into the local mechanisms impacting preferences for taxes, spending, and bond
election outcomes. The USDA County Typology Codes classify all U.S. counties according to
six mutually exclusive categories of economic dependence and six overlapping categories of
policy-relevant themes (United States Department of Agriculture, 2015). These codes are based
on county-level estimates of earnings and employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’
(BEA) Regional Local Area Personal Income & Employment data, Decennial Census data, and
5-year American Community Survey (ACS). The Distressed Communities Index (DCI) combines economic indicators into a comparative measure of community well-being and relies on
5-year American Community Survey (ACS) and Business Patterns datasets (Economic Innovation Group, 2018). In addition to these existing codes, I contribute additional variables that
may be fundamental for better explaining the underlying local effects on community outcomes.
Table 5.1 outlines these measurements.
The main implication of this recommendation is to include variables that better examine
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Table 5.1: Indexing Place and Local Effects
USDA County Types 2015 Distressed Communities Index 2018 Suggested Variables
Low Education

No High School Diploma

Changes in Funding Formulas

Low Employment

Adults Not Working

Percent of Low-Wage Jobs

Persistent Poverty

Poverty Rate

Degrees of Economic Instability

Persistent Child Poverty

Median Income Ratio

Tax Rates/Limitations

Population Loss

Changes In Employment

Demographic Changes

Retirement Destination

Changes In Business Establishments

Need for Public Services

Economic Typology

Housing Vacancy Rate

Distance to Amenities

the local factors influencing the rationale of individuals. To do this, we must better understand the local processes in which they are residing. These experiences may be comparable
or contrast across the urban-rural divide. That is, a small town may more closely resemble
a post-industrial place in its economic experience. Underlying places are political economy
mechanisms including changing demographics, such as increasing rates of older individuals,
and socioeconomic issues, increasing poverty levels and widening inequality. To fully outline
the geographical variation in economic change, place-based definitions should originate from a
variety of effects as well as degrees of severity. This would allow for a better understanding of
the effect of place, as well as effectively prescribe policy-solutions and drive decision-making.
5.1.1.2

Recognizing Place

The overarching policy implication is that place captures local experiences. These local
experiences set the baseline for how individuals demand more or less from their public institutions. Underlying these preferences is clearly ideology, however, this does not fully explain
individual preferences. Rather, individual preferences are complex and based on the shifting
social, economic, and demographic changes experienced by the individual. Thus, place matters in explaining public demand, preferences, and divergence between collective need and
citizens’ attitudes. Compared to urban and suburban communities, rural communities face
geographic isolation, population decline, and a hollowing out of employment and industry.
These trends across place present a challenging environment for funding public goods and the
goal of this research is to inform our understanding of the dynamics that shape preferences for
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public spending across geography. Overall, I find that the urban-rural divide is not a significant characterization to explain differences in preferences and voter behavior. The findings
in this dissertation show that preference variation is mainly related to local economic conditions, educational attainment, investment comparisons across jurisdictions, and differences in
local beneficiaries- factors which may transcend the categories of urban, suburban, and rural.
Rather, the findings from this study illustrate more commonalities between individuals. Rural
Americans, contrary to current belief, do not appear different in their preferences and values
for public goods, in particular, public education. If the only difference between urban and rural
places leading to differential outcomes are local economic characteristics, change can happen.
In fact, rural, suburban, and urban educational outcomes can be equalized through public policy, creating more equitable schooling outcomes– regardless of local place-based differences.
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APPENDIX A
A SIMPLE MODEL OF EDUCATION SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The key elements to this model are wages, taxes, and income. Some individuals have more
wealth than others initially, and it is assumed that individuals with more wealth effectively
permit the expansion of education. In this model, individuals are grouped by income (high,
middle, and low). Individuals who receive education will fall into two main segments of the
labor markets, skilled or unskilled, an outcome operationalized as a function of wage. For the
sake of this model, individuals are either fully skilled or unskilled (Ansell, 2010).
Skilled and unskilled labor, ws and wu , are directly related to relative productivity and
relative abundance. In other words, the economy of this model is segmented, and the value of
labor is directly related to the overall output of that labor and the premium placed on each type
of labor. It is assumed that the overall productivity of skilled labor, σs , is always higher than
the productivity of unskilled labor, σu . Skilled labor expansion,that is, more individuals doing
skilled labor, is thought to drive down the premium on this segment of the labor market. For
example, more skilled labor drives down the economic value, or the overall financial benefit, of
this labor segment. Based on this, there is an incentive to reduce the expansion of skilled labor
to ensure a high financial benefit to those already within this segment of the labor market. This
can be thought of in terms of maintaining a status quo distribution of power in the labor market.
In this model, labor supply elasticity is expressed by a (unskilled labor supply parameter) and b
(skilled labor supply parameter). These parameters reflect the degrees to which scarcity affects
wages– relative abundance of skilled labor would in turn imply a relative scarcity of unskilled
labor (Ansell, 2010). This is due to the notion that the expansion of education would move
individuals from the unskilled segment of the labor market to the skilled segment, driving down
the premium on the skilled labor group. Naturally, this is directly related to the proportion
of the population who are skilled, S ∈ [0, 1]. Accounting for these parameters, the author
builds the initial labor market equilibrium for skilled and unskilled wages, as factors of relative
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abundance and productivity.
ws = σs − bS

(1)

wu = σu + aS

(2)

Wages for skilled or unskilled work will increase or decrease based on the productivity of each
labor segment in addition to the labor premium which is reflected by the proportion of workers
currently in each segment. This means that wages will change based on the productivity of a
labor segment, as well as how many other workers are doing this type of work. Skilled wages
will decrease with the relative abundance of skilled laborers, yet increase with productivity.
The same is true for the wages of unskilled labor. This model assumes that individuals who
receive skilled wages (related to education) already have higher wealth than those who receive
unskilled wages. This means that expansion of education begins with the wealthiest members
of society extending to the poorest. In this case, everyone has a inverse skill index, S ∈ [0, 1],
where si = 0 (receives education first) and si = 1(receives last). The following wealth qi
parameter lays out this relationship.

si = f (qi ), f ‘(qi ) < 0; f (min(qi ) = 1; f (max(qi = 0)

(3)

According to this model, the inverse skill index is directly related to the proportion of the
population that are skilled, S. Earning skilled wages will increase from the richest to the poorest
as S increases. This indicates that individuals will be earning skilled wages ws or unskilled
wages wu . The following equations lay out this relationship.

si ≤ S ⇔ wj = ws

(4)

si > S ⇔ w j = w u

(5)

Using these equations, Ansell (2010) constructs the following income equations:

yi = qi + wj (si (q1 ), S)
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(6)

yi = qi + σs − bS(si ≤ S)

(7)

yi = qi + σu + aS(si > S)

(8)

In these income equations, the variable representing wages (wj ) is substituted for the relevant
equations that reflect productivity and scarcity of a labor group. In equation 7, the variable b
represents the scarcity of skilled labor and as more individuals enter this field, there is a larger
net negative for skilled laborers. For these high-income and skilled labor groups, wages will be
reduced as this field becomes more populated, creating an incentive for them (the wealthy and
educated) to restrict the expansion of education. For laborers who make the jump into skilled
labor from unskilled labor, they will experience a boost in wages. In contrast, the variable
a in equation 8 reflects the scarcity effect of unskilled labor. As long as this variable does
not decrease too dramatically (for example, below zero), there are benefits from the unskilled
labor group as unskilled labor becomes more scarce. This drives up the premium for this group.
In effect, the only group that does not benefit from expansion in education are those already
educated and in skilled labor. What we find is that education serves as a positive benefit for
those who receive education first (low-income) and a net negative for those already educated
(high-income). The receipt of education generates an increase in wages for those who receive
it for the first time and move into skilled labor.
Now, we consider the role of taxation as a factor in the endogenous preferences of individuals to expand education. To expand education, citizens must agree to taxation of their
income. This results in a total cost for education (cS). In the original model, it is assumed that
this taxation is through a flat tax on income (Ansell, 2010). In reality, this is a simplification
that deserves more attention to understand heterogeneity in preferences. However, I will lay
out this model parameter and then outline my extension on this point. The population of a
country is one in this taxation parameter, allowing us to denote the flat tax (T) as a tax rate
(t) applied to average income y). This generates the following equation: T = ty = cS. This
model is two-generational, in which parents determine their preferences for taxation in the zero
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period (0) and children are educated in the first period (1).

ty = cS ⇔ t =

cS1
y0

(9)

Based on the following equation, we can determine the utility of families in their estimation
of the value of education. Utility is comprised of income in the zero period, net of taxes, and
(future) income of period one. It is assumed that families are deciding to discount (denoted by
δ) between period zero and period one, or trying to determine the outcome of future income
(based on either unskilled wu or skilled ws labor activity) that is most likely for their children
during period one as a factor of their preference for taxation during period zero. In addition to
the expected return on education due to which segment of labor market their children will fall,
there are levels of externalities generated by education ((denoted byg). Ansell assumes that
education only produces positive externalities, whereby all citizens benefit from the education
of one citizen. An analysis of externalities are further explained in the extension of this model.
In the following utility function, we see that utility is a function of taxation of income in the
zero period alongside expected income and externalities in the first period. In addition, Ansell
(2010) takes the derivative of the utility function with respect to the level of public education
provision (S1 ). We find that parental income, weighted by relative income, in the zero period is
negative indicating that the greater the income, the more share of tax burden. Second, we find
that perceived utility of education is driven by the expected income and positive externalities
in period one.
Ui = [1 −

cS1
]yi0 + δ[qi1 + wj1 (S1 ) + g(S1 )]
y0

yi0
∂wj1 (S1 )
∂Ui
= −c
+δ
+g
∂S1
y0
∂S1

(10)
(11)

In the original model, it is argued that externalities remain purely positive. The impact of
the provision of education on income in period one is a function of which income group an
individual initially falls into (in period zero). Thus, the model further distinguishes between the
three main income groups (high, middle, and low). Consider the impact of education provision

132

on high-income earners. We find that the effect is largely a net negative for this group. This
is highlighted in equation 12. Expanding education for this group results in high taxes and
negative impact. This is mainly due to the decreasing premium on skilled labor, resulting from
an increasing proportion of the population that now falls into this labor segment.
qH + ws0
∂UH
= −c
+ δ[−b + g]
∂S1
y0

(12)

In contrast, we find that middle-income families largely benefit from the expansion of education. This is highlighted in equation 13. As this group moves from unskilled to skilled labor,
we find that they experience an increase in income. While the cost of education, relative to unskilled wages remains relatively low, the benefit from education expansion (potentially moving
this group into skilled labor) in period one is a net benefit.
∂UM
qM + wu0
+ δ[[σs − bS1 ] − [σu + aS1 ] + g]
= −c
∂S1
y0

(13)

Finally, we find that the low-income additionally benefit from increased spending on education,
regardless of their lack of movement out of the unskilled labor. This is highlighted in equation
14. Ansell argues that even if this group does not receive education, they benefit from the
positive externalities collectively generated through better local schools.
∂UL
qL + wu0
= −c
+ δ[a + g]
∂S1
y0

(14)

This model provides us with a starting point for considering variation in preferences for
education. Based on these findings, we should find the middle-class to be the persistent champions of expanding education. Arguably, it would be irrational to have a group that benefits to
demand less expansion of government in the provision of public education. The following section analyzes a few modifications to this model that provide insights into shifting preferences
for education as well as geographic variation.
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APPENDIX B
2015 SURVEY QUESTIONS
HUF15 309 If R HAS CHILDREN- Where are your children currently in school (choose more
than one, if children are enrolled in various schools)?
1. Public school
2. Private school
3. Magnet school
4. Charter school
5. Special education schools
6. Virtual Schools
7. Religious Private Schools
8. Home school
9. Not In School
HUF15 310 Do you think public schools in your district spend more per pupil or less per pupil
than other school districts in your state?
1. A Lot More
2. More
3. About Average
4. Less
5. A Lot Less
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HUF15 311 Compared to other schools in your state, do you think your local public schools
are better than average or worse than average
1. A Lot More
2. More
3. About Average
4. Less
5. A Lot Less
HUF15 312A (Split Sample) Suppose your local school district cut spending on public schools
by 10 percent. Would the schools in your area get Better or Worse or have No Change in each
of the following ways?
1. School safety
2. Quality of instruction
3. Class sizes
4. Test scores
5. Extra-Curricular Activities
6. Diversity of students
7. Overall
HUF15 313A (Split Sample) If your state government cut funds for public education by 10
percent, how do you think the following sorts of people would be affected?
1. Low Income People
2. Middle Income People
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3. High Income People
4. Homeowners
5. Whites
6. Immigrants
7. Hispanics
8. Blacks
9. Teachers
10. Students
11. Tax Payers
12. People like you
HUF15 312B (Split Sample) Suppose your local school district increased spending on public
schools by 10 percent. Would the schools in your area get Better or Worse or have No Change
in each of the following ways?
1. School safety
2. Quality of instruction
3. Class sizes
4. Test scores
5. Extra-Curricular Activities
6. Diversity of students
7. Overall
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HUF15 313B (Split Sample) If your state government increased funds for public education
by 10 percent, how do you think the following sorts of people would be affected?
1. Low Income People
2. Middle Income People
3. High Income People
4. Homeowners
5. Whites
6. Immigrants
7. Hispanics
8. Blacks
9. Teachers
10. Students
11. Tax Payers
12. People like you
HUF15 314 Would you vote to increase taxes for public school funding, decrease taxes for
public school funding, or keep taxes for public school funding the same?
1. Increase taxes for public schools
2. Decrease taxes for public schools
3. Keep the same
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APPENDIX C
2016 SURVEY QUESTIONS
HUZ420 Which applies to you? [Check all that apply]
1. I do not have children
2. I have children in public schools
3. I have children in private schools
4. I have children who are not yet school age
5. I have grown children who went to public school
6. I have grown children who went to private school
HUZ421- Education Problems What do you consider to be the problems facing public education?
1. Teachers Unions
2. Not enough Funding
3. Parents
4. Popular Culture
5. Federal Government Intervention
6. Lack of Local Control
7. Lack of Standards
8. Too much testing
9. Bad Teachers
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10. Bad Administrators
11. Unequal resources among schools
12. Immigrants
13. Charter Schools
HUZ423 Do you think that a 20 percent increase in spending on schools in the US as a whole
would make public schools better or worse?
1. A Lot Better
2. Better
3. No Impact
4. Worse
5. A Lot Worse
HUZ424 Do you think that a 20 percent cut in spending on schools in the US as a whole would
make public schools better or worse?
1. A Lot Better
2. Better
3. No Impact
4. Worse
5. A Lot Worse
HUZ425 If spending on public schools were increased by 20 percent, how do you think the
following sorts of people would be affected? [Benefit A Lot-Benefit Some-Harm A Lot- No
Impact]
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1. You
2. Tax Payers
3. People like you
4. The US as a whole
5. Low Income People
6. Middle Income People
7. High Income People
8. Homeowners
9. Whites
10. Immigrants
11. Hispanics
12. Blacks
13. Teachers
14. Students
HUZ425 If spending on public schools were CUT by 20 percent, how do you think the following
sorts of people would be affected? [Benefit A Lot-Benefit Some-Harm A Lot- No Impact]
1. You
2. Tax Payers
3. People like you
4. The US as a whole
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5. Low Income People
6. Middle Income People
7. High Income People
8. Homeowners
9. Whites
10. Immigrants
11. Hispanics
12. Blacks
13. Teachers
14. Students
HUZ427 If spending on public education increased by 20 percent, would the public schools
get Better or Worse or have No Change in each of the following ways?
1. School safety
2. Quality of instruction
3. Class sizes
4. Test scores
5. Extra-Curricular Activities
6. Diversity of students
7. Overall
HUZ429- Grade US Schools What grade would you give to public schools in the United States
overall? A is excellent and F is Failing.
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1. A
2. B
3. C
4. D
5. F
HUZ430 Would you vote to increase taxes in order to increase spending on public schools?
1. Increase taxes for public schools
2. Decrease taxes for public schools
3. Keep the same
HUZ431 Based on your current understanding, which level of government pays the most for
public schools in your area?
1. Federal
2. State
3. Local
HUZ432 In your opinion, which level of government should be most responsible for providing
education? And which level of government should be least responsible? Please rank order (1
primary responsibility, 3 least responsible). If you think a level of government should have NO
responsibility use the number 0.
1. Federal
2. State
3. Local
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HUZ433 Federal, state, and local governments spend money on public schools. For each level
of government, indicate whether you think that spending should increase or decrease or stay
the same.
1. Federal
2. State
3. Local

143

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2005). From education to democracy? American Economic Review, 95(2):44–49.
Albouy, D., Christensen, P., and Sarmiento-Barbieri, I. (2018). Unlocking amenities: Estimating public-good complementarity. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Alesina, A. and Ferrara, E. L. (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic performance. Journal of
economic literature, 43(3):762–800.
Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2011). Preferences for redistribution. In Handbook of Social
Economics, volume 1, pages 93–131. Elsevier.
Alesina, A., Glaeser, E., and Sacerdote, B. (2001). Why doesn’t the us have a european-style
welfare system? Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. Journal of Public Economics, 89(5-6):897–931.
Ansell, B. (2010). From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of
Education. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Ansolabehere, S., Rodden, J., and Snyder Jr, J. M. (2006). Purple america. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 20(2):97–118.
Bailey, C., Jensen, L., and Ransom, E. (2014). Rural America in a Globalizing World. West
Virginia University Press.
Bartels, L. M. (2006). What’s the matter with what’s the matter with kansas?
Journal of Political Science, 1(2):201–226.

Quarterly

Bartels, L. M. (2016). Unequal democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.
Princeton University Press.
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?
Bauer, D. J. and Sterba, S. K. (2011). Fitting multilevel models with ordinal outcomes: Performance of alternative specifications and methods of estimation. Psychological methods,
16(4):373.
Beaulieu, L. J., Israel, G. D., and Wimberley, R. C. (2003). Promoting educational achievement: A partnership of families, schools and communities. pages 273–289. The Pennsylvania State University Press University Park, PA.
Beaulieu, L. J. and Mulkey, D. (1995). Investing in People: The Human Capital Needs of Rural
America. Rural Studies Series. ERIC.
Becker, G. (1964). Human Capital. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Becker, G. S. (1994). Human capital revisited. In Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis with Special Reference to Education (3rd Edition), pages 15–28. The University of
Chicago Press.
144

Becker, G. S. and Murphy, K. M. (1988). The family and the state. The Journal of Law and
Economics, 31(1):1–18.
Benabou, R. and Ok, E. A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the
poum hypothesis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2):447–487.
Beramendi, P. (2012). The political geography of inequality: regions and redistribution. Cambridge University Press.
Bergstrom, T. C., Rubinfeld, D. L., and Shapiro, P. (1982). Micro-based estimates of demand
functions for local school expenditures. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,
pages 1183–1205.
Berkman, M. B. and Plutzer, E. (2004). Gray peril or loyal support? the effects of the elderly
on educational expenditures. Social Science Quarterly, 85(5):1178–1192.
Bernasconi, M. and Profeta, P. (2012). Public education and redistribution when talents are
mismatched. European Economic Review, 56(1):84–96.
Betz, M. R. and Jones, L. E. (2018). Wage and employment growth in america’s drug epidemic:
Is all growth created equal? American journal of agricultural economics, 100(5):1357–
1374.
Blinder, A. S. (1973). Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural estimates. Journal of
Human resources, pages 436–455.
Bobba, M. and Coviello, D. (2007). Weak instruments and weak identification, in estimating
the effects of education, on democracy. Economics letters, 96(3):301–306.
Boldrin, M. and Montes, A. (2005). The intergenerational state education and pensions. The
Review of Economic Studies, 72(3):651–664.
Bonnal, L., Boumahdi, R., and Favard, P. (2013). The easiest way to estimate the oaxacablinder decomposition. Applied Economic Letters, 20:96–101.
Bourke, L., Humphreys, J. S., Wakerman, J., and Taylor, J. (2012). Understanding rural and
remote health: a framework for analysis in australia. Health & Place, 18(3):496–503.
Boustan, L. P., Ferreira, F., Winkler, H., and Zolt, E. (2010). Income inequality and local
government in the united states, 1970-2000. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Bowers, A. J. and Lee, J. (2013). Carried or defeated? examining the factors associated
with passing school district bond elections in texas, 1997-2009. Educational Administration Quarterly, 49(5):732–767.
Bowers, A. J., Metzger, S. A., and Militello, M. (2010a). Knowing the odds: Parameters that
predict passing or failing school district bonds. Educational Policy, 24(2):398–420.
Bowers, A. J., Metzger, S. A., and Militello, M. (2010b). Knowing what matters: An expanded
study of school bond elections in michigan, 1998-2006. Journal of Education Finance, pages
374–396.

145

Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1977). Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and
the Contradiction of Economic Life. New York: Basic Books.
Brodsky, D. M. and Thompson III, E. (1993). Ethos, public choice, and referendum voting.
Social Science Quarterly, 74(2):286–299.
Brown, B. W. and Saks, D. H. (1977). Reviewed work: Schooling in capitalist america: Educational reform and the contradictions of economic life by samuel bowles, herbert gintis.
Journal of Economic Issues, 11(1):158–162.
Brown, B. W. and Saks, D. H. (1983). Spending for local public education: Income distribution
and the aggregation of private demands. Public Finance Quarterly, 11(1):21–45.
Brown, D. L. and Schafft, K. A. (2011). Rural people and communities in the 21st century:
Resilience and transformation. Polity.
Brown, D. L. and Swanson, L. E. (2004). Challenges for rural America in the twenty-first
century. Penn State Press.
Browne, W. P. (2001). The failure of national rural policy: Institutions and interests. Georgetown University Press.
Burdick-Will, J. and Logan, J. R. (2017). Schools at the rural-urban boundary: Blurring the
divide? The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 672(1):185–
201.
Burstein, P. (2003). The impact of public opinion on public policy: A review and an agenda.
Political Research Quarterly, 56(1):29–40.
Busemeyer, M. R. (2007). Determinants of public education spending in 21 oecd democracies,
1980–2001. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(4):582–610.
Busemeyer, M. R. (2013). Education funding and individual preferences for redistribution.
European Sociological Review, 29(6):1122–1133.
Busemeyer, M. R., Garritzmann, J. L., Neimanns, E., and Nezi, R. (2018). Investing in education in europe: Evidence from a new survey of public opinion. Journal of European Social
Policy, 28(1):34–54.
Cameron, A. C. and Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference.
Journal of Human Resources, 50(2):317–372.
Cameron, D. R. and Hofferbert, R. I. (1974). The impact of federalism on education finance: a
comparative analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 2(3):225–258.
Campbell, A. L. (2011). Policy feedbacks and the impact of policy designs on public opinion.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 36(6):961–973.
Campbell, A. L. (2012). Policy makes mass politics. Annual Review of Political Science,
15:333–351.
Card, D. (2012). Earnings, schooling, and ability revisited. In 35th Anniversary Retrospective,
pages 111–136. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
146

Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (1992). Does school quality matter? returns to education and the
characteristics of public schools in the united states. Journal of political Economy, 100(1):1–
40.
Carr, P. J. and Kefalas, M. J. (2009). Hollowing out the middle: The rural brain drain and
what it means for America. Beacon Press.
Castle, E. N. (1995). The Changing American Countryside: Rural People and Places. Series:
Rural America. ERIC.
Cattaneo, M. A. and Wolter, S. C. (2009). Are the elderly a threat to educational expenditures?
European Journal of Political Economy, 25(2):225–236.
Cheah, B. C. (2009). Clustering standard errors or modeling multilevel data. University of
Columbia, pages 2–4.
Chingos, M. M. and Blagg, K. (2017). Do poor kids get their fair share of school funding?
Technical report, Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Citrin, J. (1979). Do people want something for nothing: Public opinion on taxes and government spending. National Tax Journal, 32(2):113–129.
Citrin, J. and Green, D. P. (1990). The self-interest motive in american public opinion. Research
in Micropolitics, 3(1):1–28.
Cohen, D. K. and Moffitt, S. L. (2010). The ordeal of equality: Did federal regulation fix the
schools? Harvard University Press.
Converse, P. E. (2006). The nature of belief systems in mass publics (1964). Critical review,
18(1-3):1–74.
Cornman, S. Q., Ampadu, O., et al. (2018). Revenues and expenditures for public elementary
and secondary school districts: School year 2014-15 (fiscal year 2015). first look. nces 2018303. National Center for Education Statistics.
Council, H. A. (2012). Rural research brief: Race & ethnicity in rural america.
Cramer, K. J. (2016). The Politics of Resentment: Rural consciousness in Wisconsin and the
rise of Scott Walker. University of Chicago Press.
Cromartie, J. (2016). Five years of population loss in rural and small-town america may be
ending (amber waves). Technical report, United States Department of Agriculture.
Cromartie, J. (2017). Rural america at a glance, 2017 edition. Technical report, United States
Department of Agriculture: Economic Research Service.
Cromartie, J. and Bucholtz, S. (2008). Defining the” rural” in rural america. Technical report.
Dahlberg, M., Edmark, K., and Lundqvist, H. (2012). Ethnic diversity and preferences for
redistribution. Journal of Political Economy, 120(1):41–76.
De Fraja, G. (2004a). Education and redistribution. Rivista di Politica Economica, 94(3):3–44.

147

De Fraja, G. (2004b). Private and public schools: theoretical considerations. In Education,
Training and Labour Market Outcomes in Europe, pages 38–68. Springer.
Denzau, A. and Grier, K. (1984). Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent
estimates. Public Choice, 44(2):375–383.
Duncan, C. M. (2014). Worlds apart: Poverty and politics in rural America. Yale University
Press.
Duncombe, W., Robbins, M., and Stonecash, J. (2003). Measuring citizen preferences for
public services using surveys: Does a “gray peril” threaten funding for public education?
Public Budgeting & Finance, 23(1):45–72.
Economic Innovation Group (2018). Distressed communities index methodology.
Educational Finance Branch, U. C. B. (2015). Public education finances: 2015. US Census
Bureau.
Ejdemyr, S. and Shores, K. (2017). Pulling back the curtain: Intra-district school spending inequality and its correlates. Technical report, Working paper. California: Stanford University.
Ellis, C. and Stimson, J. A. (2012). Ideology in America. Cambridge University Press.
Emmenegger, P. and Klemmensen, R. (2013). What motivates you? the relationship between preferences for redistribution and attitudes toward immigration. Comparative Politics,
45(2):227–246.
Engel, M. (2000). The struggle for control of public education: Market ideology vs. democratic
values. Temple University Press.
Evans, W. N., Schwab, R. M., and Wagner, K. L. (2019). The great recession and public
education. Education Finance and Policy, 14(2):298–326.
Faricy, C. and Ellis, C. (2014). Public attitudes toward social spending in the united states: The
differences between direct spending and tax expenditures. Political Behavior, 36(1):53–76.
Farrigan, T., Hertz, T., and Parker, T. (2014). Rural poverty and well-being. Technical report,
Washington, DC: US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. (2001). Theories of fairness and reciprocity-evidence and economic
applications. Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 75.
Fikri, K. and Lettieri, J. (2018). From great recession to great reshuffling: Charting a decade of
change across american communities. findings from the 2018 distressed communities index.
Economic Innovation Group.
Fladmoe, A. (2012). The nature of public opinion on education in norway, sweden and finland–
measuring the degree of political polarization at the mass level. Scandinavian Journal of
Educational Research, 56(5):457–479.
Flora, C. and Flora, J. (2010). Community organization and mobilization in rural america.
Rural America in a globalizing world: Problems and prospects for the, pages 609–625.

148

Fortin, N., Lemieux, T., and Firpo, S. (2011). Decomposition methods in economics. In
Handbook of labor economics, volume 4, pages 1–102. Elsevier.
Frank, T. (2004). What’s the matter with Kansas?: How conservatives won the heart of America. Metropolitan Books.
Frank, T. (2007). What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives won the Heart of
America. Metropolitan Books.
Gardner, R., Ostrom, E., and Walker, J. M. (1990). The nature of common-pool resource
problems. Rationality and Society, 2(3):335–358.
Gibbs, R. (2005). Education as a rural development strategy. Technical report.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in
social analysis, volume 241. Univ of California Press.
Giddens, A. (1986). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration, volume
349. Univ of California Press.
Gilens, M. (2005). Inequality and democratic responsiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly,
69(5):778–796.
Gilens, M. (2009). Preference gaps and inequality in representation. PS: Political Science &
Politics, 42(2):335–341.
Glaeser, E. L., Ponzetto, G. A., and Shleifer, A. (2007). Why does democracy need education?
Journal of economic growth, 12(2):77–99.
Gramlich, E. M. and Rubinfeld, D. L. (1982). Micro estimates of public spending demand
functions and tests of the tiebout and median-voter hypotheses. Journal of political Economy, 90(3):536–560.
Gregory, E. R. and Kaufman, D. (2010). Education and federalism: the role for the federal
government in education reform. Education.
Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., and Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does
ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? American Political Science Review,
101(4):709–725.
Hansen, J. M. (1991). Gaining access: Congress and the farm lobby, 1919-1981. University
of Chicago Press.
Hansen, J. M. (1998). Individuals, institutions, and public preferences over public finance.
American Political Science Review, 92(3):513–531.
Hanushek, E. A., Leung, C. K. Y., and Yilmaz, K. (2003). Redistribution through education
and other transfer mechanisms. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(8):1719–1750.
Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, USA.
Hasenfeld, Y. and Rafferty, J. A. (1989). The determinants of public attitudes toward the
welfare state. Social Forces, 67(4):1027–1048.

149

Heckman, J. and Carneiro, P. (2003). Human capital policy. Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations,
and states, volume 25. Harvard university press.
Hobbs, D. (1995). Capacity-building: Reexamining the role of the rural school. Investing in
people: The Human Capital Needs of Rural America, pages 259–84.
Hochschild, J. L. (1981). What’s fair?: American beliefs about distributive justice. Harvard
University Press.
Hussar, W. J. and Bailey, T. M. (2011). Projections of education statistics to 2020: Nces 2011026. Technical report, National Center for Education Statistics.
Imazeki, J. and Reschovsky, A. (2003). Financing adequate education in rural settings. Journal
of Education Finance, 29(2):137–156.
Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2001). An asset theory of social policy preferences. American
Political Science Review, 95(4):875–893.
Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2009). Distribution and redistribution: The shadow of the nineteenth century. World Politics, 61(3):438–486.
Jacoby, W. G. (2000). Issue framing and public opinion on government spending. American
Journal of Political Science, pages 750–767.
Jakobsen, T. G. (2009). Public versus private: the conditional effect of state policy and institutional trust on mass opinion. European sociological review, 26(3):307–318.
Jann, B. et al. (2008). The blinder-oaxaca decomposition for linear regression models. The
Stata Journal, 8(4):453–479.
Johnson, J., Showalter, D., Klein, R., and Lester, C. (2014). Why rural matters 2013-2014:
The condition of rural education in the 50 states. Rural School and Community Trust.
Johnson, K. M. (2013). Demographic trends in nonmetropolitan america: Implications for land
use development and conservation. Vt. J. Envtl. L., 15:31.
Jordan, T. S. and Jordan, K. F. (2004). Rural schools under scrutiny. Rural Educator, 26(1):1–
4.
Kemmis, D. (1990). Community and the Politics of Place. University of Oklahoma Press.
Kemmis, D. (1992). Community and the Politics of Place. University of Oklahoma Press.
Kena, G., Hussar, W., McFarland, J., de Brey, C., Musu-Gillette, L., Wang, X., Zhang, J.,
Rathbun, A., Wilkinson-Flicker, S., Diliberti, M., et al. (2016). The condition of education
2016. nces 2016-144. National Center for Education Statistics.
Kena, G., Musu-Gillette, L., Robinson, J., Wang, X., Rathbun, A., Zhang, J., WilkinsonFlicker, S., Barmer, A., and Velez, E. D. V. (2015). The condition of education 2015. nces
2015-144. National Center for Education Statistics.

150

Klor, E. and Shayo, M. (2010). Social identity and preferences over redistribution. Journal of
Public Economics, 94(3-4):269–278.
Klugman, J., Walters, P. B., Stuber, J. M., and Rosenbaum, M. S. (2011). Social status, values,
and support for reform in education. The Social Science Journal, 48(4):722–734.
Krueger, A. B. and Lindahl, M. (2001). Education for growth: Why and for whom? Journal
of economic literature, 39(4):1101–1136.
Kuminoff, N. V., Smith, V. K., and Timmins, C. (2013). The new economics of equilibrium sorting and policy evaluation using housing markets. Journal of Economic Literature,
51(4):1007–62.
Kusmin, L. (2016). Rural america at a glance 2015 edition. Technical report, United States
Department of Agriculture.
Lambert, D. M., Clark, C. D., Wilcox, M. D., and Park, W. M. (2009). Public education
financing trends and the gray peril hypothesis. Growth and Change, 40(4):619–648.
Lange, F. and Topel, R. (2006). The social value of education and human capital. Handbook
of the Economics of Education, 1:459–509.
Lewinsohn-Zamir, D. (1998). Consumer preferences, citizen peferences, and the provision of
public goods. The Yale Law Journal, 108(2):377–406.
Lobao, L. (2014). Economic change, structural forces, and rural america: Shifting fortunes
across communities. Rural America in a Globalizing World: Problems and Prospects for
the 2010s, edited by Conner Bailey, Leif Jensen, and Elizabeth Ransom. Morgantown: West
Virginia University Press, pages 543–55.
Lochner, L. and Moretti, E. (2004). The effect of education on crime: Evidence from prison
inmates, arrests, and self-reports. American economic review, 94(1):155–189.
Logan, J. R. and Burdick-Will, J. (2017). School segregation and disparities in urban, suburban,
and rural areas. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
674(1):199–216.
Lynch, J. and Myrskylä, M. (2009). Always the third rail? pension income and policy preferences in european democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 42(8):1068–1097.
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